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Line 50: − − == Kaufmann on the future of evangelical Protestantism in Europe == − − ''See also:'' [[Secular Europe]] − − Concerning the future of [[evangelicalism|evangelical Protestantism]] in Europe, in a paper entitled ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century'', Kaufmann wrote: − {{cquote|What of European [[Christianity]]? The conventional wisdom holds it to be in free fall, especially in Western Europe. (Bruce 2002) This is undoubtedly correct for Catholic Europe, while Protestant Europe already has low levels of religious practice. Yet closer scrutiny reveals an increasingly lively and demographically growing Christian remnant. Several studies have examined the connection between religiosity - whether defined as attendance, belief or affiliation - and fertility in Europe. Most find a statistically significant effect even when controlling for age, education, income, marital status and other factors... − − Moving to the wider spectrum of European Christianity, we find that fertility is indeed much higher among European women who are religious... − − Today, most of those who remain religious in Europe wear their beliefs lightly, but conservative Christianity is hardly a spent force. Data on conservative Christians is difficult to come by since many new churches keep few official records. Reports from the World Christian Database, which meticulously tracks reports from church bodies, indicates that 4.1 percent of Europeans (including Russians) were evangelical Christians in 2005. This figure rises to 4.9 percent in northern, western and southern Europe. Most religious conservatives are charismatics, working within mainstream denominations like Catholicism or Lutheranism to ‘renew’ the faith along more conservative lines. There is also an important minority of Pentecostals, who account for .5% of Europe’s population. Together, charismatics and Pentecostals account for close to 5 % of Europe’s population. The proportion of conservative Christians has been rising, however: some estimate that the trajectory of conservative Christian growth has outpaced that of Islam in Europe. (Jenkins 2007: 75). − − In many European countries, the proportion of conservative Christians is close to − the number who are recorded as attending church weekly. This would suggest an − increasingly devout Christian remnant is emerging in western Europe which is more − resistant to secularization. This shows up in France, Britain and Scandinavia (less − Finland), the most secular countries where we have 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS and 2004 − ESS data on religiosity... − − Currently there are more evangelical Christians than Muslims in Europe. (Jenkins 2007: 75) In Eastern Europe, as outside the western world, Pentecostalism is a sociological and not a demographic phenomenon. In Western Europe, by contrast, demography is central to evangelicalism’s growth, especially in urban areas. Alas, immigration brings two foreign imports, Islam and Christianity, to secular Europe.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/RD/uploads/1-Shall%20the%20Religious%20Inherit%20the%20Earth.pdf ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century'' by Eric Kaufmann]</ref>}}
→Kaufmann on the future of evangelical Protestantism in Europe
In 2010, in his book ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth'', Kaufmann wrote concerning the [[culture war]] in the [[United States]]:
In 2010, in his book ''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth'', Kaufmann wrote concerning the [[culture war]] in the [[United States]]:
{{cquote|High evangelical fertility rates more than compensated for losses to liberal Protestant sects during the twentieth century. In recent decades, white secularism has surged, but Latino and Asian religious immigration has taken up the slack, keeping secularism at bay. Across denominations, the fertility advantage of religious fundamentalists of all colours is significant and growing. After 2020, their demographic weight will begin to tip the balance in the culture wars towards the conservative side, ramping up pressure on hot-button issues such as abortion. By the end of the century, three quarters of America may be [[pro-life]]. Their activism will leap over the borders of the 'Redeemer Nation' to evangelize the world. Already, the rise of the World Congress of Families has launched a global religious right, its arms stretching across the bloody lines of the War on Terror to embrace the entire Abrahamic family.<ref>''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth'' by Eric Kaufmann</ref>}}
{{cquote|High evangelical fertility rates more than compensated for losses to liberal Protestant sects during the twentieth century. In recent decades, white secularism has surged, but Latino and Asian religious immigration has taken up the slack, keeping secularism at bay. Across denominations, the fertility advantage of religious fundamentalists of all colours is significant and growing. After 2020, their demographic weight will begin to tip the balance in the culture wars towards the conservative side, ramping up pressure on hot-button issues such as abortion. By the end of the century, three quarters of America may be [[pro-life]]. Their activism will leap over the borders of the 'Redeemer Nation' to evangelize the world. Already, the rise of the World Congress of Families has launched a global religious right, its arms stretching across the bloody lines of the War on Terror to embrace the entire Abrahamic family.<ref>''Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth'' by Eric Kaufmann</ref>}}
== Books ==
== Books ==