*The fix was in by September 2015, a few weeks after the investigation began. DOJ prosecutors determined the outcome by a tortured reading of the [[Espionage Act of 1918]] (18 USC Sec. 793(f)). Intent is not required to prove culpability, yet DOJ prosecutors told the Inspector General (IG) that they interpreted the provision to require that the person accused must possess knowledge that the information is classified, and that the conduct must be so gross as to almost suggest deliberate intent. This misapplied standard would require a smoking gun text or email to prove intent, which was unlikely. | *The fix was in by September 2015, a few weeks after the investigation began. DOJ prosecutors determined the outcome by a tortured reading of the [[Espionage Act of 1918]] (18 USC Sec. 793(f)). Intent is not required to prove culpability, yet DOJ prosecutors told the Inspector General (IG) that they interpreted the provision to require that the person accused must possess knowledge that the information is classified, and that the conduct must be so gross as to almost suggest deliberate intent. This misapplied standard would require a smoking gun text or email to prove intent, which was unlikely. |