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After surveying the American position, Cornwallis began his advance at 1:30 p.m., with Leslie and Webster on either side of the road leading to Guilford. Webster was slightly in advance, and was the first to make contact with the North Carolina militia west of the road. As instructed, the militia fired two volleys with a level of accuracy that surprised many in the British ranks; Webster was forced to order a bayonet charge to dislodge them. Both Webster and Leslie (now reinforced by O'Hara) closed on the second line of Virginia militia, though continuing to take oblique fire from Washington's and Lee's detachments on either flank. Webster attacked the militia's right flank under Brigadier General Edward Stevens, pushing it back and pressing on to attack the line of Continentals before the rest of the militia had been driven off; this left the British van exposed, and the Continentals responded with a musket volley and a bayonet charge of their own that drove Webster back.

After surveying the American position, Cornwallis began his advance at 1:30 p.m., with Leslie and Webster on either side of the road leading to Guilford. Webster was slightly in advance, and was the first to make contact with the North Carolina militia west of the road. As instructed, the militia fired two volleys with a level of accuracy that surprised many in the British ranks; Webster was forced to order a bayonet charge to dislodge them. Both Webster and Leslie (now reinforced by O'Hara) closed on the second line of Virginia militia, though continuing to take oblique fire from Washington's and Lee's detachments on either flank. Webster attacked the militia's right flank under Brigadier General Edward Stevens, pushing it back and pressing on to attack the line of Continentals before the rest of the militia had been driven off; this left the British van exposed, and the Continentals responded with a musket volley and a bayonet charge of their own that drove Webster back.

Despite having already sustained heavy casualties, Cornwallis then re-formed his whole line (Leslie and O'Hara having in the meantime pushed back the remaining Virginia militia) and launched another attack on the Continentals. A short period of close combat ensued, during which neither side could make much progress; fearing his line would break, Cornwallis ordered his artillery to fire grapeshot into the melee, despite the fact that it would inflict casualties on his own troops as well as the Americans. Though the British did indeed suffer a number of casualties from this friendly fire, it did succeed in causing Greene to withdraw his line.<ref>https://web.archive.org/web/20151115115901/http://www.theamericanrevolution.org/battledetail.aspx?battle=27</ref>  

Despite having already sustained heavy casualties, Cornwallis then re-formed his whole line (Leslie and O'Hara having in the meantime pushed back the remaining Virginia militia) and launched another attack on the Continentals. A short period of close combat ensued, during which neither side could make much progress; fearing his line would break, Cornwallis ordered his artillery to fire [[Grapeshot]] into the melee, despite the fact that it would inflict casualties on his own troops as well as the Americans. Though the British did indeed suffer a number of casualties from this friendly fire, it did succeed in causing Greene to withdraw his line.<ref>https://web.archive.org/web/20151115115901/http://www.theamericanrevolution.org/battledetail.aspx?battle=27</ref>  

Had Greene known the desperate situation of Cornwallis and his army, he might have continued the battle. However, most of his militia had already departed the field, and while most of his Continentals still held firm, he was unwilling to risk the survival of the South's only field army, and therefore ordered a retreat at about 3:30 p.m.

Had Greene known the desperate situation of Cornwallis and his army, he might have continued the battle. However, most of his militia had already departed the field, and while most of his Continentals still held firm, he was unwilling to risk the survival of the South's only field army, and therefore ordered a retreat at about 3:30 p.m.