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{{move|Essay:Brexit: a Crisis for British Conservatism}}
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Events of the last two years, including the two elections this year, suggest that [[Brexit]] is the biggest crisis for the British Conservative (Tory) Party, and British conservatism in general, in 160 years.  In this essay, I will examine what brought us to this crisis, the nature of the crisis and what is likely to happen next.  It is analytical, not descriptive or narrative - there's plenty of detail and data elsewhere.  It is based on over thirty years of closely following British politics, including my own time as a researcher for the Conservative Party, and conversations with senior researchers and analysts of the EU, senior Conservatives and senior UKIP activists.  
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Events of the last two years, including the two elections this year, suggest that Brexit is the biggest crisis for the British Conservative (Tory) Party, and British conservatism in general, in 160 years.  In this essay, I will examine what brought us to this crisis, the nature of the crisis and what is likely to happen next.  It is analytical, not descriptive or narrative - there's plenty of detail and data elsewhere.  It is based on over thirty years of closely following British politics, including my own time as a researcher for the Conservative Party, and conversations with senior researchers and analysts of the EU, senior Conservatives and senior UKIP activists.  
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On June 23, 2016, the British public voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU, much to the shock of David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, and the political classes in general.  Cameron had called the referendum because he was struggling to keep the Tory Party together.  Since the 1980s, a significant number of MPs and activists had been uncomfortable with our membership of the EU and were pushing against the leadership.  Margaret Thatcher and John Major were able to keep a lid on things but, since the landslide against the Tories in 1997, it was becoming open civil war within the party.  To complicate matters, Cameron was firmly on the liberal wing of the Tory Party and saw its future as a centrist party.  Because UKIP were snapping at his party's heels on the right, Cameron intended the referendum as a vote of confidence in his vision, giving him a mandate to marginalise the conservative wing of the party.
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On June 23, 2016, the British public voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU, much to the shock of [[David Cameron]], the British Prime Minister, and the political classes in general.  Cameron had called the referendum because he was struggling to keep the Tory Party together.  Since the 1980s, a significant number of MPs and activists had been uncomfortable with our membership of the EU and were pushing against the leadership.  Margaret Thatcher and John Major were able to keep a lid on things but, since the landslide against the Tories in 1997, it was becoming open civil war within the party.  To complicate matters, Cameron was firmly on the liberal wing of the Tory Party and saw its future as a centrist party.  Because UKIP were snapping at his party's heels on the right, Cameron intended the referendum as a vote of confidence in his vision, giving him a mandate to marginalise the conservative wing of the party.
    
Why he lost is not straightforward.  Yes, people voted leave because they resented being in the EU and people voted leave because they rejected Cameron's plans.  But people also voted leave because the Remain campaign smugly assumed many voters were stupid and did not need positive reasons to vote remain.  They voted leave - particularly in the regions - because, ironically, they were deeply unhappy with Tory austerity policies.  They voted leave because they were promised a lot of things by the Leave campaign - including an implied end to austerity, an extra £350 million a week for the National Health Service, strict immigration controls and easy trade deals.  It is significant that neither side was strong on detail and nobody defined at the time what leave means.   
 
Why he lost is not straightforward.  Yes, people voted leave because they resented being in the EU and people voted leave because they rejected Cameron's plans.  But people also voted leave because the Remain campaign smugly assumed many voters were stupid and did not need positive reasons to vote remain.  They voted leave - particularly in the regions - because, ironically, they were deeply unhappy with Tory austerity policies.  They voted leave because they were promised a lot of things by the Leave campaign - including an implied end to austerity, an extra £350 million a week for the National Health Service, strict immigration controls and easy trade deals.  It is significant that neither side was strong on detail and nobody defined at the time what leave means.   
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In short, although we voted to leave, there was not a strong qualitative or quantitative mandate.
 
In short, although we voted to leave, there was not a strong qualitative or quantitative mandate.
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The day after the referendum, David Cameron stood down and Theresa May became Prime Minister shortly after. Boris Johnson had his eye on the prize but he was treated with suspicion before being brought down by Michael Gove, one of his closest allies.  Significantly, Nigel Farage also stepped down as leader of UKIP.  And that's when it started to get serious.   
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The day after the referendum, David Cameron stood down and [[Theresa May]] became Prime Minister shortly after. Boris Johnson had his eye on the prize but he was treated with suspicion before being brought down by Michael Gove, one of his closest allies.  Significantly, Nigel Farage also stepped down as leader of UKIP.  And that's when it started to get serious.   
    
Neither the Remain or Leave campaigns had fully understood what leaving the EU would entail and the British government soon realised they were in trouble - they could not deliver what the Leave campaign had promised.  May, with her party 21% ahead in the polls, decided to call a general election to strengthen her hand.  Her priority was to keep the Conservative Party from falling apart, with delivering Brexit second, and - like Cameron - she gambled and lost.  Instead of a substantial Parliamentary majority, she was forced into partnership with the Democratic Unionist Party and found herself with a more fractured party than ever.
 
Neither the Remain or Leave campaigns had fully understood what leaving the EU would entail and the British government soon realised they were in trouble - they could not deliver what the Leave campaign had promised.  May, with her party 21% ahead in the polls, decided to call a general election to strengthen her hand.  Her priority was to keep the Conservative Party from falling apart, with delivering Brexit second, and - like Cameron - she gambled and lost.  Instead of a substantial Parliamentary majority, she was forced into partnership with the Democratic Unionist Party and found herself with a more fractured party than ever.
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[[Category:Essays]]
 
[[Category:Essays]]
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Brexit: a Crisis for British Conservatism}}
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