| − | Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control. [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref>James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions—including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]] | + | Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control. [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref>James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions—including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. [[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]] |
| − | * Blight, James G. and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=FPjXXuaLA-kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:Intelligence+intitle:and+intitle:the+intitle:Cuban+intitle:Missile+intitle:Crisis&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&sig=E4shr9za-71dC52dtmCPy6S2IzE excerpt and text search] | + | * Blight, James G. and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=FPjXXuaLA-kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:Intelligence+intitle:and+intitle:the+intitle:Cuban+intitle:Missile+intitle:Crisis&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&sig=E4shr9za-71dC52dtmCPy6S2IzE excerpt and text search] |
| | * Byrne, Paul J. ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink of War'' (Snapshots in History series) (2006) [[File:Dobbs-Cuba.jpg|thumb|240px]] | | * Byrne, Paul J. ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink of War'' (Snapshots in History series) (2006) [[File:Dobbs-Cuba.jpg|thumb|240px]] |
| | * Coleman, David G. "The Missiles of November, December, January, February . . .: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 9.3 (2007) 5-48 in Project Muse, examines developments after Oct. 1962, esp. regarding domestic politics | | * Coleman, David G. "The Missiles of November, December, January, February . . .: The Problem of Acceptable Risk in the Cuban Missile Crisis Settlement," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 9.3 (2007) 5-48 in Project Muse, examines developments after Oct. 1962, esp. regarding domestic politics |