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→Aftermath
The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.
==Aftermath==
==Aftermath==
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous point in postwar history; neither side wanted to escalate the conflict, but both realized that it could get out of control, especially if local commanders made some mistakes. Kennedy demonstrated firmness in crisis, and avoided serious losses in the midterm elections. Ignoring the military chain of command, he established the pattern of command-post micromanagement over military matters that [[Lyndon Johnson]] after 1964 expanded during the Vietnam war. Kennedy's refusal to consult Congress enhanced the "imperial presidency."
The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous point in post-World War II history; neither side wanted to escalate the conflict, but both realized that it could get out of control, especially if local commanders made some mistakes. Kennedy demonstrated firmness in crisis, and avoided serious losses in the midterm elections. Ignoring the military chain of command, he established the pattern of command-post micromanagement over military matters that [[Lyndon Johnson]] after 1964 expanded during the Vietnam war. Kennedy's refusal to consult Congress enhanced the "imperial presidency."
Conservative Republicans, dissatisfied that Castro had escaped the noose, rallied behind Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] and editor [[William F. Buckley]]. They redirected the GOP to an aggressive [[rollback]] policy of the sort represented by the rejected invasion option.
Conservative Republicans, dissatisfied that Castro had escaped the noose, rallied behind Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] and editor [[William F. Buckley]]. They redirected the GOP to an aggressive [[rollback]] policy of the sort represented by the rejected invasion option.
The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906–82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.
The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906–82). Russia built its own submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.
The incident also contributed to the [[Sino-Soviet split]]. China and the Maoists reacted by viewing Khrushchev and the post-Stalinist leadership of the global Marxist revolution in the nuclear age as reckless. The communist monolith was broken over more than just how to implement Marxist theory. By 1964, China debveloped it's own nuclear bomb. But the Washington and the CIA was slow to recognize the Sino-Soviet split and continued to view the world-wide communist movement as being directed from Moscow for another decade.
Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.
Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.