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→The Surge
Since the removal of Saddam, the United States has been caught in the middle of sectarian violence between [[Sunni]] Muslims and [[Shia]] Muslims. The Shia majority, notably the [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]], have began to attack American and other coalition troops even while the coalition has been protecting the Shia from Sunni attacks. Other Shia groups that have not attacked coalition forces have pursued their own factional aims while relying on the US to ensure Shia majority rule. To many if not most Sunnis, the US is viewed as the enemy because it supports Shia majority rule. As the Sunni interpret Muslim law, only Muslims may rule a Muslim state, and the Shia are considered heretics and thus not fit to lead the nation. Though a minority, the Sunni have traditionally ruled Iraq and view themselves entitled to continue the privilege of doing so.<ref> Testimony of Edward N. Luttwak, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate , Hearings on [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts070123luttwak.pdf Securing America's Interest in Iraq], retrieved March 21, 2007</ref>
Since the removal of Saddam, the United States has been caught in the middle of sectarian violence between [[Sunni]] Muslims and [[Shia]] Muslims. The Shia majority, notably the [[Jaysh Al-Madhi]], have began to attack American and other coalition troops even while the coalition has been protecting the Shia from Sunni attacks. Other Shia groups that have not attacked coalition forces have pursued their own factional aims while relying on the US to ensure Shia majority rule. To many if not most Sunnis, the US is viewed as the enemy because it supports Shia majority rule. As the Sunni interpret Muslim law, only Muslims may rule a Muslim state, and the Shia are considered heretics and thus not fit to lead the nation. Though a minority, the Sunni have traditionally ruled Iraq and view themselves entitled to continue the privilege of doing so.<ref> Testimony of Edward N. Luttwak, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate , Hearings on [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts070123luttwak.pdf Securing America's Interest in Iraq], retrieved March 21, 2007</ref>
==The Surge==
==The Surge and Progress in Iraq==
<!--[[Image:Cuncil.jpg|right|thumb|Iraqi governing council as of July 15, 2003]]-->
<!--[[Image:Cuncil.jpg|right|thumb|Iraqi governing council as of July 15, 2003]]-->
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<!--Hid picture, try to find a new one; half of them are probably dead.-->
Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said in a recent interview, that the increase of nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in the country had achieved "modest progress" but had also had setbacks such as a rise in suicide bombings and other problems. Petraeus also stated that he was uncertain whether his counterinsurgency strategy would be ultimately succeed, but he stated "<b>We have certainly pulled [Baghdad] neighborhoods back from the brink.</b>" Assessing the first two months of the U.S. and Iraqi plan to pacify the capital, senior American commanders -- including Petraeus; Adm. William Fallon, head of U.S. forces in the Middle East; Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of military operations in Iraq; and top regional commanders -- see mixed results. Critical now, they said in interviews last week, is for Iraqi leaders to forge the political compromises needed for long-term stability. The deployment of additional troops in Baghdad is only 60 percent complete, and a major concern shared by U.S. military leaders is whether al-Maliki's government is capable of solidifying gains in security as well as making the crucial political compromises needed to achieve peace.
Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, said in a recent interview, that the increase of nearly 30,000 U.S. troops in the country had achieved "modest progress" but had also had setbacks such as a rise in suicide bombings and other problems. Petraeus also stated that he was uncertain whether his counterinsurgency strategy would be ultimately succeed, but he stated "<b>We have certainly pulled [Baghdad] neighborhoods back from the brink.</b>" Assessing the first two months of the U.S. and Iraqi plan to pacify the capital, senior American commanders -- including Petraeus; Adm. William Fallon, head of U.S. forces in the Middle East; Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of military operations in Iraq; and top regional commanders -- see mixed results. Critical now, they said in interviews last week, is for Iraqi leaders to forge the political compromises needed for long-term stability. The deployment of additional troops in Baghdad is only 60 percent complete, and a major concern shared by U.S. military leaders is whether al-Maliki's government is capable of solidifying gains in security as well as making the crucial political compromises needed to achieve peace.
<ref> http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070423/NEWS/70422011</ref>
<ref> http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070423/NEWS/70422011</ref>
In an interview of <b>Iraq's national security adviser, Mowaffak Al-Rubaie</b> aired May 10, 2007, Mr. Rubaie stated, "<b>This is an ideological war. This is a -- a long-term war. This is a war on a global scale. This is a war, if it gets out of control, it will spill over to Europe and America in no time. And it will disturb the oil flow in the Gulf.</b> What happened in Iraq is not something minor and simple, like a coup d'etat or a revolution. What happened is a hurricane. What happened is a huge, major shift, from the old order of 1,000 years of persecution, of dictatorship, of religious supremacy, of prosecuting minorities, to a completely new order, which is called democracy, human rights, accountability, and transparency, and all this. <b>This paradigm shift needs some time. You cannot -- it needs strategic patience.</b> And it needs time. You cannot fit this major shift and the strategic objectives in the election cycle of Washington. You cannot do that."
<b>He went on to note progress and plead for patience, "I think we made a remarkable progress over the last three years</b>. In June 2004, we had only one battalion in the Iraqi army. Now we have 11 divisions. And, in June 2004, we did not have policemen. We did not have national police, local police, an intelligence service. We didn't have anything. Now we have Iraqi security forces, several hundreds of thousands of them. And what we need, we need some refinements, some tuning. We need some training. And we need some equipment and logistical support. We need to build the system within the Iraqi security forces. <b>In a very short period of time, we're going to be self-reliant</b>."
"Take, for example, in Baghdad. Last year, Baghdad was under the command of an American general called General Thurman. And now Baghdad is under the command-and- control of general -- an Iraqi general called General Abboud. And he is commanding and leading and controlling 2.5 Iraqi army division and 11 or 13 Iraqi police, national police, brigades. -- we needed the upsurge, and we need the upsurge to clear some areas of these neighborhoods and to hold them and to build them. When we have this upsurge, let's the best use of it. And let's clear these areas and hold it and build it." <ref> http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/10/acd.01.html </ref>
==Iraq Strategy in Relation to the Global War on Terrorism==
==Iraq Strategy in Relation to the Global War on Terrorism==