Changes

''See also:'' [[World War II in the Air]]

''See also:'' [[World War II in the Air]]

Do not be misled by tanks and artillery and infantry, air strategists insisted—that was ancient history. The war could be won hundreds or thousands of miles behind the front lines—an invasion would be unnecessary because the bombers alone could defeat Germany and Japan. Modern warfare depended upon industrial production in large, fixed, visible factories, oil refineries and electric power stations. As Lovett explained, "Our main job is to carry the war to the country of the people fighting us--to make their working conditions as intolerable as possible, to destroy their plants, their sources of electric power, their communications system."<ref>see [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684837714/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=claim+that+air+power&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# Isaacson and Thomas, ''Wise Men'' p. 206]</ref> Advocates promised that strategic bombing was "guaranteed" to destroy those installations sooner or later. To win the war, therefore, it was necessary merely to build up a strategic air force from suitable bases. In Europe, the enemy was within attack range of American [[B-17]] bases in Britain and Italy, and British "LOancaster" bomber bases.  Matters were more complicated in the Pacific, where the Rising Sun flew above all the islands within range of Tokyo. Perhaps suitable bases could be built in China; a very-long-range bomber for those bases, the [[B-29]] was needed. It went into mass production. Closer and more secure bases could be built in the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Guam, Tinian), which therefore were invaded in June 1944.  

Do not be misled by tanks and artillery and infantry, air strategists insisted—that was ancient history. The war could be won hundreds or thousands of miles behind the front lines—an invasion would be unnecessary because the bombers alone could defeat Germany and Japan. Modern warfare depended upon industrial production in large, fixed, visible factories, oil refineries and electric power stations. As Lovett explained, "Our main job is to carry the war to the country of the people fighting us--to make their working conditions as intolerable as possible, to destroy their plants, their sources of electric power, their communications system."<ref>see [https://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684837714/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=claim+that+air+power&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# Isaacson and Thomas, ''Wise Men'' p. 206]</ref> Advocates promised that strategic bombing was "guaranteed" to destroy those installations sooner or later. To win the war, therefore, it was necessary merely to build up a strategic air force from suitable bases. In Europe, the enemy was within attack range of American [[B-17]] bases in Britain and Italy, and British "LOancaster" bomber bases.  Matters were more complicated in the Pacific, where the Rising Sun flew above all the islands within range of Tokyo. Perhaps suitable bases could be built in China; a very-long-range bomber for those bases, the [[B-29]] was needed. It went into mass production. Closer and more secure bases could be built in the Mariana Islands (Saipan, Guam, Tinian), which therefore were invaded in June 1944.  

In August, 1941, the AAF devised AWPD-1, its plan to win the war through air power alone (an appendix discussed tactical support for an invasion, should that prove necessary.)<ref>See [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/awpd-1-jfacc/awpdproc.htm text of AWPD-1]</ref> AWPD-1 read like an engineering document, and focused on the choke points of the German war economy. It listed 154 German targets in order of priority (electric power, railroad yards and bridges, synthetic oil plants, aircraft factories). By assuming half the bombs would land within 400 yards of their targets, it concluded that 3,800 bombers could finish the job in six months time. A total of 62,000 combat planes, and 37,000 trainers would have to be built. AWPD-42, completed a year later, provided more tactical air power, proposed a detailed strategic air war against Japan, and reaffirmed the same German targets (plus submarine yards). The summit conference at Casablanca in January, 1943, accepted the basic plan of AWPD-42: Germany and Japan would be the targets of massive strategic bombing that would either force their surrender or soften them up for an infantry invasion.<ref>See [http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/awpd-1-jfacc/awpdcovr.htm "AWPD-1 The Process" (1996)</ref>

In August, 1941, the AAF devised AWPD-1, its plan to win the war through air power alone (an appendix discussed tactical support for an invasion, should that prove necessary.)<ref>See [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/awpd-1-jfacc/awpdproc.htm text of AWPD-1]</ref> AWPD-1 read like an engineering document, and focused on the choke points of the German war economy. It listed 154 German targets in order of priority (electric power, railroad yards and bridges, synthetic oil plants, aircraft factories). By assuming half the bombs would land within 400 yards of their targets, it concluded that 3,800 bombers could finish the job in six months time. A total of 62,000 combat planes, and 37,000 trainers would have to be built. AWPD-42, completed a year later, provided more tactical air power, proposed a detailed strategic air war against Japan, and reaffirmed the same German targets (plus submarine yards). The summit conference at Casablanca in January, 1943, accepted the basic plan of AWPD-42: Germany and Japan would be the targets of massive strategic bombing that would either force their surrender or soften them up for an infantry invasion.<ref>See [http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/awpd-1-jfacc/awpdcovr.htm "AWPD-1 The Process" (1996)</ref>

===Targets Fought Back===

===Targets Fought Back===

In evaluating the strategic bombing campaigns it is important to keep in mind what the targets were. The AAF (and the RAF) concentrated on the largest 75 to 100 cities in Germany and Japan. In Germany the targeted cities contained 25 million people before the war; the damage was done primarily in 1944-45 when at least 5 million people had evacuated. Of all 75 million civilians in Germany, 1/2 of one percent (300,000) were killed, another 1% were injured, 10% were dehoused, 25% deprived of gas, water and electricity for varying periods, and 100% were inconvenienced by fear, shortages and disruptions.<ref>.. USSBS 1:72, 95</ref> The bombing campaigns did not target civilians outside large cities, or their food supplies. (Tactical air sometimes did strafe passenger trains; the pilots could not tell whether they carried civilians or soldiers.) The main emphasis was on large cities for several reasons. Pragmatically, the target had to be large enough to hit. Small cities or factories in the forests were extremely hard to bomb from high altitude. Big bombers flew high when it was discovered the risk from flak was near 100% at 8,000 feet, but "only" 25% at 20,000 feet. Even at great height bombers often had to zigzag and rush their bombing run lest the ground crews get their range. The RAF noticed that when flak was light, 41% of its bombs hit near the target, compared to only 32% when flak was heavy. The Luftwaffe had figured out the logic of strategic bombing, and by late 1944 used over one million men and women to operate 16,000 heavy (high altitude) guns, 50,000 light guns, 7,500 searchlights, and 1,500 barrage balloons. The extremely critical synthetic oil plants at Leuna, Ludwigshaven and elsewhere were ringed by scores of batteries each with 8 to 12 guns. The 600 guns guarding Cologne could hurl 80 tons of shells skyward every minute. The best response was to saturate the defenses by putting as many bombers over target as quickly as possible. For every 100 sorties in 1944, 25 bombers were hit by flak; most managed to hold formation and return—stragglers usually crashed or were shot down by fighters. The Pentagon did not see enemy cities as mere passive housing tracks filled with innocent civilians but rather as the nerve centers of warmaking and as active fortresses that fought back vigorously and which often inflicted more damage than they received. ** Some raids caused "firestorms," notably Hamburg and Kassel in 1943, Dresden and Tokyo in 1945. Firestorms were very hard to start; they occurred in unpredictable situations when a number of scattered fires suddenly combined into a tornado-like inferno which sucked up all the oxygen (including the oxygen in underground shelters). At Hamburg 40,000 people suffocated inside shelters. Tens of thousands died in Dresden, but the railway yards, munitions factories and military bases were mostly undamaged. At Hamburg, full factory production resumed in a matter of weeks, but about a million civilians fled the city.<ref>Martin Middlebrook, '' The Battle of Hamburg: The Firestorm Raid'' (2nd ed. 2000) [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0304353450/ref=sib_dp_srch_pop?v=search-inside&keywords=million&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# p. 353 online]</ref>

In evaluating the strategic bombing campaigns it is important to keep in mind what the targets were. The AAF (and the RAF) concentrated on the largest 75 to 100 cities in Germany and Japan. In Germany the targeted cities contained 25 million people before the war; the damage was done primarily in 1944-45 when at least 5 million people had evacuated. Of all 75 million civilians in Germany, 1/2 of one percent (300,000) were killed, another 1% were injured, 10% were dehoused, 25% deprived of gas, water and electricity for varying periods, and 100% were inconvenienced by fear, shortages and disruptions.<ref>.. USSBS 1:72, 95</ref> The bombing campaigns did not target civilians outside large cities, or their food supplies. (Tactical air sometimes did strafe passenger trains; the pilots could not tell whether they carried civilians or soldiers.) The main emphasis was on large cities for several reasons. Pragmatically, the target had to be large enough to hit. Small cities or factories in the forests were extremely hard to bomb from high altitude. Big bombers flew high when it was discovered the risk from flak was near 100% at 8,000 feet, but "only" 25% at 20,000 feet. Even at great height bombers often had to zigzag and rush their bombing run lest the ground crews get their range. The RAF noticed that when flak was light, 41% of its bombs hit near the target, compared to only 32% when flak was heavy. The Luftwaffe had figured out the logic of strategic bombing, and by late 1944 used over one million men and women to operate 16,000 heavy (high altitude) guns, 50,000 light guns, 7,500 searchlights, and 1,500 barrage balloons. The extremely critical synthetic oil plants at Leuna, Ludwigshaven and elsewhere were ringed by scores of batteries each with 8 to 12 guns. The 600 guns guarding Cologne could hurl 80 tons of shells skyward every minute. The best response was to saturate the defenses by putting as many bombers over target as quickly as possible. For every 100 sorties in 1944, 25 bombers were hit by flak; most managed to hold formation and return—stragglers usually crashed or were shot down by fighters. The Pentagon did not see enemy cities as mere passive housing tracks filled with innocent civilians but rather as the nerve centers of warmaking and as active fortresses that fought back vigorously and which often inflicted more damage than they received. ** Some raids caused "firestorms," notably Hamburg and Kassel in 1943, Dresden and Tokyo in 1945. Firestorms were very hard to start; they occurred in unpredictable situations when a number of scattered fires suddenly combined into a tornado-like inferno which sucked up all the oxygen (including the oxygen in underground shelters). At Hamburg 40,000 people suffocated inside shelters. Tens of thousands died in Dresden, but the railway yards, munitions factories and military bases were mostly undamaged. At Hamburg, full factory production resumed in a matter of weeks, but about a million civilians fled the city.<ref>Martin Middlebrook, '' The Battle of Hamburg: The Firestorm Raid'' (2nd ed. 2000) [https://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0304353450/ref=sib_dp_srch_pop?v=search-inside&keywords=million&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# p. 353 online]</ref>

===Ludwigshaven===

===Ludwigshaven===

:The Fuhrer has decreed: that our conduct of war must become fanatical since the battle has touched German soil along broad sectors, and German cities and villages are being turned into battlegrounds....Every bunker, every block in a German city, and every German village must be turned into a fortress against which the enemy will either bleed to death or its garrison be buried in man-to-man combat.   

:The Fuhrer has decreed: that our conduct of war must become fanatical since the battle has touched German soil along broad sectors, and German cities and villages are being turned into battlegrounds....Every bunker, every block in a German city, and every German village must be turned into a fortress against which the enemy will either bleed to death or its garrison be buried in man-to-man combat.   

All civilian men became liable for militia duty in the Volkssturm, and in 1945 many fought in the last ditches. In Japan, total mobilization had been declared as early as 1938 (when Japan was fighting China): "We must mobilize our entire resources, both physical and spiritual; it is not enough merely to provide sufficient munitions."<ref>Quoted in Conrad Totman, [https://books.google.com/books?id=UJLtPR_gMtsC&pg=PA435&lpg=PA435&dq=%22entire+resources,+both+physical+and+spiritual%22&source=web&ots=j1M8y-kwVm&sig=Gv7d1URKUV7U2TkQNtzXK0nhNrw&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result  ''History of Japan'' (2000) online p. 435]</ref>  Civilians were more tightly organized on behalf of the state than in any other nation, and American policy makers concluded there were no peaceable civilians in Japan. The AAF policy said that deliberate killing of innocent civilians was immoral, but that in Germany and Japan all workers "voluntary or involuntary" were assisting the enemy and should accept the risks "which must be the lot of any individual who participates directly in the war effort of a belligerent nation."<ref>Crane, [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0700611037/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=+must+be+the+lot+of+any+individual&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''Bombs, Cities, and Civilians'' p. 45 online]</ref>

All civilian men became liable for militia duty in the Volkssturm, and in 1945 many fought in the last ditches. In Japan, total mobilization had been declared as early as 1938 (when Japan was fighting China): "We must mobilize our entire resources, both physical and spiritual; it is not enough merely to provide sufficient munitions."<ref>Quoted in Conrad Totman, [https://books.google.com/books?id=UJLtPR_gMtsC&pg=PA435&lpg=PA435&dq=%22entire+resources,+both+physical+and+spiritual%22&source=web&ots=j1M8y-kwVm&sig=Gv7d1URKUV7U2TkQNtzXK0nhNrw&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result  ''History of Japan'' (2000) online p. 435]</ref>  Civilians were more tightly organized on behalf of the state than in any other nation, and American policy makers concluded there were no peaceable civilians in Japan. The AAF policy said that deliberate killing of innocent civilians was immoral, but that in Germany and Japan all workers "voluntary or involuntary" were assisting the enemy and should accept the risks "which must be the lot of any individual who participates directly in the war effort of a belligerent nation."<ref>Crane, [https://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0700611037/ref=sib_dp_srch_bod?v=search-inside&keywords=+must+be+the+lot+of+any+individual&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''Bombs, Cities, and Civilians'' p. 45 online]</ref>

====Dispersal of critical installations====

====Dispersal of critical installations====

Speer figured out the antidote to air raids in 1943—disperse critical factories outside the major cities. The V-1 and V-2 missiles were built in caves and underground factories that were largely immune from bombs. However, many local Nazi leaders, fearful that Speer's plans to build new factories in their villages would attract air raids, dragged their feet and effectively sabotaged Speer's program. Dispersal, furthermore, made the Germans even more reliant on their fragile transportation system. With railroad yards hit every week, it took longer and longer for parts to reach underground assembly factories, and it became more and more difficult to move the final product to the front lines. The Japanese built airplane components in thousands of small shops scattered about their major cities; they did not use their small towns and villages. The U.S. Air Force answered the dispersion by burning out entire large cities (while avoiding the small towns and villages.) The Soviets carried dispersion to the logical extreme. As the Germans pushed east in 1941-42, the Russians loaded trains full of blueprints, engineers, skilled craftsmen, critical materials, vital parts, and necessary tools, and set up shop in makeshift quarters in the Urals. Often the new quarters lacked heat and the workers froze in place. A complete dispersal outside the major cities could indeed drastically limited the direct damage done by strategic bombing. However, dispersal to small, remote locations with poor transportation and communications created extremely complex management problems. It slowed everything down and multiplied the difficulties of overall coordination, of recruiting, training and housing workers, of supplying fuel and raw materials, of cross-shipping of sub-assemblies, and of final shipment to the front line soldiers. Postwar analysts in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey who stressed the unexpectedly small amount of damage done to individual plants overlooked the vast damage done to the German and Japanese system of providing munitions to the battlefront. Germany ground forces fought hard, but after the summer of 1944 they were defeated in every battle, in large part because they had lost control of their airspace, and because strategic bombing cut the front lines off from their industrial base.<ref>Albert Speer, [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684829495/ref=sib_dp_srch_pop?v=search-inside&keywords=287&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''Inside the Third Reich'' (1969) p. 287]; Richard Overy, ''The Air War: 1939-1945'' (1981) p. 122</ref>

Speer figured out the antidote to air raids in 1943—disperse critical factories outside the major cities. The V-1 and V-2 missiles were built in caves and underground factories that were largely immune from bombs. However, many local Nazi leaders, fearful that Speer's plans to build new factories in their villages would attract air raids, dragged their feet and effectively sabotaged Speer's program. Dispersal, furthermore, made the Germans even more reliant on their fragile transportation system. With railroad yards hit every week, it took longer and longer for parts to reach underground assembly factories, and it became more and more difficult to move the final product to the front lines. The Japanese built airplane components in thousands of small shops scattered about their major cities; they did not use their small towns and villages. The U.S. Air Force answered the dispersion by burning out entire large cities (while avoiding the small towns and villages.) The Soviets carried dispersion to the logical extreme. As the Germans pushed east in 1941-42, the Russians loaded trains full of blueprints, engineers, skilled craftsmen, critical materials, vital parts, and necessary tools, and set up shop in makeshift quarters in the Urals. Often the new quarters lacked heat and the workers froze in place. A complete dispersal outside the major cities could indeed drastically limited the direct damage done by strategic bombing. However, dispersal to small, remote locations with poor transportation and communications created extremely complex management problems. It slowed everything down and multiplied the difficulties of overall coordination, of recruiting, training and housing workers, of supplying fuel and raw materials, of cross-shipping of sub-assemblies, and of final shipment to the front line soldiers. Postwar analysts in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey who stressed the unexpectedly small amount of damage done to individual plants overlooked the vast damage done to the German and Japanese system of providing munitions to the battlefront. Germany ground forces fought hard, but after the summer of 1944 they were defeated in every battle, in large part because they had lost control of their airspace, and because strategic bombing cut the front lines off from their industrial base.<ref>Albert Speer, [https://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0684829495/ref=sib_dp_srch_pop?v=search-inside&keywords=287&go.x=0&go.y=0&go=Go%21# ''Inside the Third Reich'' (1969) p. 287]; Richard Overy, ''The Air War: 1939-1945'' (1981) p. 122</ref>

   

   

Revenge and racism played a role in the bombings. The American public demanded revenge for Pearl Harbor, and saw the Japanese as moral subhumans. (However Americans also proudly went to war to defend the morally worthy Filipinos and Chinese.) The British, having watched fifty thousand civilians die from the Blitz, were more than pleased to retaliate ten times over. Strategic bombing doctrine had always held with enough pounding, enemy morale would collapse and they would be forced to surrender. That is indeed what happened with Japan. The Germans surrendered only after Berlin was captured, but the ability to resist invasion had been blasted away by the Allied bombings that Germany was helpless to stop. The bottom line regarding strategic bombing in World War Two is that it was the only way a total war could be fought and won. The alternatives were compromise with the Nazis and Japanese, or invasions that would have killed far more people in Japan (and did kill far more Germans than the bombings did).<ref>Lacking strategic bombers, the Russians relied on their ground forces to capture Berlin in April, 1945. It was the bloodiest battle of the war. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed, along with very large numbers of civilians.  Antony Beevor, ''The Fall of Berlin 1945'' (2003)</ref>

Revenge and racism played a role in the bombings. The American public demanded revenge for Pearl Harbor, and saw the Japanese as moral subhumans. (However Americans also proudly went to war to defend the morally worthy Filipinos and Chinese.) The British, having watched fifty thousand civilians die from the Blitz, were more than pleased to retaliate ten times over. Strategic bombing doctrine had always held with enough pounding, enemy morale would collapse and they would be forced to surrender. That is indeed what happened with Japan. The Germans surrendered only after Berlin was captured, but the ability to resist invasion had been blasted away by the Allied bombings that Germany was helpless to stop. The bottom line regarding strategic bombing in World War Two is that it was the only way a total war could be fought and won. The alternatives were compromise with the Nazis and Japanese, or invasions that would have killed far more people in Japan (and did kill far more Germans than the bombings did).<ref>Lacking strategic bombers, the Russians relied on their ground forces to capture Berlin in April, 1945. It was the bloodiest battle of the war. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were killed, along with very large numbers of civilians.  Antony Beevor, ''The Fall of Berlin 1945'' (2003)</ref>

* Haulman, Daniel L. ''Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan,'' (1998) [http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/hittinghome/ online edition]

* Haulman, Daniel L. ''Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan,'' (1998) [http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/hittinghome/ online edition]

* Kennett, Lee. ''A History of Strategic Bombing'' (1982)  good brief overview, starting in 1914

* Kennett, Lee. ''A History of Strategic Bombing'' (1982)  good brief overview, starting in 1914

* Knell, Herman. ''To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and Its Human Consequences in World War II'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/Destroy-City-Strategic-Bombing-Consequences/dp/0306811693/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243707906&sr=1-3 excerpt and text search]

* Knell, Herman. ''To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and Its Human Consequences in World War II'' (2003) [https://www.amazon.com/Destroy-City-Strategic-Bombing-Consequences/dp/0306811693/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243707906&sr=1-3 excerpt and text search]

* Overy, Richard J. ''The Air War, 1939-1945'' (1981), sophisticated standard interpretation, covering all major countries

* Overy, Richard J. ''The Air War, 1939-1945'' (1981), sophisticated standard interpretation, covering all major countries

* Overy. Richard. "The Means to Victory: Bombs and Bombing" in Overy, ''Why the Allies Won'' (1995), pp 101–33  

* Overy. Richard. "The Means to Victory: Bombs and Bombing" in Overy, ''Why the Allies Won'' (1995), pp 101–33  

* Jablonsky, Edward. ''Flying Fortress'' (1965)

* Jablonsky, Edward. ''Flying Fortress'' (1965)

* ''Jane's Fighting Aircraft of World War II'' (1989), reprint of 1945 edition  

* ''Jane's Fighting Aircraft of World War II'' (1989), reprint of 1945 edition  

* Johnsen, Frederick A.  ''B-17 Flying Fortress: The Symbol of Second World War Air Power'' (2000) [http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0071344454/ref=sib_dp_pop_ex/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&p=S00K#reader-link excerpt]

* Johnsen, Frederick A.  ''B-17 Flying Fortress: The Symbol of Second World War Air Power'' (2000) [https://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0071344454/ref=sib_dp_pop_ex/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&p=S00K#reader-link excerpt]

* MacIsaac, David,  ed. ''The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (10 v, 1976) reprints of some reports

* MacIsaac, David,  ed. ''The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (10 v, 1976) reprints of some reports

* Madej, Victor. ed. ''German war economy: the motorization myth'' (1984) (based on v. 64a, 77, and 113 of the U.S. Strategic Bombing  reports on oil and chemical industry.)

* Madej, Victor. ed. ''German war economy: the motorization myth'' (1984) (based on v. 64a, 77, and 113 of the U.S. Strategic Bombing  reports on oil and chemical industry.)