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| | ===Chief of German police=== | | ===Chief of German police=== |
| − | When Hitler came to power in January 1933, Himmler controlled the "Schutzstaffel" (Protection Squadron; SS) which at the time was a 50,000-man sub-branch of the Nazi Party. In March Himmler became the Polizeipräsident in Munich. In April 1933 the political and intelligence sections of the Prussian police were combined into one unit and named the "Geheime Staatspolizei" (the [[Gestapo]]). It was under the control of then Prussian Ministry of Interior, [[Hermann Goering]]. During 1933-34, Himmler and his second in command, [[Reinhard Heydrich]] took over the political police departments in each German state until only Prussia was left. On April 20, 1934, Goering handed over the Gestapo to Himmler for use in the purge of the [[SA]]. Himmler appointed SD (Security Service) chief Heydrich, the director of the Gestapo. | + | When Hitler came to power in January 1933, Himmler controlled the "Schutzstaffel" (Protection Squadron; SS) which at the time was a 50,000-man sub-branch of the Nazi Party. In March Himmler became the Polizeipräsident in Munich. In April 1933 the political and intelligence sections of the Prussian police were combined into one unit and named the "Geheime Staatspolizei" (the [[Gestapo]]). It was under the control of then Prussian Ministry of Interior, [[Hermann Goering]]. During 1933–34, Himmler and his second in command, [[Reinhard Heydrich]] took over the political police departments in each German state until only Prussia was left. On April 20, 1934, Goering handed over the Gestapo to Himmler for use in the purge of the [[SA]]. Himmler appointed SD (Security Service) chief Heydrich, the director of the Gestapo. |
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| | At first Ernst Röhm's SA ("brownshirts"), with 2.9 million members, was a much larger and more powerful part of the Nazi Party than Himmler's SS. That suddenly changed in June 1934 as a result of a power struggle between the SA, which had a more radical vision than Hitler would tolerate, and a coalition of Himmler, Goering, the army and big business who wanted the SA eliminated from power. The army feared the SA would absorb it into its ranks or become a people's army. Himmler and Heydrich prepared the list of Röhm's SA associates who were executed or imprisoned in the "[[Night of the Long Knives]]" which took place between June 30 and July 2, 1934. Hitler had Röhm killed, as well. As a result, Himmler and his SS gained enormously; the SS was now its own separate branch and Himmler reported only to Hitler.<ref name="Weale, 2010; Gerwarth 2011"/><ref>The SA lost most of its members and all of its power. Evans (2005), pp. 31-41; Kershaw (1998) 1: pp. 499-522</ref> | | At first Ernst Röhm's SA ("brownshirts"), with 2.9 million members, was a much larger and more powerful part of the Nazi Party than Himmler's SS. That suddenly changed in June 1934 as a result of a power struggle between the SA, which had a more radical vision than Hitler would tolerate, and a coalition of Himmler, Goering, the army and big business who wanted the SA eliminated from power. The army feared the SA would absorb it into its ranks or become a people's army. Himmler and Heydrich prepared the list of Röhm's SA associates who were executed or imprisoned in the "[[Night of the Long Knives]]" which took place between June 30 and July 2, 1934. Hitler had Röhm killed, as well. As a result, Himmler and his SS gained enormously; the SS was now its own separate branch and Himmler reported only to Hitler.<ref name="Weale, 2010; Gerwarth 2011"/><ref>The SA lost most of its members and all of its power. Evans (2005), pp. 31-41; Kershaw (1998) 1: pp. 499-522</ref> |
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| | ===Waffen-SS in combat=== | | ===Waffen-SS in combat=== |
| − | Himmler had dreams of his own army, which were strenuously opposed by the regular army. He managed to field three division of the '''Waffen-SS''' on the eastern front in 1941-42; their ferocity impressed Hitler and the SS was allowed to recruit volunteers from neutral and occupied countries. The Wehrmacht, however, intensely disliked the SS troops, so Himmler had to use his negotiating skills directly with Hitler to remove his SS formations from army control. The compromise was that SS generals took operational orders from the army, and in turn commanded their own SS troops.<ref>Burleigh 438ff</ref> By the end of the war, Himmler's SS supplied 38 Waffen-SS divisions comprising volunteers from the [[Hitler Youth]] and from other countries across Europe; including conscripts from 1943, forward. By the end of the war, the Waffen-SS had organized 38 divisions comprising about 800,000 soldiers; 25% were killed in battle. They were never integrated into the Wehrmacht, and grew to become a "de facto" fourth branch of the German military. However, they were never any real threat to replace the army, given their much smaller percentage of size in the armed forces (under 10%) and the fact they never had independence of operational command. They had a reputation for fanatical loyalty, bravery, brutality, mistreatment and killing of prisoners and civilians, and war crimes.<ref>Wegner (1990); McNab (2009)</ref> | + | Himmler had dreams of his own army, which were strenuously opposed by the regular army. He managed to field three division of the '''Waffen-SS''' on the eastern front in 1941–42; their ferocity impressed Hitler and the SS was allowed to recruit volunteers from neutral and occupied countries. The Wehrmacht, however, intensely disliked the SS troops, so Himmler had to use his negotiating skills directly with Hitler to remove his SS formations from army control. The compromise was that SS generals took operational orders from the army, and in turn commanded their own SS troops.<ref>Burleigh 438ff</ref> By the end of the war, Himmler's SS supplied 38 Waffen-SS divisions comprising volunteers from the [[Hitler Youth]] and from other countries across Europe; including conscripts from 1943, forward. By the end of the war, the Waffen-SS had organized 38 divisions comprising about 800,000 soldiers; 25% were killed in battle. They were never integrated into the Wehrmacht, and grew to become a "de facto" fourth branch of the German military. However, they were never any real threat to replace the army, given their much smaller percentage of size in the armed forces (under 10%) and the fact they never had independence of operational command. They had a reputation for fanatical loyalty, bravery, brutality, mistreatment and killing of prisoners and civilians, and war crimes.<ref>Wegner (1990); McNab (2009)</ref> |
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| | In July 1944, after the failed army plot against Hitler's life, Himmler reached the apex of his power. With the added position of Commander in Chief of the German Home Forces, he became on paper at least, the most powerful man in Germany, rivaling in many aspects the power of Hitler.<ref>Padfield (1990)</ref> | | In July 1944, after the failed army plot against Hitler's life, Himmler reached the apex of his power. With the added position of Commander in Chief of the German Home Forces, he became on paper at least, the most powerful man in Germany, rivaling in many aspects the power of Hitler.<ref>Padfield (1990)</ref> |
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| | * Gutman, Israel, ed. ''Encyclopedia of the Holocaust,'' 4 vol (1989) | | * Gutman, Israel, ed. ''Encyclopedia of the Holocaust,'' 4 vol (1989) |
| | * Kershaw, Ian. ''Hitler'' (2 vol, 1998, 2000), the standard biography. | | * Kershaw, Ian. ''Hitler'' (2 vol, 1998, 2000), the standard biography. |
| − | * Loewenberg, Peter J. "The Unsuccessful Adolescence of Heinrich Himmler", ''American Historical Review'' 1971 76(3): 612-641. Issn: 0002-8762 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(197106)76%3A3%3C612%3ATUAOHH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D in Jstor] | + | * Loewenberg, Peter J. "The Unsuccessful Adolescence of Heinrich Himmler", ''American Historical Review'' 1971 76(3): 612–641. Issn: 0002-8762 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8762(197106)76%3A3%3C612%3ATUAOHH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D in Jstor] |
| | * Longerich, Peter. ''Heinrich Himmler: A Life'', (2012) | | * Longerich, Peter. ''Heinrich Himmler: A Life'', (2012) |
| | * Manvell, Roger, and Heinrich Fraenkel. ''Heinrich Himmler: The SS, Gestapo, His Life and Career'' (2007) | | * Manvell, Roger, and Heinrich Fraenkel. ''Heinrich Himmler: The SS, Gestapo, His Life and Career'' (2007) |
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| | ===Primary sources=== | | ===Primary sources=== |
| − | * Angress, Werner T., and Bradley F. Smith, "Diaries of Heinrich Himmler's Early Years." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1959 31(3): 206-224. Issn: 0022-2801 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801(195909)31%3A3%3C206%3ADOHHEY%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 Jstor] | + | * Angress, Werner T., and Bradley F. Smith, "Diaries of Heinrich Himmler's Early Years." ''Journal of Modern History'' 1959 31(3): 206–224. Issn: 0022-2801 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801(195909)31%3A3%3C206%3ADOHHEY%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 Jstor] |
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| | {{DEFAULTSORT:Himmler, Heinrich}} | | {{DEFAULTSORT:Himmler, Heinrich}} |