Changes

*'''1 May.''' Carter Page publishes a paper for the Center for National Policy, entitled ''After Boston: Alternative Diplomacy and the Reconsideration of Unbridled U.S. Power'', critical of Obama administration and deep state foreign policy in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing.<ref>Paper for Center for National Policy ''After Boston: Alternative Diplomacy and the Reconsideration of Unbridled U.S. Power'', May 1, 2013.

*'''1 May.''' Carter Page publishes a paper for the Center for National Policy, entitled ''After Boston: Alternative Diplomacy and the Reconsideration of Unbridled U.S. Power'', critical of Obama administration and deep state foreign policy in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing.<ref>Paper for Center for National Policy ''After Boston: Alternative Diplomacy and the Reconsideration of Unbridled U.S. Power'', May 1, 2013.

In March 2003, the Century Foundation and the Stanley Foundation released a report entitled ''U.S. Foreign Policy and Chechnya''. Written by Michael McFaul who was then a Professor at Stanford University prior to taking positions in the Obama Administration, the report included a review of various factoids on this topic. But the most valuable contribution it offered was a window into the underlying source of age-old problems that have plagued the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship to this day. Some of these very same obstacles may have helped pave the way for the tragedy that occurred at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The report’s conclusions essentially highlight fundamental philosophies, objectives and dilemmas that have stood in the way of vital cooperation: “US policy regarding [[Chechnya]] exposes the limits of American power even in an age of unbridled US power. Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya were policies that US  

In March 2003, the Century Foundation and the Stanley Foundation released a report entitled ''U.S. Foreign Policy and Chechnya''. Written by Michael McFaul who was then a Professor at Stanford University prior to taking positions in the Obama Administration, the report included a review of various factoids on this topic. But the most valuable contribution it offered was a window into the underlying source of age-old problems that have plagued the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship to this day. Some of these very same obstacles may have helped pave the way for the tragedy that occurred at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013. The report’s conclusions essentially highlight fundamental philosophies, objectives and dilemmas that have stood in the way of vital cooperation: “US policy regarding [[Chechnya]] exposes the limits of American power even in an age of unbridled US power. Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya were policies that US  

[[foreign policy]] leaders would have liked to stop. In the end, however, policies pursued by both the Clinton and [[Bush administration]]s have had little impact on the course of the war in Chechnya.”<br>Reflecting persistent tendencies and aspirations toward unbridled US power, some of the options suggested in the article bordered on the truly draconian: “There were and are policy alternatives. Clinton and Bush could have sanctioned Russia by cutting off direct assistance to the Russian government. They could have suspended Russia from membership in the [[G-8]]. They could have postponed presidential summits. They could have offered more humanitarian assistance to the region. Even more dramatically, they could have offered their services as a mediator. Theoretically, Chechen and Russian officials could have met at Camp David in 1995 or 2001 to hammer out a political settlement. Hypothetically, they even could have recognized the legitimacy of the elected government of Chechnya and provided direct assistance to the government in exile.”<br>Although US foreign tactics and ambitions have varied by region, these approaches of sanctions, suspensions and meddling in internal affairs when not invited remain consistent with intrusive policies which have often afflicted America since the [[Cold War]].<br>In an epilogue written after a deadly Chechen [[terrorist]] attack and hostage seizure at the sold-out Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on October 23, 2002, McFaul added his bottom-line conclusion regarding certain cooperative approaches: “Most dramatically, Bush unambiguously framed his ‘[[war on terrorism]]’ and Putin’s ‘war in Chechnya’ as part of one common struggle. The real losers of this [{united front]] are the people of Chechnya.”<br>A debate has emerged whether the U.S. missed the chance to prevent the Boston bombing. Although evidence will materialize over time and despite the acknowledgement of U.S. government officials that a “trust deficit” may have negatively impacted the earlier investigations, the possibility of prevention might remain a controversy that can never be definitively solved. However, there is one certainty that cannot be called into question: a more cooperative U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship would clearly decrease the risks of such a potential event, both earlier this month and in the future. In this sense, the recent tragedy in [[Boston]] could offer a valuable wake-up call for the U.S. government.<br>Instead of putting in place excessive restrictions on Russian officials as seen in last year’s [[Magnitsky Act]] which was reminiscent of the blacklists of the [[McCarthyism|McCarthy era]], establishing policies that instead build links could help to address a range of critical [[globalism|global]] challenges. Yet while  

[[foreign policy]] leaders would have liked to stop. In the end, however, policies pursued by both the Clinton and [[Bush administration]]s have had little impact on the course of the war in Chechnya.”<br>Reflecting persistent tendencies and aspirations toward unbridled US power, some of the options suggested in the article bordered on the truly draconian: “There were and are policy alternatives. Clinton and Bush could have sanctioned Russia by cutting off direct assistance to the Russian government. They could have suspended Russia from membership in the [[G-8]]. They could have postponed presidential summits. They could have offered more humanitarian assistance to the region. Even more dramatically, they could have offered their services as a mediator. Theoretically, Chechen and Russian officials could have met at Camp David in 1995 or 2001 to hammer out a political settlement. Hypothetically, they even could have recognized the legitimacy of the elected government of Chechnya and provided direct assistance to the government in exile.”<br>Although US foreign tactics and ambitions have varied by region, these approaches of sanctions, suspensions and meddling in internal affairs when not invited remain consistent with intrusive policies which have often afflicted America since the [[Cold War]].<br>In an epilogue written after a deadly Chechen [[terrorist]] attack and hostage seizure at the sold-out Dubrovka Theater in Moscow on October 23, 2002, McFaul added his bottom-line conclusion regarding certain cooperative approaches: “Most dramatically, Bush unambiguously framed his ‘[[war on terrorism]]’ and Putin’s ‘war in Chechnya’ as part of one common struggle. The real losers of this [[united front]] are the people of Chechnya.”<br>A debate has emerged whether the U.S. missed the chance to prevent the Boston bombing. Although evidence will materialize over time and despite the acknowledgement of U.S. government officials that a “trust deficit” may have negatively impacted the earlier investigations, the possibility of prevention might remain a controversy that can never be definitively solved. However, there is one certainty that cannot be called into question: a more cooperative U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship would clearly decrease the risks of such a potential event, both earlier this month and in the future. In this sense, the recent tragedy in [[Boston]] could offer a valuable wake-up call for the U.S. government.<br>Instead of putting in place excessive restrictions on Russian officials as seen in last year’s [[Magnitsky Act]] which was reminiscent of the blacklists of the [[McCarthyism|McCarthy era]], establishing policies that instead build links could help to address a range of critical [[globalism|global]] challenges. Yet while  

Washington and its representatives sleep on the security front, other actors are taking matters into their own hand in other arenas.<br>'''Uncle Sam, please do no harm: Alternative forms of diplomacy in an era of gridlock'''<br>Last week, a subtle theme permeated the second annual New York Times Energy for Tomorrow Conference. While on one hand dysfunction in the U.S. federal government has instituted an era of gridlock, innovative initiatives across the [[private sector]] and at the state and municipal level of government have continued to drive forward monumental change in the energy sector. In the  

Washington and its representatives sleep on the security front, other actors are taking matters into their own hand in other arenas.<br>'''Uncle Sam, please do no harm: Alternative forms of diplomacy in an era of gridlock'''<br>Last week, a subtle theme permeated the second annual New York Times Energy for Tomorrow Conference. While on one hand dysfunction in the U.S. federal government has instituted an era of gridlock, innovative initiatives across the [[private sector]] and at the state and municipal level of government have continued to drive forward monumental change in the energy sector. In the  

wake of this structural evolution of governance, corporations and local communities have taken control of their own destiny through a diverse array of revolutionary technologies and investment programs.<br>In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, a similar example may be seen in the relationship of [[ExxonMobil]] and Rosneft – the largest oil companies in each of these respective countries.<br>Through a diverse portfolio of agreements and related ventures, the two leading companies have continued to move forward on projects in the United States, Russia and beyond. Under the leadership of Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s President and Management Board Chairman, the company has taken steps to build bridges and advance the interests of both companies.<br>At an investment conference organized by the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia last week, a former [[Australia]]n diplomat named Glenn Waller was the star of the show. As the President of ExxonMobil Russia, he offered telling comments regarding his company’s joint accomplishments with Rosneft: "I was happy to hear from Ambassador McFaul that it has been discussed at the highest level between presidents. We have very strong support from various levels of the Russian government."<br>Consistent with the conclusions of the recent New York Times conference, Waller’s quote did  

wake of this structural evolution of governance, corporations and local communities have taken control of their own destiny through a diverse array of revolutionary technologies and investment programs.<br>In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, a similar example may be seen in the relationship of [[ExxonMobil]] and Rosneft – the largest oil companies in each of these respective countries.<br>Through a diverse portfolio of agreements and related ventures, the two leading companies have continued to move forward on projects in the United States, Russia and beyond. Under the leadership of Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s President and Management Board Chairman, the company has taken steps to build bridges and advance the interests of both companies.<br>At an investment conference organized by the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia last week, a former [[Australia]]n diplomat named Glenn Waller was the star of the show. As the President of ExxonMobil Russia, he offered telling comments regarding his company’s joint accomplishments with Rosneft: "I was happy to hear from Ambassador McFaul that it has been discussed at the highest level between presidents. We have very strong support from various levels of the Russian government."<br>Consistent with the conclusions of the recent New York Times conference, Waller’s quote did