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| | ==Historical context== | | ==Historical context== |
| | + | ===Concentration camps=== |
| | The [[FDR|Roosevelt administration]], which granted diplomatic recognition and legitimacy to the leftist regime in 1933, was aware of the [[human rights]] violations, systematic malnutrition ("systematic malnutrition" was deemed a Crime Against Humanity by Soviet, American, UK and French prosecutors at the [[Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal]]), and mass murder occurring in the Soviet [[concentration camps]] before the U.S. entrance into World War II, and before [[Adolf Hitler]]'s implementation of the [[holocaust]]. An April 14, 1941 Memorandum from the U.S. Military Attache (G-2) in Moscow, found in the [[Harry Hopkins]] Papers at the FDR Presidential Library, entitled "[[NKVD]] of the USSR", states in part, | | The [[FDR|Roosevelt administration]], which granted diplomatic recognition and legitimacy to the leftist regime in 1933, was aware of the [[human rights]] violations, systematic malnutrition ("systematic malnutrition" was deemed a Crime Against Humanity by Soviet, American, UK and French prosecutors at the [[Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal]]), and mass murder occurring in the Soviet [[concentration camps]] before the U.S. entrance into World War II, and before [[Adolf Hitler]]'s implementation of the [[holocaust]]. An April 14, 1941 Memorandum from the U.S. Military Attache (G-2) in Moscow, found in the [[Harry Hopkins]] Papers at the FDR Presidential Library, entitled "[[NKVD]] of the USSR", states in part, |
| | {{quotebox|Although the Soviets disclaim [[forced labor]] in this country, the organization of this commissariat is interesting to note. In it are the means to apprehend (militia), try and sentence (advisory council) and imprison offenders ([[Gulag|corrective labor]]). Any governmental organization that has a crying need for labor simply calls upon the NKVD to supply it. If the amount of labor is insufficient to supply the need, it is relatively an easy matter to institute a reign of terror on any pretext and fill up labor colonies to meet requirements....Its close supervision over the people, its [[pogroms]], its raids and arrests, has instilled fear...<ref>https://web.archive.org/web/20040423034159/www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/5d.gif</ref> | | {{quotebox|Although the Soviets disclaim [[forced labor]] in this country, the organization of this commissariat is interesting to note. In it are the means to apprehend (militia), try and sentence (advisory council) and imprison offenders ([[Gulag|corrective labor]]). Any governmental organization that has a crying need for labor simply calls upon the NKVD to supply it. If the amount of labor is insufficient to supply the need, it is relatively an easy matter to institute a reign of terror on any pretext and fill up labor colonies to meet requirements....Its close supervision over the people, its [[pogroms]], its raids and arrests, has instilled fear...<ref>https://web.archive.org/web/20040423034159/www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/5d.gif</ref> |
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| | In 2001, a [[Russia|Russian Federation-based]] patriot organization applied to the [[Russian Federation]]'s military prosecutor for a review of Gen. Vlasov's case,<ref>Valeria Korchagina and Andrei Zolotov Jr.[https://web.archive.org/web/20070928003436/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=5830 It's Too Early To Forgive Vlasov] ''The St. Petersburg Times''. 6 Nov 2001.</ref> saying that "Vlasov was a [[patriot]] who spent much time re-evaluating his service in the Red Army and the essence of Stalin's regime before agreeing to collaborate with the Germans". The military prosecutor concluded that the law of rehabilitation of victims of political repressions did not apply to Vlasov and refused to consider the case again. However, Vlasov's Article 58 RSFSR Penal Code conviction for anti-Soviet agitation (ASA) and propaganda was vacated. A memorial dedicated to Gen. Vlasov and the participants in the Russian Liberation Movement was erected at the Novo-Diveevo [[Russian Orthodox]] convent and cemetery in Nanuet, [[New York]]. Twice annually, on the anniversary of Vlasov's execution and on the Sunday following Orthodox [[Easter]], a memorial service is held for Vlasov and the combatants of the Russian National Army. While Solzhenitsyn was a Red Army captain who served with distinction, by the personal stories of Vlasovites and what happened to their families in the decades before World War II under the leftwing ideology and regime, Solzhenitsyn came to understand why they took arms against the Red Army. | | In 2001, a [[Russia|Russian Federation-based]] patriot organization applied to the [[Russian Federation]]'s military prosecutor for a review of Gen. Vlasov's case,<ref>Valeria Korchagina and Andrei Zolotov Jr.[https://web.archive.org/web/20070928003436/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=5830 It's Too Early To Forgive Vlasov] ''The St. Petersburg Times''. 6 Nov 2001.</ref> saying that "Vlasov was a [[patriot]] who spent much time re-evaluating his service in the Red Army and the essence of Stalin's regime before agreeing to collaborate with the Germans". The military prosecutor concluded that the law of rehabilitation of victims of political repressions did not apply to Vlasov and refused to consider the case again. However, Vlasov's Article 58 RSFSR Penal Code conviction for anti-Soviet agitation (ASA) and propaganda was vacated. A memorial dedicated to Gen. Vlasov and the participants in the Russian Liberation Movement was erected at the Novo-Diveevo [[Russian Orthodox]] convent and cemetery in Nanuet, [[New York]]. Twice annually, on the anniversary of Vlasov's execution and on the Sunday following Orthodox [[Easter]], a memorial service is held for Vlasov and the combatants of the Russian National Army. While Solzhenitsyn was a Red Army captain who served with distinction, by the personal stories of Vlasovites and what happened to their families in the decades before World War II under the leftwing ideology and regime, Solzhenitsyn came to understand why they took arms against the Red Army. |
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| | + | ===Post-War New Order=== |
| | Commenting on the Yalta and [[Teheran Conference]], where much of a post-War War II, [[New World Order]] was worked out, Solzhenitsyn remarked, | | Commenting on the Yalta and [[Teheran Conference]], where much of a post-War War II, [[New World Order]] was worked out, Solzhenitsyn remarked, |
| | {{quotebox|In their own countries Roosevelt and [[Churchill]] are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of [[Eastern Europe]]? How could they give away broad regions of [[Saxony]] and [[Thuringia]] in exchange for the preposterous toy of a four-zone [[Berlin]], their own future Achilles' heel? And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens [Vlasovites] determined not to surrender? They say it was the price they paid for Stalin's agreeing to enter the war against Japan. With the [[atom bomb]] already in their hands, they paid Stalin for not refusing to occupy [[Manchuria]], for strengthening [[Mao Tse-tung]] in [[China]], and for giving [[Kim Il Sung]] control of half [[Korea]]! What bankruptcy of political thought! And when subsequently, the Russians pushed out [[World War II#War in Europe 1944|Mikolajczyk]], when [[Benes]] and Masaryk came to their ends, when [[Berlin Airlift|Berlin was blockaded]], and [[Budapest]] flamed and fell silent, and Korea went up in smoke, and Britain’s Conservatives [[Suez Crisis|fled Suez]], could one really believe that those among them with the most accurate memories did not at least recall that episode of the [[Operation Keelhaul|Cossacks]]? <ref>''[[Gulag Archipelago]]'', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1956, Part I. Chap. 4., pg. 258 fn. 12</ref><ref>[http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp Repatriation — The Dark Side of World War II], Part 3 | | {{quotebox|In their own countries Roosevelt and [[Churchill]] are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious. How could they, in their decline from 1941 to 1945, fail to secure any guarantees whatever of the independence of [[Eastern Europe]]? How could they give away broad regions of [[Saxony]] and [[Thuringia]] in exchange for the preposterous toy of a four-zone [[Berlin]], their own future Achilles' heel? And what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens [Vlasovites] determined not to surrender? They say it was the price they paid for Stalin's agreeing to enter the war against Japan. With the [[atom bomb]] already in their hands, they paid Stalin for not refusing to occupy [[Manchuria]], for strengthening [[Mao Tse-tung]] in [[China]], and for giving [[Kim Il Sung]] control of half [[Korea]]! What bankruptcy of political thought! And when subsequently, the Russians pushed out [[World War II#War in Europe 1944|Mikolajczyk]], when [[Benes]] and Masaryk came to their ends, when [[Berlin Airlift|Berlin was blockaded]], and [[Budapest]] flamed and fell silent, and Korea went up in smoke, and Britain’s Conservatives [[Suez Crisis|fled Suez]], could one really believe that those among them with the most accurate memories did not at least recall that episode of the [[Operation Keelhaul|Cossacks]]? <ref>''[[Gulag Archipelago]]'', Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 1956, Part I. Chap. 4., pg. 258 fn. 12</ref><ref>[http://www.fff.org/freedom/0495a.asp Repatriation — The Dark Side of World War II], Part 3 |