Changes

On 1 July 2003, over half a million Hong Kong citizens staged a mass protest against the poor governance of the post-handover SAR government. The grievances of the marchers quickly snowballed into a widely backed movement for democracy, and another large rally was held on 1 July 2004.  The landslide support for pro-democratic candidates during the local elections held on 23 November 2003 unnerved Beijing over its possible loss of control over Hong Kong. The government of China quickly shifted from a soft-line approach that talked about virtual autonomy to a hard-line approach, attempting to dampen the local democracy movement.  Beijing banned universal suffrage for the elections of a Chief Executive in 2007 and a legislature in 2008.  There were five fundamental causes of Hong Kong's broad-based demand for full democracy. First economic uncertainly rose sharply after 1999, as the competitiveness of the Hong Kong economy slipped and the transition to a knowledge economy was hindered by stagnant rates of university attendance. Secondly, the level of economic inequality increased,<ref>Li Zhang, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Hong Kong: Trends and Explanations," ''China: An International Journal'' 3#1 March 2005, pp. 74-103 in [[Project Muse]]</ref> along with a sense that cronyism was rampant and getting worse.  Thirdly the government deficit has soared, leading to cutbacks in government services; by 2003 the government had spent half the financial reserves left by the British, and sold land assets to cover the deficit. At a deeper level citizens are anxious about their lack of voice in an authoritarian polity.<ref>Yushuo Zheng, "Hong Kong's Democrats Stumble," ''Journal of Democracy'' 16#1 January 2005, pp. 138-152 in [[Project Muse]]</ref> The The fifth fundamental problem was the failure of the new "Principal Officials Accountability System" and the growth of popular distrust towards the non-democratic system.<ref>Ming Sing, "The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 2006 15(48): 517-532. Issn: 1067-0564 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Christine Loh, and Richard Cullen, "Political Reform in Hong Kong: the Principal Officials Accountability System. The First Year (2002-2003)." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 2005 14(42): 153-176. Issn: 1067-0564 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

On 1 July 2003, over half a million Hong Kong citizens staged a mass protest against the poor governance of the post-handover SAR government. The grievances of the marchers quickly snowballed into a widely backed movement for democracy, and another large rally was held on 1 July 2004.  The landslide support for pro-democratic candidates during the local elections held on 23 November 2003 unnerved Beijing over its possible loss of control over Hong Kong. The government of China quickly shifted from a soft-line approach that talked about virtual autonomy to a hard-line approach, attempting to dampen the local democracy movement.  Beijing banned universal suffrage for the elections of a Chief Executive in 2007 and a legislature in 2008.  There were five fundamental causes of Hong Kong's broad-based demand for full democracy. First economic uncertainly rose sharply after 1999, as the competitiveness of the Hong Kong economy slipped and the transition to a knowledge economy was hindered by stagnant rates of university attendance. Secondly, the level of economic inequality increased,<ref>Li Zhang, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Hong Kong: Trends and Explanations," ''China: An International Journal'' 3#1 March 2005, pp. 74-103 in [[Project Muse]]</ref> along with a sense that cronyism was rampant and getting worse.  Thirdly the government deficit has soared, leading to cutbacks in government services; by 2003 the government had spent half the financial reserves left by the British, and sold land assets to cover the deficit. At a deeper level citizens are anxious about their lack of voice in an authoritarian polity.<ref>Yushuo Zheng, "Hong Kong's Democrats Stumble," ''Journal of Democracy'' 16#1 January 2005, pp. 138-152 in [[Project Muse]]</ref> The The fifth fundamental problem was the failure of the new "Principal Officials Accountability System" and the growth of popular distrust towards the non-democratic system.<ref>Ming Sing, "The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 2006 15(48): 517-532. Issn: 1067-0564 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]; Christine Loh, and Richard Cullen, "Political Reform in Hong Kong: the Principal Officials Accountability System. The First Year (2002-2003)." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 2005 14(42): 153-176. Issn: 1067-0564 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

In September 2008, "pandemocrats" as they call themselves, retained the voters’ support during the Legislative Council election. Beijing’s interferences with the elections, though less blatant than those of 2004, unmistakably cast doubt on its sincerity to implement democracy in Hong Kong by 2020. In 2008, Beijing promoted a new wave of pro-Beijing professionals with a stronger and more independent image. The sudden rise and stunning electoral victories of the Social Democrats, who are hallmarked by civil disobedience on behalf of democratic and social reforms, reflect a deepening sense of public despair about the futility of the current political system, and a proliferating radicalism. A decade after the handover of their city to China, Hong Kong’s “pandemocrats” remain able to stand their ground at the ballot box.<ref>Ming Sing, "Hong Kong’s Democrats Hold Their Own," ''Journal of Democracy'', Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 98-112 in [[Project MUSE]]</ref>

In September 2008, "pandemocrats" as they call themselves, retained the voters’ support during the Legislative Council election. Beijing’s interferences with the elections, though less blatant than those of 2004, unmistakably cast doubt on its sincerity to implement democracy in Hong Kong by 2020. In 2008, Beijing promoted a new wave of pro-Beijing professionals with a stronger and more independent image. The sudden rise and stunning electoral victories of the Social Democrats, who are hallmarked by civil disobedience on behalf of democratic and social reforms, reflect a deepening sense of public despair about the futility of the current political system, and a proliferating radicalism. A decade after the handover of their city to China, Hong Kong's "pandemocrats" remain able to stand their ground at the ballot box.<ref>Ming Sing, "Hong Kong’s Democrats Hold Their Own," ''Journal of Democracy'', Volume 20, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 98-112 in [[Project MUSE]]</ref>

Hong Kong saw massive protests in 2019 – dwarfing previous protests – over an extradition bill that would have reduced the city's autonomy and freedoms.

Hong Kong saw massive protests in 2019 – dwarfing previous protests – over an extradition bill that would have reduced the city's autonomy and freedoms. In November 2019, pro-democracy activists saw major victories in the city's district council elections.<ref>Multiple references:

China has promoted mass migration to Hong Kong in order to reduce the territory's sense of having an independent identity from China.<ref>Bocchi, Alessandra (September 5, 2019). [https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-china-weaponizes-mass-migration-against-hong-kong/ How China Weaponizes Mass Migration Against Hong Kong]. ''Conservative Review''. Retrieved September 6, 2019.</ref>

China has promoted mass migration to Hong Kong in order to reduce the territory's sense of having an independent identity from China.<ref>Bocchi, Alessandra (September 5, 2019). [https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-china-weaponizes-mass-migration-against-hong-kong/ How China Weaponizes Mass Migration Against Hong Kong]. ''Conservative Review''. Retrieved September 6, 2019.</ref>