Changes

|pages=68

|pages=68

|isbn=978-0-89051-597-6

|isbn=978-0-89051-597-6

|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=gvyHquVubDoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hedtke+The+secrets+of+the+sixth+edition&source=bl&ots=VQBk7unu95&sig=3-pYZsIj2vzBHgcIbYEpexlVc9s&hl=en&sa=X&ei=FsOGUO2kCIKJ4gS-tYCoBg&redir_esc=y}}</ref>

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gvyHquVubDoC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Hedtke+The+secrets+of+the+sixth+edition&source=bl&ots=VQBk7unu95&sig=3-pYZsIj2vzBHgcIbYEpexlVc9s&hl=en&sa=X&ei=FsOGUO2kCIKJ4gS-tYCoBg&redir_esc=y}}</ref>

==Notable examples==

==Notable examples==

*The late world famous philosopher [[Antony Flew]] claimed that his departure from [[atheism]] was caused by consequent adherence to this principle.<ref name="Flew">{{Cite book|title=There is a God, How the world's most notorious atheist changed his mind|author=Antony Flew|publisher=HarperOne|year=2008|isbn=978-0-06-133530-3|pages=22, 42, 75, 89|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=zbL66ePcjpQC&dq=Antony+Flew+There+is+a+God&source=bl&ots=o0jEX-bGMl&sig=Rrf5Tv5MynLGVHFOhZy95LFfLGw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Zfx_UI7sNLDY4QSLi4HAAQ&redir_esc=y|quote=he was obeying the the command that the Plato in the Republic attributes to Socrates: "We must follow the argument wherever it leads." ...This Socratic principle also formed the inspiration of Socratic Club, a group that was really at the center of what intellectual life there was in wartime Oxford. ...C.S. Lewis's Socratic Club was open for business during the heyday of the new philosophy, and the Socratic principle I saw exemplified there...This statement represents a major change of course for me, but it was nevertheless consistent with principle I have embraced since the beginning of my philosophical life - of following the argument no matter where it leads...When I finally came to recognize the existence of a God, it was not a paradigm shift, because my paradigm remains, as Plato in his Republic scripted his Socrates to insist: "We must follow the argument wherever it leads."}}</ref>  

*The late world famous philosopher [[Antony Flew]] claimed that his departure from [[atheism]] was caused by consequent adherence to this principle.<ref name="Flew">{{Cite book|title=There is a God, How the world's most notorious atheist changed his mind|author=Antony Flew|publisher=HarperOne|year=2008|isbn=978-0-06-133530-3|pages=22, 42, 75, 89|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zbL66ePcjpQC&dq=Antony+Flew+There+is+a+God&source=bl&ots=o0jEX-bGMl&sig=Rrf5Tv5MynLGVHFOhZy95LFfLGw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Zfx_UI7sNLDY4QSLi4HAAQ&redir_esc=y|quote=he was obeying the the command that the Plato in the Republic attributes to Socrates: "We must follow the argument wherever it leads." ...This Socratic principle also formed the inspiration of Socratic Club, a group that was really at the center of what intellectual life there was in wartime Oxford. ...C.S. Lewis's Socratic Club was open for business during the heyday of the new philosophy, and the Socratic principle I saw exemplified there...This statement represents a major change of course for me, but it was nevertheless consistent with principle I have embraced since the beginning of my philosophical life - of following the argument no matter where it leads...When I finally came to recognize the existence of a God, it was not a paradigm shift, because my paradigm remains, as Plato in his Republic scripted his Socrates to insist: "We must follow the argument wherever it leads."}}</ref>  

*''"I think the [[Intelligent design|design]] is back on the table, we can’t explain [[Irreducible complexity|these systems]] by [[Natural Law|natural law]]. And if we’re searching for truth, and they are in fact designed if we have to be design engineers to understand [[Flagellum|them]], then I say what’s the problem? You go where the data lead you. And the implications? Yeah, they have profound [[metaphysical]] implications, but so be it."'' Scott Minnich, Molecular biologist University of Idaho<ref>{{cite web

*''"I think the [[Intelligent design|design]] is back on the table, we can’t explain [[Irreducible complexity|these systems]] by [[Natural Law|natural law]]. And if we’re searching for truth, and they are in fact designed if we have to be design engineers to understand [[Flagellum|them]], then I say what’s the problem? You go where the data lead you. And the implications? Yeah, they have profound [[metaphysical]] implications, but so be it."'' Scott Minnich, Molecular biologist University of Idaho<ref>{{cite web

  | people      = Lad Allen (Director), Timothy Eaton  

  | people      = Lad Allen (Director), Timothy Eaton  

|title=The Flow of Wet Water, The Feynman Lectures on Physics

|title=The Flow of Wet Water, The Feynman Lectures on Physics

|chapter=41

|chapter=41

|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=uaQfAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Flow+of+Wet+Water,+The+Feynman+Lectures+on+Physics&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DRT1UuGABOf8ywOT-4KACQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=frogs&f=false}}</ref>

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uaQfAQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Flow+of+Wet+Water,+The+Feynman+Lectures+on+Physics&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DRT1UuGABOf8ywOT-4KACQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=frogs&f=false}}</ref>

*[[Edwin Hubble]] was criticised by [[John Hartnett]] for being biased<ref name="Hubble Bubble">{{cite book |title=Hubble Bubble: Big Bang in Trouble|author=John Hartnett|publisher=Creation Book Publishers|year=2010|pages=|format=DVD|url=http://www.amazon.com/Hubble-Bubble-Big-Bang-Trouble/dp/0949906387|quote=}}</ref> (thus effectively violating the Socratic principle) in his following type of statements in the paper ''The Observational Approach To Cosmology''<ref name="Observational Approach">{{cite web

*[[Edwin Hubble]] was criticised by [[John Hartnett]] for being biased<ref name="Hubble Bubble">{{cite book |title=Hubble Bubble: Big Bang in Trouble|author=John Hartnett|publisher=Creation Book Publishers|year=2010|pages=|format=DVD|url=http://www.amazon.com/Hubble-Bubble-Big-Bang-Trouble/dp/0949906387|quote=}}</ref> (thus effectively violating the Socratic principle) in his following type of statements in the paper ''The Observational Approach To Cosmology''<ref name="Observational Approach">{{cite web

|title=The Observational Approach to Cosmology

|title=The Observational Approach to Cosmology

**''"...'''There must be no favoured location in the universe, no centre, no boundary; all must see the universe alike'''. And, '''in order to ensure this situation, the cosmologist, postulates''' spatial isotropy and spatial homogeneity, which is his way of stating that the universe must be pretty much alike everywhere and in all directions. The kinds of universes that would be compatible with the relativity principle and the '''assumption of homogeneity''' have been determined by intricate mathematical reasoning."''

**''"...'''There must be no favoured location in the universe, no centre, no boundary; all must see the universe alike'''. And, '''in order to ensure this situation, the cosmologist, postulates''' spatial isotropy and spatial homogeneity, which is his way of stating that the universe must be pretty much alike everywhere and in all directions. The kinds of universes that would be compatible with the relativity principle and the '''assumption of homogeneity''' have been determined by intricate mathematical reasoning."''

**''...Thus the density of the nebular distribution increases outwards, symmetrically in all directions, leaving the observer in a unique position. '''Such a favoured position, of course, is intolerable'''; moreover, it represents '''a discrepancy with the theory''', because the theory postulates homogeneity. Therefore, in order to restore homogeneity, and to escape '''the [[horror of a unique position]]'''{{#tag:ref|Similar embarrassment known from history of science, or philosophy, respectively, and related to [[vacuum]], was articulated by the famous expression ''"[[horror vacui]]."''|group=note}}, the departures from uniformity, which are introduced by the recession factors, must be compensated by the second term representing effects of spatial curvature.''

**''...Thus the density of the nebular distribution increases outwards, symmetrically in all directions, leaving the observer in a unique position. '''Such a favoured position, of course, is intolerable'''; moreover, it represents '''a discrepancy with the theory''', because the theory postulates homogeneity. Therefore, in order to restore homogeneity, and to escape '''the [[horror of a unique position]]'''{{#tag:ref|Similar embarrassment known from history of science, or philosophy, respectively, and related to [[vacuum]], was articulated by the famous expression ''"[[horror vacui]]."''|group=note}}, the departures from uniformity, which are introduced by the recession factors, must be compensated by the second term representing effects of spatial curvature.''

Although not explicitly mentioning the Socratic principle, [[Richard Feynman]] effectually comments that the reluctance to adopt it and an effort to replace it with [[prejudice]] in case of a so called unique position of [[Earth]] in the [[universe]] stems barely from [[embarrassment]] and not [[exact sciences|scientific rigor]] (emphasis added): ''"I suspect that '''the assumption of uniformity''' of the universe reflects a [[prejudice]] born of a sequence of overthrows of [[geocentric]] ideas...It would be embarrassing to find, after stating that we live in an ordinary [[planet]] about an ordinary [[star]] in an ordinary [[galaxy]], that our place in the universe is extraordinary{{#tag:ref|cf. ''"Most advocates do not defend their theses out of conviction that they are true, but rather because they once declared them to be true."'' (Georg Christoph Lichtenberg)<ref>{{cite book |title=Lexikon der populären Irrtümer: 500 kapitale Mißverständnisse, Vorurteile und Denkfehler von Abendrot bis Zeppelin Piper|author=Walter Krämer, Götz Trenkler|publisher=Piper Verlag GmbH |year=1998|page=258|isbn= 9783492224468 |url=http://www.amazon.de/Lexikon-popul%C3%A4ren-Irrt%C3%BCmer-Walter-Kr%C3%A4mer/dp/3492224466/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1370885779&sr=8-1&keywords=Walter+Kr%C3%A4mer+Lexikon+der+popul%C3%A4ren+Irrt%C3%BCmer|language=German}}</ref>|group=note}}...to avoid embarrassment we cling to the hypothesis of uniformity"''.<ref name="Feynman">{{cite book |title=Feynman Lectures on Gravitation |author=Richard Phillips Feynman et al. |publisher=Westview Press |year=2002 |page=166 |isbn=978-0813-340388 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=jL9reHGIcMgC&dq=Feynman+lectures+on+gravitation&source=bl&ots=_nuGcNOn2_&sig=VyTgUmNcfeCOiwisdwoTEgKK9og&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gaYyUMHwIcfP4QTm5YD4Ag&redir_esc=y}}</ref> Slovak mathematician Adam Roman maintains that scientists should base their research on starting point where except verifiable [[fact]]s no biased ''[[a priori]]'' assumptions are made. Furthermore, scientists should bear the [[burden of proof]] in any case of [[reductionism|reducing]] the set of [[explanation in science|explanatory]] possibilities. Narrowing down options requires [[Scientific evidence|proof]] from one who argues that this narrowing (such as ''"the theory postulates homogeneity"''; ''a favoured position...is intolerable''; ''"we cling to the hypothesis of uniformity"'') should take place.<ref>{{cite web |title=Kto má pravdu dokazovať? (Who should bear the burden of proof)|author=Adam Roman|date=November 1, 2001|accessdate=June 7, 2013|url=http://adam.humanisti.sk/?p=31|language=Slovak|quote=Ľudia pravdu iba zisťujú a dokazujú (ak sa im to darí). Isteže, pri objavení neočakávanej pravdy je bremeno dôkazu na nich: keď donedávna ani len nevedeli, čo je pravda, a teraz to zistili, s radosťou to oznámia celému svetu. Vedci k objavenej pravde radi pripoja aj dôkaz, aby im druhí rozumeli (a uverili, lenže to je už druhoradé: ak rozumieme, môžeme veriť). Ten, kto novú, doteraz nepoznanú pravdu objavil, ju rád a bez mučenia aj dokáže. ...Z toho všetkého už začína čitateľ tušiť, kto je povinný pravdu dokazovať: každý, kto ju odhalil, vychádzajúc z predpokladov, ktoré okrem každým overiteľných faktov nič a priori nepredpokladali.  ...A máme tu druhé kritérium pre to, kto má znášať bremeno dôkazu: ten, kto tvrdí, že sa deje jedna z mnohých (apriórne rovnako pravdepodobných!) možností. Ak by niekto tvrdil, že mu pri hode kockou vypadne stále číslo šesť, tvrdil by, že sa uskutoční iba jedna zo šiestich možností a mal by preto dokázať, prečo akurát vypadne jedno číslo a nikdy nie ostatných päť. Pochopili ste? Zúženie možností si vyžaduje dôkaz od toho, kto tvrdí, že k tomu zúženiu dôjde. Ten, kto tvrdí, že môže vypadnúť hocaké číslo, nič dokazovať nemusí, lebo jeho tvrdenie nezavrhuje žiadne možnosti. Napríklad Pytagorova veta sa dokazuje preto, lebo tvrdí, že súčet plôch štvorcov nad odvesnami nie je hocaká plocha, ale akurát plocha štvorca nad preponou. Pytagorova veta, ako každé slušné matematické tvrdenie, zužuje apriórne možnosti, a preto sa musí dokázať. Každé pravdivé tvrdenie je zaujímavé práve preto, že zužuje možnosti. Poznávanie sveta stojí na tom, že vieme čo nie je možné. Pre malé dieťa je možné všetko, svet (rozumného) dospelého je už chudobnejší na možnosti.}}</ref> An [[argument]] where ''a priori'' assumptions (cf. "a... must be avoided at all costs... Therefore, we accept ..., and assume that ...") are masquerading as [[proof|evidence]] for making [[conclusion]]s (''"the universe must be pretty much alike everywhere and in all directions"'') is in effect a form of [[circular reasoning]].<ref>{{cite book

Although not explicitly mentioning the Socratic principle, [[Richard Feynman]] effectually comments that the reluctance to adopt it and an effort to replace it with [[prejudice]] in case of a so called unique position of [[Earth]] in the [[universe]] stems barely from [[embarrassment]] and not [[exact sciences|scientific rigor]] (emphasis added): ''"I suspect that '''the assumption of uniformity''' of the universe reflects a [[prejudice]] born of a sequence of overthrows of [[geocentric]] ideas...It would be embarrassing to find, after stating that we live in an ordinary [[planet]] about an ordinary [[star]] in an ordinary [[galaxy]], that our place in the universe is extraordinary{{#tag:ref|cf. ''"Most advocates do not defend their theses out of conviction that they are true, but rather because they once declared them to be true."'' (Georg Christoph Lichtenberg)<ref>{{cite book |title=Lexikon der populären Irrtümer: 500 kapitale Mißverständnisse, Vorurteile und Denkfehler von Abendrot bis Zeppelin Piper|author=Walter Krämer, Götz Trenkler|publisher=Piper Verlag GmbH |year=1998|page=258|isbn= 9783492224468 |url=http://www.amazon.de/Lexikon-popul%C3%A4ren-Irrt%C3%BCmer-Walter-Kr%C3%A4mer/dp/3492224466/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1370885779&sr=8-1&keywords=Walter+Kr%C3%A4mer+Lexikon+der+popul%C3%A4ren+Irrt%C3%BCmer|language=German}}</ref>|group=note}}...to avoid embarrassment we cling to the hypothesis of uniformity"''.<ref name="Feynman">{{cite book |title=Feynman Lectures on Gravitation |author=Richard Phillips Feynman et al. |publisher=Westview Press |year=2002 |page=166 |isbn=978-0813-340388 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jL9reHGIcMgC&dq=Feynman+lectures+on+gravitation&source=bl&ots=_nuGcNOn2_&sig=VyTgUmNcfeCOiwisdwoTEgKK9og&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gaYyUMHwIcfP4QTm5YD4Ag&redir_esc=y}}</ref> Slovak mathematician Adam Roman maintains that scientists should base their research on starting point where except verifiable [[fact]]s no biased ''[[a priori]]'' assumptions are made. Furthermore, scientists should bear the [[burden of proof]] in any case of [[reductionism|reducing]] the set of [[explanation in science|explanatory]] possibilities. Narrowing down options requires [[Scientific evidence|proof]] from one who argues that this narrowing (such as ''"the theory postulates homogeneity"''; ''a favoured position...is intolerable''; ''"we cling to the hypothesis of uniformity"'') should take place.<ref>{{cite web |title=Kto má pravdu dokazovať? (Who should bear the burden of proof)|author=Adam Roman|date=November 1, 2001|accessdate=June 7, 2013|url=http://adam.humanisti.sk/?p=31|language=Slovak|quote=Ľudia pravdu iba zisťujú a dokazujú (ak sa im to darí). Isteže, pri objavení neočakávanej pravdy je bremeno dôkazu na nich: keď donedávna ani len nevedeli, čo je pravda, a teraz to zistili, s radosťou to oznámia celému svetu. Vedci k objavenej pravde radi pripoja aj dôkaz, aby im druhí rozumeli (a uverili, lenže to je už druhoradé: ak rozumieme, môžeme veriť). Ten, kto novú, doteraz nepoznanú pravdu objavil, ju rád a bez mučenia aj dokáže. ...Z toho všetkého už začína čitateľ tušiť, kto je povinný pravdu dokazovať: každý, kto ju odhalil, vychádzajúc z predpokladov, ktoré okrem každým overiteľných faktov nič a priori nepredpokladali.  ...A máme tu druhé kritérium pre to, kto má znášať bremeno dôkazu: ten, kto tvrdí, že sa deje jedna z mnohých (apriórne rovnako pravdepodobných!) možností. Ak by niekto tvrdil, že mu pri hode kockou vypadne stále číslo šesť, tvrdil by, že sa uskutoční iba jedna zo šiestich možností a mal by preto dokázať, prečo akurát vypadne jedno číslo a nikdy nie ostatných päť. Pochopili ste? Zúženie možností si vyžaduje dôkaz od toho, kto tvrdí, že k tomu zúženiu dôjde. Ten, kto tvrdí, že môže vypadnúť hocaké číslo, nič dokazovať nemusí, lebo jeho tvrdenie nezavrhuje žiadne možnosti. Napríklad Pytagorova veta sa dokazuje preto, lebo tvrdí, že súčet plôch štvorcov nad odvesnami nie je hocaká plocha, ale akurát plocha štvorca nad preponou. Pytagorova veta, ako každé slušné matematické tvrdenie, zužuje apriórne možnosti, a preto sa musí dokázať. Každé pravdivé tvrdenie je zaujímavé práve preto, že zužuje možnosti. Poznávanie sveta stojí na tom, že vieme čo nie je možné. Pre malé dieťa je možné všetko, svet (rozumného) dospelého je už chudobnejší na možnosti.}}</ref> An [[argument]] where ''a priori'' assumptions (cf. "a... must be avoided at all costs... Therefore, we accept ..., and assume that ...") are masquerading as [[proof|evidence]] for making [[conclusion]]s (''"the universe must be pretty much alike everywhere and in all directions"'') is in effect a form of [[circular reasoning]].<ref>{{cite book

|title=The Myth of Junk DNA

|title=The Myth of Junk DNA

|author=Jonathan Wells

|author=Jonathan Wells

|page=112

|page=112

|isbn=978-1-9365990-0-4

|isbn=978-1-9365990-0-4

|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Rc4ikgAACAAJ&dq=The+Myth+Of+junk+DNA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=cXYXUd_GAuTw4QSX_4GQAg&redir_esc=y

|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rc4ikgAACAAJ&dq=The+Myth+Of+junk+DNA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=cXYXUd_GAuTw4QSX_4GQAg&redir_esc=y

|quote=The second form ... is a circular argument, because the conclusion is already stated in premises.}}</ref> If scientists had made biased a priori assumptions, there is little point in asking what conclusions they have derived.<ref name="DeniableDarwin">{{cite book

|quote=The second form ... is a circular argument, because the conclusion is already stated in premises.}}</ref> If scientists had made biased a priori assumptions, there is little point in asking what conclusions they have derived.<ref name="DeniableDarwin">{{cite book

|author=David Berlinski

|author=David Berlinski