Changes

==State Support==

==State Support==

===Pakistan===

===Pakistan===

In 2000, British Intelligence reported that the Pakistani Inter-Services-Intelligence(ISI) had been taking an active role in several Al-Qaeda training camps since the 1990's. <ref>https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_9_11_Encyclopedia/PDDIgWRN_HQC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1&printsec=frontcover</ref> In 2012, the Afghan parliament's Security Commission has said that the ISI provides support to Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Nuristan Province.<ref>https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2012/04/12/pakistans-isi-supports-taliban-al-qaeda-in-nuristan-says-afghan-parliament/</ref>

In 2000, British Intelligence reported that the Pakistani Inter-Services-Intelligence(ISI) had been taking an active role in several Al-Qaeda training camps since the 1990s.<ref>https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_9_11_Encyclopedia/PDDIgWRN_HQC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA1&printsec=frontcover</ref> In 2012, the Afghan parliament's Security Commission has said that the ISI provides support to Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Nuristan Province.<ref>https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2012/04/12/pakistans-isi-supports-taliban-al-qaeda-in-nuristan-says-afghan-parliament/</ref>

===Iran===

===Iran===

According to a U.S. court record for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, Osama Bin Laden was living in Khartoum, Sudan when Sudanese religious scholar Ahmed Abdel Rahman Hamadabi brought Shekih Nomani an emissary of Iran to meet the Al-Qaeda leadership. Sheikh Nomani was described as having "had access to the highest echelons of power in Tehran. <ref>https://books.google.com/books?id=WDkqQSWFvvIC&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q&f=false</ref> This meeting resulted in an informal agreement between Iran and Al-Qaeda to cooperate, with Iran providing critical explosives, intelligence and security training to Bin Laden's organization. <ref>https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum</ref> Iran continued to provide support to Al-Qaeda even after they relocated to Afghanistan in 1996. Iranian officials helped Al-Qaeda members transit through Iran to Afghanistan. Iranian border guards were instructed not to stamp their passports, to prevent their home governments from suspecting that they had traveled to Afghanistan. <ref>https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum</ref> A section of the 9/11 commission states that shortly after the meetings between Iran and Al-Qaeda in Sudan in 1991,"senior Al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations."<ref>https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf#page=257</ref>  

According to a U.S. court record for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, Osama Bin Laden was living in Khartoum, Sudan when Sudanese religious scholar Ahmed Abdel Rahman Hamadabi brought Shekih Nomani an emissary of Iran to meet the Al-Qaeda leadership. Sheikh Nomani was described as having "had access to the highest echelons of power in Tehran.<ref>https://books.google.com/books?id=WDkqQSWFvvIC&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q&f=false</ref> This meeting resulted in an informal agreement between Iran and Al-Qaeda to cooperate, with Iran providing critical explosives, intelligence and security training to Bin Laden's organization.<ref name="washingtoninstitute.org">https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum</ref> Iran continued to provide support to Al-Qaeda even after they relocated to Afghanistan in 1996. Iranian officials helped Al-Qaeda members transit through Iran to Afghanistan. Iranian border guards were instructed not to stamp their passports, to prevent their home governments from suspecting that they had traveled to Afghanistan.<ref name="washingtoninstitute.org"/> A section of the 9/11 commission states that shortly after the meetings between Iran and Al-Qaeda in Sudan in 1991,"senior Al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations."<ref>https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf#page=257</ref>  

Iran and Al-Qaeda cooperation continues to this day. The State Department's Country Reports on terrorism has noted that, "Iran has allowed [Al-Qaeda] facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling[Al-Qaeda] to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria."<ref>https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/02/06/irans-support-for-al-qaeda-is-incompatible-with-fatf-standards/</ref>

Iran and Al-Qaeda cooperation continues to this day. The State Department's Country Reports on terrorism has noted that, "Iran has allowed [Al-Qaeda] facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling[Al-Qaeda] to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria."<ref>https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/02/06/irans-support-for-al-qaeda-is-incompatible-with-fatf-standards/</ref>