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Desecularization and aging populations (view source)
Revision as of 15:49, October 3, 2019
, 15:49, October 3, 2019→Abstract for the journal article Religiosity and Aging: Age and Cohort Effects and Their Implications for the Future of Religious Values in High‐Income OECD Countries
The abstract for the journal article ''Religiosity and Aging: Age and Cohort Effects and Their Implications for the Future of Religious Values in High‐Income OECD Countries'' published in the ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'' indicates:
The abstract for the journal article ''Religiosity and Aging: Age and Cohort Effects and Their Implications for the Future of Religious Values in High‐Income OECD Countries'' published in the ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'' indicates:
{{Cquote|It has long been noticed that older people tend to be more religious than younger people. However, it is still disputable whether this fact should be attributed to people generally becoming more religious with age per se (age effect), or to the process of secularization, wherein earlier cohorts (to which the now older people belong) used to be more religious than those that appeared later, younger cohorts (cohort effect). We try to distinguish between these two effects using a multifactor model applied to World Values Survey data (1981–2014) and find that at least in the developed countries the age effect strongly prevails over the cohort effect. This finding has important implications, e.g., that population aging in OECD countries can possibly slow down the transition from religious to secular values. This effect is already visible in some countries, such as Japan.<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jssr.12613 ''Religiosity and Aging: Age and Cohort Effects and Their Implications for the Future of Religious Values in High‐Income OECD Countries''] by Sergey Shulgin, Julia Zinkina and Andrey Korotayev, ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'', First published: 02 July 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12613</ref>}}
{{Cquote|It has long been noticed that older people tend to be more religious than younger people. However, it is still disputable whether this fact should be attributed to people generally becoming more religious with age per se (age effect), or to the process of secularization, wherein earlier cohorts (to which the now older people belong) used to be more religious than those that appeared later, younger cohorts (cohort effect). We try to distinguish between these two effects using a multifactor model applied to World Values Survey data (1981–2014) and find that at least in the developed countries the age effect strongly prevails over the cohort effect. This finding has important implications, e.g., that population aging in OECD countries can possibly slow down the transition from religious to secular values. This effect is already visible in some countries, such as Japan.<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jssr.12613 ''Religiosity and Aging: Age and Cohort Effects and Their Implications for the Future of Religious Values in High‐Income OECD Countries''] by Sergey Shulgin, Julia Zinkina and Andrey Korotayev, ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'', First published: 02 July 2019 https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12613</ref>}}
== Eric Kaufmann on aging atheist populations in the Western World ==
Professor [[Eric Kaufmann]], who teaches at [[Birkbeck College, University of London]], specializes in the academic area of how [[demography|demographic]] changes affect religion/irreligion and politics. Kaufmann is an [[agnosticism|agnostic]].
On December 23, 2012, Kaufmann wrote:
{{cquote|I argue that 97% of the world's population growth is taking place in the developing world, where 95% of people are religious.
On the other hand, the secular West and East Asia has very low fertility and a rapidly aging population... In the coming decades, the developed world's demand for workers to pay its pensions and work in its service sector will soar alongside the booming supply of young people in the third world. Ergo, we can expect significant immigration to the secular West which will import religious revival on the back of ethnic change. In addition, those with religious beliefs tend to have higher birth rates than the secular population, with fundamentalists having far larger families. The epicentre of these trends will be in immigration gateway cities like New York (a third white), Amsterdam (half Dutch), Los Angeles (28% white), and London, 45% white British.<ref>[https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/eric-kaufmann/london-a-rising-island-of-religion_b_2336699.html London: A Rising Island of Religion in a Secular Sea] by Eric Kaufmann, ''Huffington Post'', 2012</ref>
<ref>[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2013/04/97-of-worlds-population-growth-is.html 97% of the world's population growth is taking place in the developing world, where 95% of people are religious], Tuesday, April 30, 2013</ref>}}
At a conference Kaufmann said of religious demographic projections concerning the 21st century:
{{cquote|Part of the reason I think [[demography]] is very important, at least if we are going to speak about the future, is that it is the most predictable of the [[social sciences]].
...if you look at a population and its age structure now. You can tell a lot about the future. ...So by looking at the relative age structure of different populations you can already say a lot about the future...
...Religious [[fundamentalism]] is going to be on the increase in the future and not just out there in the developing world..., but in the developed world as well.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7vCDeKPRSo Eric Kaufmann - Religion, Demography and Politics in the 21st Century]</ref>}}
See also: [[Religion and migration]] and [[Growth of religious fundamentalism]]
== See also ==
== See also ==