Changes

On the other hand the ''I'' is not yet included in the natural, actual event which is to pass over into the primary word ''I-It'', into the experience with its relation to ''I''.  This actual event is the separation of the human body, as the bearer of its perceptions, from the world round about it. The body comes to know and to differentiate itself in its peculiarities; the differentiation, however, remains one of pure juxtaposition, and hence cannot have the character of the state in which ''I'' is implied.  

On the other hand the ''I'' is not yet included in the natural, actual event which is to pass over into the primary word ''I-It'', into the experience with its relation to ''I''.  This actual event is the separation of the human body, as the bearer of its perceptions, from the world round about it. The body comes to know and to differentiate itself in its peculiarities; the differentiation, however, remains one of pure juxtaposition, and hence cannot have the character of the state in which ''I'' is implied.  

But when the ''I'' of the relation has stepped forth and taken on separate existence, it also moves, strangely tenuous and reduced to merely functional activity, into the natural, actual event of the separation of the body from the world round about it, and awakens there the state in which ''I'' is properly active. Only now can the conscious act of the ''I'' take "place. This act is the first form of the primary word ''I-It'', of the experience in its relation to ''I''. The ''I'' which stepped forth declares itself to be the bearer, and the world round about to be the object, of the perceptions. Of course, this happens in a "primitive" form and not in the form of a "theory of knowledge."  But whenever the sentence "I see the tree" is so uttered that it no longer tells of a relation between the man—''I''—and the tree—''Thou''—, but establishes the perception of the tree as object by the human consciousness, the barrier between subject and object has been set up. The primary word ''I-It'', the word of separation, has been spoken.

But when the ''I'' of the relation has stepped forth and taken on separate existence, it also moves, strangely tenuous and reduced to merely functional activity, into the natural, actual event of the separation of the body from the world round about it, and awakens there the state in which ''I'' is properly active. Only now can the conscious act of the ''I'' take place. This act is the first form of the primary word ''I-It'', of the experience in its relation to ''I''. The ''I'' which stepped forth declares itself to be the bearer, and the world round about to be the object, of the perceptions. Of course, this happens in a "primitive" form and not in the form of a "theory of knowledge."  But whenever the sentence "I see the tree" is so uttered that it no longer tells of a relation between the man—''I''—and the tree—''Thou''—, but establishes the perception of the tree as object by the human consciousness, the barrier between subject and object has been set up. The primary word ''I-It'', the word of separation, has been spoken.