Changes

In April 1917 the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corps comprised 65 very junior officers and 1,120 enlisted men. with 200 obsolete airplanes at two airfields. The Navy had 39 pilots and 54 planes—and no aircraft carriers. The impetus for expansion came from the French, who proposed an American air arm of 4,500 aircraft for the 1918 campaign, with 2,000 replacements a month. With a tangible goal in hand that was well-suited to the American taste for technology and adventure, the Congress appropriated the vast sum of $640 million.<ref>British statistics suggest that planes lasted six months. Pilots lasted 10 to 16 weeks before they were shot down or lost their touch and were grounded. Lee Kennett, ''First Air War'' (1999), pp 94, 167</ref>  

In April 1917 the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corps comprised 65 very junior officers and 1,120 enlisted men. with 200 obsolete airplanes at two airfields. The Navy had 39 pilots and 54 planes—and no aircraft carriers. The impetus for expansion came from the French, who proposed an American air arm of 4,500 aircraft for the 1918 campaign, with 2,000 replacements a month. With a tangible goal in hand that was well-suited to the American taste for technology and adventure, the Congress appropriated the vast sum of $640 million.<ref>British statistics suggest that planes lasted six months. Pilots lasted 10 to 16 weeks before they were shot down or lost their touch and were grounded. Lee Kennett, ''First Air War'' (1999), pp 94, 167</ref>  

The French had wanted American bombers, but neglected to make that point clear. Washington, still groping in the dark for an air doctrine, adopted the Signal Corps emphasis on information gathering by setting the ratio of three reconnaissance planes to every five fighters and one bomber. (The fighters were to protect the unarmed reconnaissance planes from German fighters.) Having observed the French closely, Major [[Billy Mitchell|William "Billy" Mitchell]] recommended a separate force of bombers and escorts to hit "strategic" targets far behind the tactical lines, rather like a cavalry raid. Mitchell further stressed what became the cardinal doctrine of air power: "A decision in the air must be sought and obtained before a decision on the ground can be reached."<ref>David E. Johnson, [http://books.google.com/books?id=kKevvLmIjDcC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=%22obtained+before+a+decision+on+the+ground+%22&source=web&ots=EERvbnmKlm&sig=61h9DdaLOH_NTtRdZ0Fz_rjohL4&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result ''Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945'' (2003) online p 46]</ref>

The French had wanted American bombers, but neglected to make that point clear. Washington, still groping in the dark for an air doctrine, adopted the Signal Corps emphasis on information gathering by setting the ratio of three reconnaissance planes to every five fighters and one bomber. (The fighters were to protect the unarmed reconnaissance planes from German fighters.) Having observed the French closely, Major [[Billy Mitchell|William "Billy" Mitchell]] recommended a separate force of bombers and escorts to hit "strategic" targets far behind the tactical lines, rather like a cavalry raid. Mitchell further stressed what became the cardinal doctrine of air power: "A decision in the air must be sought and obtained before a decision on the ground can be reached."<ref>David E. Johnson, [https://books.google.com/books?id=kKevvLmIjDcC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=%22obtained+before+a+decision+on+the+ground+%22&source=web&ots=EERvbnmKlm&sig=61h9DdaLOH_NTtRdZ0Fz_rjohL4&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result ''Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945'' (2003) online p 46]</ref>

By October, 1917, Washington had adopted Mitchell's proposals: strategic bombing had become part of America's war- fighting doctrine.<ref>A few days before the Armistice, Secretary of War Baker warned against "promiscuous bombing upon industry, commerce or population." It is not clear whether he would have allowed strategic bombing if the war had gone on another year. In 1941 Roosevelt endorsed--even demanded--strategic bombing. Hurley, ''Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power'' (1975) p 37</ref> The British were moving even faster in the same direction, as they set up an independent Air Ministry. It began building four-engine Handley- Page "superbombers" capable of flying at 14,000 feet (at 97 miles per hour) carrying 7,500 pounds of high explosives to Berlin. Aircraft production in the States fell far behind schedule. The Liberty engine, a powerful 12 cylinder, liquid-cooled, 400 horsepower, 860 pound motor was designed in only six days in May 1917, but it took Detroit over a year to figure out how to build it assembly-line style like the Model T. (It cost $7,000; the Model T was $400.)<ref>Kennett, ''First Air War'' 95 101</ref>  

By October, 1917, Washington had adopted Mitchell's proposals: strategic bombing had become part of America's war- fighting doctrine.<ref>A few days before the Armistice, Secretary of War Baker warned against "promiscuous bombing upon industry, commerce or population." It is not clear whether he would have allowed strategic bombing if the war had gone on another year. In 1941 Roosevelt endorsed--even demanded--strategic bombing. Hurley, ''Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power'' (1975) p 37</ref> The British were moving even faster in the same direction, as they set up an independent Air Ministry. It began building four-engine Handley- Page "superbombers" capable of flying at 14,000 feet (at 97 miles per hour) carrying 7,500 pounds of high explosives to Berlin. Aircraft production in the States fell far behind schedule. The Liberty engine, a powerful 12 cylinder, liquid-cooled, 400 horsepower, 860 pound motor was designed in only six days in May 1917, but it took Detroit over a year to figure out how to build it assembly-line style like the Model T. (It cost $7,000; the Model T was $400.)<ref>Kennett, ''First Air War'' 95 101</ref>  

:since the other fellows were not showing yellow and I stuck with the bunch. It was that very thing that kept us together. All of us were afraid in a sort of way, in that we didn't know what to expect. But in order to keep our personal reputation up...we were more afraid to go to the rear than to the Front.<ref>Quoted in Schaffer, ''America in the Great War,'' pp.  159, 192</ref>  

:since the other fellows were not showing yellow and I stuck with the bunch. It was that very thing that kept us together. All of us were afraid in a sort of way, in that we didn't know what to expect. But in order to keep our personal reputation up...we were more afraid to go to the rear than to the Front.<ref>Quoted in Schaffer, ''America in the Great War,'' pp.  159, 192</ref>  

The Americans fired artillery only a third as often as did the British, French or Germans. The problems included a doctrine that emphasized fast infantry movement rather than heavy firepower, a poor system to communicate between artillery and infantry commands, and an overall lack of experience to know when to use what. Too often the shells fell short and landed inside American positions, creating what later would be called "friendly fire" casualties. Routinely, when the infantry did advance the artillery was slow moving forward. The volunteers in the Tank Corps were convinced they would clinch victory with their new weapon. Eisenhower recalled how his "men dreamed of overwhelming assault on enemy lines, rolling effortlessly over wire entanglements and trenches, demolishing gun nests with their fire, and terrorizing the foe into quick and abject surrender."<ref>Evan Andrew Huelfer,  [http://books.google.com/books?id=hFsMWZsXvBsC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22rolling+effortlessly+over+wire+entanglements+%22&source=web&ots=0UU9rYL1xt&sig=kznx96DgunMjaFuxkBodiP8GBoM&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result ''The "Casualty Issue" in American Military Practice: The Impact of World War I'' (2003) p. 126 online]</ref>  

The Americans fired artillery only a third as often as did the British, French or Germans. The problems included a doctrine that emphasized fast infantry movement rather than heavy firepower, a poor system to communicate between artillery and infantry commands, and an overall lack of experience to know when to use what. Too often the shells fell short and landed inside American positions, creating what later would be called "friendly fire" casualties. Routinely, when the infantry did advance the artillery was slow moving forward. The volunteers in the Tank Corps were convinced they would clinch victory with their new weapon. Eisenhower recalled how his "men dreamed of overwhelming assault on enemy lines, rolling effortlessly over wire entanglements and trenches, demolishing gun nests with their fire, and terrorizing the foe into quick and abject surrender."<ref>Evan Andrew Huelfer,  [https://books.google.com/books?id=hFsMWZsXvBsC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22rolling+effortlessly+over+wire+entanglements+%22&source=web&ots=0UU9rYL1xt&sig=kznx96DgunMjaFuxkBodiP8GBoM&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result ''The "Casualty Issue" in American Military Practice: The Impact of World War I'' (2003) p. 126 online]</ref>  

In actual combat, the Americans used too few tanks, for Pershing saw them as mere auxiliaries to the riflemen. The AEF ignored Patton's vision of armor as powerful strike weapons in its own right, with follow-on infantry in the supporting role. The AEF doctrine was: "Tanks in common with all other auxiliary arms are but a means of aiding infantry, on whom the fate of battle ever rests, to drive their bayonets into the bellies of the enemy."<ref>Carlo D'Este, [http://books.google.com/books?id=cz-hBWYOTnEC&pg=PA215&dq=Tanks+in+common+with+all+other+auxiliary+arms&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=ocZaSO7SCafSigGL3fmDDA&sig=oR6_GNptYzCLlCDwjJAotE2Z-SA ''Patton: A Genius for War'' (1996) p. 215 online]</ref> Infantry units had never trained with tanks, and failed to follow closely in order to mop up enemy machine guns. Even a handful of the little Renaults, provided their treads did not pop off or the whole vehicle vanish in the mud, could be highly effective. As a German staff report drily noted, "The [American] tanks which have broken through then employ machine guns with which they attack our infantry from the rear, which has a negative effect on morale."<ref>Robert Cutler Walton, ed. ''Over There: European Reaction to Americans in World War I'' (1972) p. 198</ref>

In actual combat, the Americans used too few tanks, for Pershing saw them as mere auxiliaries to the riflemen. The AEF ignored Patton's vision of armor as powerful strike weapons in its own right, with follow-on infantry in the supporting role. The AEF doctrine was: "Tanks in common with all other auxiliary arms are but a means of aiding infantry, on whom the fate of battle ever rests, to drive their bayonets into the bellies of the enemy."<ref>Carlo D'Este, [https://books.google.com/books?id=cz-hBWYOTnEC&pg=PA215&dq=Tanks+in+common+with+all+other+auxiliary+arms&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=ocZaSO7SCafSigGL3fmDDA&sig=oR6_GNptYzCLlCDwjJAotE2Z-SA ''Patton: A Genius for War'' (1996) p. 215 online]</ref> Infantry units had never trained with tanks, and failed to follow closely in order to mop up enemy machine guns. Even a handful of the little Renaults, provided their treads did not pop off or the whole vehicle vanish in the mud, could be highly effective. As a German staff report drily noted, "The [American] tanks which have broken through then employ machine guns with which they attack our infantry from the rear, which has a negative effect on morale."<ref>Robert Cutler Walton, ed. ''Over There: European Reaction to Americans in World War I'' (1972) p. 198</ref>

===Officers===

===Officers===

How good were the American officers? Pershing's primary goal of building a distinctly American force meant that inexperienced US regulars were in charge. Some had spent four or five days observing British and French battlefield operations. The US perhaps should have sent many officers to the front months earlier and attached them to Allied units. Pershing, however, vetoed any notion of letting foreigners control Americans. He was livid when he discovered that 1,000 Americans assigned for training purposes to the British army had been used in combat in July. Not just the-90-day wonders but also the regulars had zero large scale battle experience—no one had organized anything more complex than the frustrating pursuit of Pancho Villa's raiders in the Mexican mountains, or tracking down rebellious Filipinos.<ref>. Furthermore the officers did not realize their ignorance. "Anyone who lived through the fighting in the Philippines could live through anything," boasted Benjamin Foulois, who later commanded the AEF Air Service in France, Coffman ''The War to End All Wars,'' p. 19</ref>  

How good were the American officers? Pershing's primary goal of building a distinctly American force meant that inexperienced US regulars were in charge. Some had spent four or five days observing British and French battlefield operations. The US perhaps should have sent many officers to the front months earlier and attached them to Allied units. Pershing, however, vetoed any notion of letting foreigners control Americans. He was livid when he discovered that 1,000 Americans assigned for training purposes to the British army had been used in combat in July. Not just the-90-day wonders but also the regulars had zero large scale battle experience—no one had organized anything more complex than the frustrating pursuit of Pancho Villa's raiders in the Mexican mountains, or tracking down rebellious Filipinos.<ref>. Furthermore the officers did not realize their ignorance. "Anyone who lived through the fighting in the Philippines could live through anything," boasted Benjamin Foulois, who later commanded the AEF Air Service in France, Coffman ''The War to End All Wars,'' p. 19</ref>  

* Ayres, Leonard P. ''The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary'' (1919); [http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/docs/statistics/statstc.htm online edition]

* Ayres, Leonard P. ''The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary'' (1919); [http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/memoir/docs/statistics/statstc.htm online edition]

*  Barbeau, Arthur E.,  and Florette Henri. ''The Unknown Soldier: Black American Troops in World War I'' (1974).

*  Barbeau, Arthur E.,  and Florette Henri. ''The Unknown Soldier: Black American Troops in World War I'' (1974).

* Bassett, John Spencer. ''Our War with Germany: A History'' (1919) [http://books.google.com/books?id=76UTAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=intitle:war+date:1919-1921&num=30&as_brr=1&sig=4Vx3GGygya6F24ozaNJyLzMI694#PPP10,M1 online edition]

* Bassett, John Spencer. ''Our War with Germany: A History'' (1919) [https://books.google.com/books?id=76UTAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=intitle:war+date:1919-1921&num=30&as_brr=1&sig=4Vx3GGygya6F24ozaNJyLzMI694#PPP10,M1 online edition]

* Chambers, John W., II. ''To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America'' (1987)

* Chambers, John W., II. ''To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America'' (1987)

* Clark,  George B. ''The Second Infantry Division in World War I: A History of the American Expeditionary Force Regulars, 1917-1919'' (2007)

* Clark,  George B. ''The Second Infantry Division in World War I: A History of the American Expeditionary Force Regulars, 1917-1919'' (2007)

* Coffman, Edward M. ''The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I'' (1998). the standard history [http://books.google.com/books?id=px_1JGtbeIAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=COFFMAN+The+War+to+End+All+Wars:&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=0RdYSJKmKJyMjAG04JWFDA&sig=s-w6Np6drA_a-MzUxR0UnsQcORc excerpt and text search]

* Coffman, Edward M. ''The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I'' (1998). the standard history [https://books.google.com/books?id=px_1JGtbeIAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=COFFMAN+The+War+to+End+All+Wars:&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=0RdYSJKmKJyMjAG04JWFDA&sig=s-w6Np6drA_a-MzUxR0UnsQcORc excerpt and text search]

* Cooke, James J. ''The U.S. Air Service In the Great War: 1917-1919'' (1996). 272 pgs.

* Cooke, James J. ''The U.S. Air Service In the Great War: 1917-1919'' (1996). 272 pgs.

* Cooke, James J. ''Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF'' (1997) [http://www.amazon.com/Pershing-His-Generals-Command-Staff/dp/0275953637/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213740260&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/113160319?title=Pershing%20and%20His%20Generals%3a%20%20Command%20and%20Staff%20in%20the%20AEF online edition]

* Cooke, James J. ''Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF'' (1997) [http://www.amazon.com/Pershing-His-Generals-Command-Staff/dp/0275953637/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213740260&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/113160319?title=Pershing%20and%20His%20Generals%3a%20%20Command%20and%20Staff%20in%20the%20AEF online edition]

* Odom, William O. ''After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939'' (1999) [http://www.questia.com/read/9498237?title=After%20the%20Trenches%3a%20The%20Transformation%20of%20U.S.%20Army%20Doctrine%2c%201918-1939 online edition]

* Odom, William O. ''After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939'' (1999) [http://www.questia.com/read/9498237?title=After%20the%20Trenches%3a%20The%20Transformation%20of%20U.S.%20Army%20Doctrine%2c%201918-1939 online edition]

* Rainey, James W "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I" ''Parameters'' 13 (September 1983): 34-46. influential article

* Rainey, James W "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I" ''Parameters'' 13 (September 1983): 34-46. influential article

* Skilman,  Willis Rowland. ''The A.E.F.: Who They Were, what They Did, how They Did it'' (1920) 231 pp; [http://books.google.com/books?id=U9NCAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:aef&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=uzFYSOv7D4egiwGT_JClCQ full text online]

* Skilman,  Willis Rowland. ''The A.E.F.: Who They Were, what They Did, how They Did it'' (1920) 231 pp; [https://books.google.com/books?id=U9NCAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:aef&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=uzFYSOv7D4egiwGT_JClCQ full text online]

* Smith, Gene. '' Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies John J. Pershing'' (1999), popular biography. [http://www.amazon.com/Until-Last-Trumpet-Sounds-Pershing/dp/0471350648/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213740105&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Smith, Gene. '' Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies John J. Pershing'' (1999), popular biography. [http://www.amazon.com/Until-Last-Trumpet-Sounds-Pershing/dp/0471350648/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213740105&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Smythe, Donald. ''Pershing General of the Armies'' (1980), standard biography

* Smythe, Donald. ''Pershing General of the Armies'' (1980), standard biography

* Snell, Mark A. ''Unknown Soldiers: The American Expeditionary Forces in Memory and Remembrance'' (2008)  

* Snell, Mark A. ''Unknown Soldiers: The American Expeditionary Forces in Memory and Remembrance'' (2008)  

* Thomas, Shipley. '' The History of the A. E. F.'' (1920), 540pp; [http://books.google.com/books?id=EMoLAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:aef&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=uzFYSOv7D4egiwGT_JClCQ full text online]

* Thomas, Shipley. '' The History of the A. E. F.'' (1920), 540pp; [https://books.google.com/books?id=EMoLAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:aef&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=uzFYSOv7D4egiwGT_JClCQ full text online]

* Trask, David. ''The AEF and Coalition Warmaking: 1917-18'' (1993), influential study of relations with Britain and France; highly critical of Pershing; [http://www.amazon.com/Coalition-Warmaking-1917-1918-Modern-Studies/dp/0700611150/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213746012&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Trask, David. ''The AEF and Coalition Warmaking: 1917-18'' (1993), influential study of relations with Britain and France; highly critical of Pershing; [http://www.amazon.com/Coalition-Warmaking-1917-1918-Modern-Studies/dp/0700611150/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213746012&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Vandiver, Frank E. '' Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing'' (2 vol. 1977), standard biography

* Vandiver, Frank E. '' Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing'' (2 vol. 1977), standard biography

* Marshall, George C. ''Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918'' (1976).  

* Marshall, George C. ''Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918'' (1976).  

* Pershing, John J. ''My Experiences in the World War'' (2 vol 1931)

* Pershing, John J. ''My Experiences in the World War'' (2 vol 1931)

* Pershing, John J. '' Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.'' (1919) [http://books.google.com/books?id=-ncMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=NTBYSMiaHpPgiQHnnrCIDA full text online]

* Pershing, John J. '' Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.'' (1919) [https://books.google.com/books?id=-ncMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=NTBYSMiaHpPgiQHnnrCIDA full text online]

* U.S. Army, 82nd Division. ''Official History of 82nd Division American Expeditionary Forces'' (1919) 310 pp. [http://books.google.com/books?id=6c0MAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=NTBYSMiaHpPgiQHnnrCIDA full text online]

* U.S. Army, 82nd Division. ''Official History of 82nd Division American Expeditionary Forces'' (1919) 310 pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=6c0MAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=NTBYSMiaHpPgiQHnnrCIDA full text online]

*  U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers. '' Historical Report of the Chief Engineer'' (1919) 437 pp; [http://books.google.com/books?id=QhpLAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=-zBYSPHDJIjaigGe1rGLDA full text online]

*  U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers. '' Historical Report of the Chief Engineer'' (1919) 437 pp; [https://books.google.com/books?id=QhpLAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:American+intitle:Expeditionary+intitle:Forces&lr=&num=30&as_brr=3&ei=-zBYSPHDJIjaigGe1rGLDA full text online]

* Walton, Robert Cutler, ed. ''Over There: European Reaction to Americans in World War I'' (1972)

* Walton, Robert Cutler, ed. ''Over There: European Reaction to Americans in World War I'' (1972)