Changes

In 1965, a major riot in the all-black Watts neighborhood signaled the beginning of "long hot summers", as virtually all major cities experienced similar riots in the next four years. A large part of the reason the rioting grew as bad as it did during that time (which eventually would have required a whole army division of 15,000 National Guardsmen to stop it), and by extension why similar riots occurred in Newark and Detroit in 1967, was because of a failure of the higher ups to actually do something about it, as then-California governor [[Pat Brown]] had been vacationing in Greece at the time, and then-President Lyndon Johnson refused to even acknowledge the gravity of the situation, much less take action, with Johnson's domestic policy advisor Joseph Califano stating that "[Johnson] refused to look at the cables from Los Angeles. . . .He refused to take calls from the generals who were requesting government planes to fly in the [[National Guard]]. . . . We need decisions from him. But he simply wouldn't respond."<ref>''The Politically Incorrect Guide to the 1960s'' by Jonathan Leaf, p. 61</ref><ref>John Fabanjong, ''Understanding the Backlash Against Affirmative Action'', 72.</ref>

In 1965, a major riot in the all-black Watts neighborhood signaled the beginning of "long hot summers", as virtually all major cities experienced similar riots in the next four years. A large part of the reason the rioting grew as bad as it did during that time (which eventually would have required a whole army division of 15,000 National Guardsmen to stop it), and by extension why similar riots occurred in Newark and Detroit in 1967, was because of a failure of the higher ups to actually do something about it, as then-California governor [[Pat Brown]] had been vacationing in Greece at the time, and then-President Lyndon Johnson refused to even acknowledge the gravity of the situation, much less take action, with Johnson's domestic policy advisor Joseph Califano stating that "[Johnson] refused to look at the cables from Los Angeles. . . .He refused to take calls from the generals who were requesting government planes to fly in the [[National Guard]]. . . . We need decisions from him. But he simply wouldn't respond."<ref>''The Politically Incorrect Guide to the 1960s'' by Jonathan Leaf, p. 61</ref><ref>John Fabanjong, ''Understanding the Backlash Against Affirmative Action'', 72.</ref>

When the four police officers who had been videotaped beating motorist Rodney King were found not guilty of criminal acts in 1992, the city erupted in the worst rioting seen in the United States since the 1960s.  Black ghetto neighborhoods were aflame as attacks and lootings went on three nights and two days. The riot was produced by social forces that included the end of Cold War federal spending and the ensuing regional recession, the movement of middle-class blacks out of South Central Los Angeles into safer neighborhoods, and the failure of local and state leaders to handle tensions emerging in rising crime, drug abuse and gangs. The increasingly violent underclass in the inner city was a challenge that that Mayor [[Tom Bradley]] could not deal with politically since he had come to office in a middle class coalition. Police Chief Daryl Gates aggressively attacked with Operation Hammer street, using sweeps of South Central streets rather than a softer community policing approach. That kept the thugs low until the riot released all restraints. The loss of life and destruction of property left permanent economic damage. Tensions remain very high between blacks and Koreans, who owned many of the stores and shops that came under violent attack.<ref>See Lou Cannon, ''Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD'' (1997), [http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3188 online review]</ref>

When the four police officers who had been videotaped beating motorist Rodney King were found not guilty of criminal acts in 1992, the city erupted in the worst rioting seen in the United States since the 1960s.  Black ghetto neighborhoods were aflame as attacks and lootings went on three nights and two days. The riot was produced by social forces that included the end of Cold War federal spending and the ensuing regional recession, the movement of middle-class blacks out of South Central Los Angeles into safer neighborhoods, and the failure of local and state leaders to handle tensions emerging in rising crime, drug abuse and gangs. The increasingly violent underclass in the inner city was a challenge that that Mayor [[Tom Bradley]] could not deal with politically since he had come to office in a middle class coalition. Police Chief Daryl Gates aggressively attacked with Operation Hammer street, using sweeps of South Central streets rather than a softer community policing approach. That kept the thugs low until the riot released all restraints. The loss of life and destruction of property left permanent economic damage. Tensions remain very high between blacks and Koreans, who owned many of the stores and shops that came under violent attack.<ref>See Lou Cannon, ''Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD'' (1997), [http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3188 online review]</ref> In 1993, a federal trial held in Los Angeles itself resulted in convictions of two of these officers-Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell-who served 2 1/2 year sentences each as well as termination from LAPD. The other two defendants, Ted Briseno and Timothy Wind, were acquitted again but were also fired from LAPD before the decade was half over and earlier in this century left California altogether.

William Bratton, LA police chief from 2002 to 2009, introduced extensive use of computerized data to allocate police resources, and saw crime rates fall steadily—just as they had when he headed the New York City police, 1994-96. Major crimes in LA were down crimes down 33% and homicides down 41%.  He had to implement court-ordered reforms to stop police corruption and brutality while supervising  9,800 sworn officers, 3,000 civilian employees, and billion dollar budget.

William Bratton, LA police chief from 2002 to 2009, introduced extensive use of computerized data to allocate police resources, and saw crime rates fall steadily—just as they had when he headed the New York City police, 1994-96. Major crimes in LA were down crimes down 33% and homicides down 41%.  He had to implement court-ordered reforms to stop police corruption and brutality while supervising  9,800 sworn officers, 3,000 civilian employees, and billion dollar budget.