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An additional strategy that is often followed and debated is the "Grim Trigger": that is to say, cooperate until the first defection, and from then on out, defect every turn. Grim Trigger tends to work only when there is informational exchange.
An additional strategy that is often followed and debated is the "Grim Trigger": that is to say, cooperate until the first defection, and from then on out, defect every turn. Grim Trigger tends to work only when there is informational exchange.
== Relation to International Affairs: Nuclear Detente ==
The Prisoner's Dilemma can be used to explain the awkward situation of exact nuclear parity. So long as a first-strike is possible, and the first-strike would eliminate the chance of retaliation, the players are in a "Prisoner's Dilemma," and, as noted above, are incentivized to defect.
Much of Cold War policy, then, was at preventing a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. For example, the retention of American nuclear warheads in untraceable submarines, and the retention of Russian arms in untraceable rail cars, prevented the incentive of the first strike, and kept the parties locked in a situation where cooperation remained the best strategy.
Nuclear "escalation" could destabilize such parity. For example, the development of MIRV ('''M'''ultiple '''R'''e-entry '''V'''ehicle) warheads placed Russia briefly ahead of the US. Similarly, American development of an effective nuclear shield would have "won" the game, and was greatly feared by Russia, and contemplated as a reason for a first-strike were its completion imminent.
[[category:mathematics]]
[[category:mathematics]]
[[category:philosophy]]
[[category:philosophy]]