Changes

Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following [[Lenin]], was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the [[Third World]]. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America—run by and for the benefit of giant corporations—had succeeded [[fascism]] as most dangerous agent of [[imperialism]]. [[Moscow]]'s differences with [[Beijing]] on Marxist theory meant that it had to compete for influence among [[leftist]]s: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].

Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "[[National liberation movement|national liberation]]" in the third world. The Communist logic, following [[Lenin]], was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the [[Third World]]. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America—run by and for the benefit of giant corporations—had succeeded [[fascism]] as most dangerous agent of [[imperialism]]. [[Moscow]]'s differences with [[Beijing]] on Marxist theory meant that it had to compete for influence among [[leftist]]s: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].

In June 1961 Khrushchev and Kennedy met [[Vienna]]. Reporter James Reston of the ''[[New York Times]]'' wrote "Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev....I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time," Reston reported. Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.<ref>https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/187067191/ </ref>

In June 1961 Khrushchev and Kennedy met [[Vienna]]. Reporter James Reston of the ''[[New York Times]]'' wrote "Kennedy went there shortly after his spectacular blunders at the [[Bay of Pigs]], and was savaged by Khrushchev....I had an hour alone with President Kennedy immediately after his last meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna at that time," Reston reported. Khrushchev had assumed, Kennedy said, that any American President who invaded Cuba without adequate preparation was inexperienced, and any president who then didn't use force to see the invasion through was weak. Kennedy admitted Khrushchev's logic on both points.<ref>https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/187067191/</ref>

==Cuba==

==Cuba==

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

[[Image:SS-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|350px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States.  U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

===Historiography===

===Historiography===

*  Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp.&nbsp;689–718, famous political science article uses three models, the rational actor (the state is treated like an individual), organizational behavior model (the agencies involved have their own procedures), government politics (result comes after negotiations among actors) [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1954423 in JSTOR]

*  Allison, Graham. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp.&nbsp;689–718, famous political science article uses three models, the rational actor (the state is treated like an individual), organizational behavior model (the agencies involved have their own procedures), government politics (result comes after negotiations among actors) [http://www.jstor.org/pss/1954423 in JSTOR]

*  Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. ''Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,'' (2nd ed. (1999), 440pp

*  Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. ''Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,'' 2nd ed. (1999), 440pp

*  Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh. "Introduction" to Chang and Kornbluh, eds. ''Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader'' (1998)  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm Introduction online]

*  Chang, Laurence, and Peter Kornbluh. "Introduction" to Chang and Kornbluh, eds. ''Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader'' (1998)  [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/declass.htm Introduction online]

* Garthoff, Raymond L. "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2004, pp.&nbsp;21–56 in [[Project Muse]]

* Garthoff, Raymond L. "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' - Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2004, pp.&nbsp;21–56 in [[Project Muse]]