Changes

:b.  Between in or around April 2016 and June 2016, the Conspirators installed multiple versions of their X-Agent malware on at least ten DCCC computers, which allowed them to monitor individual employees’ computer activity, steal passwords, and maintain access to the DCCC network.

:b.  Between in or around April 2016 and June 2016, the Conspirators installed multiple versions of their X-Agent malware on at least ten DCCC computers, which allowed them to monitor individual employees’ computer activity, steal passwords, and maintain access to the DCCC network.

:c.  X-Agent malware implanted on the DCCC network transmitted information from the victims’ computers to a GRU- leased server located in Arizona.  The Conspirators referred to this server as their “AMS ” panel.  KOZACHEK, MALYSHEV, and their co-conspirators logged into the AMS panel to use X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions in the course of monitoring and surveilling activity on the DCCC computers.  The keylog function allowed the Conspirators to capture keystrokes entered by DCCC employees.  The screenshot function allowed the Conspirators to take pictures of the DCCC employees’ computer screens.

:c.  X-Agent malware implanted on the DCCC network transmitted information from the victims’ computers to a GRU- leased server located in [[Arizona]].  The Conspirators referred to this server as their “AMS ” panel.  KOZACHEK, MALYSHEV, and their co-conspirators logged into the AMS panel to use X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions in the course of monitoring and surveilling activity on the DCCC computers.  The keylog function allowed the Conspirators to capture keystrokes entered by DCCC employees.  The screenshot function allowed the Conspirators to take pictures of the DCCC employees’ computer screens.

:d.  For example, on or about April 14, 2016, the Conspirators repeatedly activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to surveil DCCC Employee 1’s computer activity over the course of eight hours.  During that time, the Conspirators captured DCCC Employee 1’s communications with co-workers and the passwords she entered while working on [[fundraising]] and voter outreach projects.  Similarly, on or about April 22, 2016, the Conspirators activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to capture the discussions of another DCCC Employee (“DCCC Employee 2”) about the DCCC’s [[finance]]s, as well as her individual [[banking]] information and other personal topics.<ref>Obviously DCCC Employee 2 co-mingled DCCC’s [[finance]]s with her individual [[banking]] information.</ref>

:d.  For example, on or about April 14, 2016, the Conspirators repeatedly activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to surveil DCCC Employee 1’s computer activity over the course of eight hours.  During that time, the Conspirators captured DCCC Employee 1’s communications with co-workers and the passwords she entered while working on [[fundraising]] and voter outreach projects.  Similarly, on or about April 22, 2016, the Conspirators activated X-Agent’s keylog and screenshot functions to capture the discussions of another DCCC Employee (“DCCC Employee 2”) about the DCCC’s [[finance]]s, as well as her individual [[banking]] information and other personal topics.<ref>Obviously DCCC Employee 2 co-mingled DCCC’s [[finance]]s with her individual [[banking]] information.</ref>