Changes

From the time [[Baghdad]] fell in 2003, American leadership at the highest levels, beginning with [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]], were reluctant to admit an insurgency – an armed uprising against the new Baghdad regime – was taking place.

From the time [[Baghdad]] fell in 2003, American leadership at the highest levels, beginning with [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]], were reluctant to admit an insurgency – an armed uprising against the new Baghdad regime – was taking place.

Traditional American counter-insurgency doctrine cuts deeply against the Army’s institutional instincts which focus on combat operations.  The most recent field manual at the time was two decades old, focusing on hunting people and an approach called “kill-capture,” similar to the "search and destroy" methods used in Vietnam. Ultimately there are more insurgents than when they started.

Traditional American counter-insurgency doctrine cuts deeply against the Army's institutional instincts which focus on combat operations.  The most recent field manual at the time was two decades old, focusing on hunting people and an approach called “kill-capture,” similar to the "search and destroy" methods used in Vietnam. Ultimately there are more insurgents than when they started.

Counterinsurgency warfare is 20% military and 80% political, McMaster argues, using the classic doctrine developed by the British in [[Malaysia]] in the 1940s–50s. The focus of operations is on the civilian population: isolating residents from insurgents, providing security, building a police force, and allowing political and economic development to take place so that the government commands the allegiance of its citizens. A counterinsurgency strategy involves both offensive and defensive operations, but there is an emphasis on using the minimum amount of force necessary. From Iraq, McMaster collaborated remotely with Petraeus in Fort Leavenworth on a revision of the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

Counterinsurgency warfare is 20% military and 80% political, McMaster argues, using the classic doctrine developed by the British in [[Malaysia]] in the 1940s–50s. The focus of operations is on the civilian population: isolating residents from insurgents, providing security, building a police force, and allowing political and economic development to take place so that the government commands the allegiance of its citizens. A counterinsurgency strategy involves both offensive and defensive operations, but there is an emphasis on using the minimum amount of force necessary. From Iraq, McMaster collaborated remotely with Petraeus in Fort Leavenworth on a revision of the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

McMaster and his staff in field tried to teach soldiers to distinguish between [[nationalist]]-minded [[Sunni]]s and [[Salafi]] extremists, a distinction that, in the war’s first two years, American soldiers were rarely able to make; they were simply trained to fight "bad guys."

McMaster and his staff in field tried to teach soldiers to distinguish between [[nationalist]]-minded [[Sunni]]s and [[Salafi]] extremists, a distinction that, in the war's first two years, American soldiers were rarely able to make; they were simply trained to fight "bad guys."

The strategy focused on building an Iraqi [[nationalist]] identity of Muslims against ''takfiri'', or Muslims who shed their Islamic identity. This Muslim unity call of Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Sunni, and Shia, was intended to counter the Sunni-Shia divisions which spurred genocidal atrocities.<ref>http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar</ref> This [[globalist]] approach to using Iraqi [[nationalism]] to strengthen Muslim unity, however, is not without critics.

The strategy focused on building an Iraqi [[nationalist]] identity of Muslims against ''takfiri'', or Muslims who shed their Islamic identity. This Muslim unity call of Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Sunni, and Shia, was intended to counter the Sunni-Shia divisions which spurred genocidal atrocities.<ref>http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar</ref> This [[globalist]] approach to using Iraqi [[nationalism]] to strengthen Muslim unity, however, is not without critics.