| | Following our decision in City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq. That statute, enacted under Congress’s Commerce and Spending Clause powers, imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715-716, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005). And, what is most relevant for present purposes, RLUIPA amended RFRA’s definition of the “exercise of religion.” See §2000bb-2(4) (importing RLUIPA definition). Before RLUIPA, RFRA’s definition made reference to the First Amendment. See §2000bb-2(4) (1994 ed.) (defining “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment”). In RLUIPA, in an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” §2000cc-5(7)(A). And Congress mandated that this concept “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” §2000cc-3(g).}} | | Following our decision in City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq. That statute, enacted under Congress’s Commerce and Spending Clause powers, imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715-716, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005). And, what is most relevant for present purposes, RLUIPA amended RFRA’s definition of the “exercise of religion.” See §2000bb-2(4) (importing RLUIPA definition). Before RLUIPA, RFRA’s definition made reference to the First Amendment. See §2000bb-2(4) (1994 ed.) (defining “exercise of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment”). In RLUIPA, in an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the “exercise of religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” §2000cc-5(7)(A). And Congress mandated that this concept “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” §2000cc-3(g).}} |
| − | ''Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores'', 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760-62 (2014). | + | ''[[Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores]]'', 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760-62 (2014). |
| | Notice that in ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' (1997), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] invalidated the RFRA to the extent it applied against the states. [[Congress]] reacted by passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. | | Notice that in ''[[City of Boerne v. Flores]]'' (1997), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] invalidated the RFRA to the extent it applied against the states. [[Congress]] reacted by passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. |
| | *''Sossamon v. Texas'', 563 U.S. 277 (holding that sovereign immunity protected Texas against damages to a state prison inmate based on prison policies concerning religious worship) | | *''Sossamon v. Texas'', 563 U.S. 277 (holding that sovereign immunity protected Texas against damages to a state prison inmate based on prison policies concerning religious worship) |