Changes

In November 1945 when the War was finally over, a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] operating in numerous federal agencies throughout the [[New Deal]],which included the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

In November 1945 when the War was finally over, a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] operating in numerous federal agencies throughout the [[New Deal]],which included the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents during the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of them still employed in the government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, even embarrassing to the FBI, but it soon was determined that Bentley’s allegations were borne out by information already in Bureau files.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer than 227 FBI agents were investigating in the case.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents during the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of them still employed in the government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, even embarrassing to the FBI, but it soon was determined that Bentley's allegations were borne out by information already in Bureau files.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer than 227 FBI agents were investigating in the case.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]],<ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref>  a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada. The FBI was unaware at this point the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] was secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow.  

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]],<ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref>  a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada. The FBI was unaware at this point the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] was secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow.  

In 1947,<ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."</ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks.<ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages".</ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  [[Leak]]s in the investigation into the [[Greg Silvermaster#Silvermaster group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges...there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

In 1947,<ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."</ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks.<ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages".</ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  [[Leak]]s in the investigation into the [[Greg Silvermaster#Silvermaster group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges...there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy's Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

One day before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the intelligence sharing loop after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] became more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have counter espionage information of considerable value in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic. In the summer of 1949 the FBI learned that the secret of the construction of the atom bomb had been stolen and turned over to a foreign power. An immediate investigation resulted in the identification of Fuchs.<ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/atom/atom.htm The Atom Spy Case], FBI History, fbi.gov</ref> The JAEIC stated had they known in June about Fuchs, it would have impacted their estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities released in July which did not foresee the Soviet Union exploding its first nuclear device at the end of August in 1949. They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects.<ref>W. K.  Benons to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,] 9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency.</ref>

One day before McCarthy's Wheeling speech the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) wrote a memorandum to the Scientific Intelligence Committee complaining how they had been kept out of the intelligence sharing loop after the confession of [[Klaus Fuchs]] became more widely known.  In the memorandum the JAEIC suspected the FBI and others may have counter espionage information of considerable value in making an estimate on the status of the Soviet atomic. In the summer of 1949 the FBI learned that the secret of the construction of the atom bomb had been stolen and turned over to a foreign power. An immediate investigation resulted in the identification of Fuchs.<ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/atom/atom.htm The Atom Spy Case], FBI History, fbi.gov</ref> The JAEIC stated had they known in June about Fuchs, it would have impacted their estimate of Soviet atomic capabilities released in July which did not foresee the Soviet Union exploding its first nuclear device at the end of August in 1949. They noted some information was obtained through HUAC, some from Canada as a result of the [[Igor Gouzenko]] case, and Hoover supplied some information but it was only of slight value. The memorandum declares, "The only real assurance we have of getting the information at present seems to be as a result of a Congressional Committee" or the arrest of suspects.<ref>W. K.  Benons to Chairman, Scientific Intelligence Committee, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/29.gif Failure of the JAEIC To Receive Counter Espionage Information having Positive Intelligence Value,] 9 February 1950, Central Intelligence Agency.</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector Elizabeth Bentley and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. Espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not known to the FBI prior to 1946 but many were identified through investigation by 1950.<ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

In summary memorandums to Director Hoover of [[Venona project]] information begun in 1950 entitled, ''Operations of the [[MGB]] Residency at New York, 1944-45'', Special Agent [[Alan Belmont]] reported the FBI had identified 206 persons involved in Soviet espionage activity who had been active in United States. Of this number the FBI had information from defector Elizabeth Bentley and other sources regarding espionage activity on 87 of these persons. Espionage activity on the part of 119 persons from Venona information were not known to the FBI prior to 1946 but many were identified through investigation by 1950.<ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/venona/venona.pdf FBI Venona file]</ref>

==Hiss and the UN==

==Hiss and the UN==

[[Image:Hisstruman.jpg|thumb|300px|right|'''UN Secretary General of the Charter Conference Alger Hiss is seated second from President Truman's left who is speaking at the rostrum.''']]

[[Image:Hisstruman.jpg|thumb|300px|right|'''UN Secretary General of the Charter Conference Alger Hiss is seated second from President Truman's left who is speaking at the rostrum.''']]

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter.<ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]]—a clear violation of the principles of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied powers#United Nations Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter.<ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]]—a clear violation of the principles of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September 1939.  What's more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied powers#United Nations Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of [[KGB Illegal]] operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss.<ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf.</ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007.</ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators.<ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was Venona's “Ales”? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.<ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, Elizabeth Bentley was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President Franklin Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt.<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of [[KGB Illegal]] operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss.<ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf.</ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007.</ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators.<ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was Venona's “Ales”? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.<ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, Elizabeth Bentley was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President Franklin Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt.<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

President Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26, 1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops at that moment for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the administration set up a foreign policy that placed Soviet interests ahead of the United States.<ref>Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History, Washington, DC :  Brassey’s, 2002, pgs. 31, 33.</ref>

President Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan and on July 26, 1941 implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. which virtually ended all trade between the two countries.  The chief of the Japanese Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be doubtful Japan could win. The Japanese Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all military plans against Soviet Siberia, which had badly needed Red Army troops at that moment for the defense of Moscow pinned down,  and looked to the south instead for the oil resources. Due to White's involvement and influence, the administration set up a foreign policy that placed Soviet interests ahead of the United States.<ref>Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History, Washington, DC :  Brassey’s, 2002, pgs. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]] sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941.<ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White’s demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

In August, 1941, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin D. Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]]. On November 18, 1941, Secretary of the Treasury [[Henry Morgenthau]] sent to Secretary of State Hull a memorandum drafted by White on the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>  At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941.<ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull put in final shape the ultimatum. In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo and Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> War between the United States and Japan - the lone obstacle to [[Comintern]] designs in the Far East - was the primary aim of Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

On November 8, 1945 the [[FBI]] notified the White House with a provisional summary of defector Elizabeth Bentley’s revelations.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pgs. 98 - 100] pdf.</ref>  President Truman, whose motto was "The Buck Stops Here," telephoned FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on November 14 and told Hoover to confer with Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] on the various matters of Soviet espionage.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pg. 101; pgs. 102 -104] pdf.</ref>  On May 4, 1946 Truman announced the appointment of White to head the newly created [[International Monetary Fund]].  White, like [[Greg Silvermaster]] and others, rather than be fired as a Security risk at a time when there was public support for the execution of spies, received a transfer, promotion and increase in pay grade.

On November 8, 1945 the [[FBI]] notified the White House with a provisional summary of defector Elizabeth Bentley's revelations.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pgs. 98 - 100] pdf.</ref>  President Truman, whose motto was "The Buck Stops Here," telephoned FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] on November 14 and told Hoover to confer with Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] on the various matters of Soviet espionage.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster016.pdf Vol. 16, pg. 101; pgs. 102 -104] pdf.</ref>  On May 4, 1946 Truman announced the appointment of White to head the newly created [[International Monetary Fund]].  White, like [[Greg Silvermaster]] and others, rather than be fired as a Security risk at a time when there was public support for the execution of spies, received a transfer, promotion and increase in pay grade.

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==

==Oppenheimer and atomic espionage==

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for Comintern operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.<ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for Comintern operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.<ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore sent a dispatch from China to Currie in the White House arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]].<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan—did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore’s career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek wrote the Introduction of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [https://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore sent a dispatch from China to Currie in the White House arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]].<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan—did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore's career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek wrote the Introduction of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [https://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15, 1943, Lattimore instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, were later to write in the ''New York Times'' of China's "agrarian reformers." But in July and August 1943, the [[Maoist]]s—in the midst of the war—joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15, 1943, Lattimore instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, were later to write in the ''New York Times'' of China's "agrarian reformers." But in July and August 1943, the [[Maoist]]s—in the midst of the war—joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[https://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[https://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy's contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee’s lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee.<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

Most but not all of [[Senator McCarthy]]’s numbered cases were drawn from the “Lee List” or “108 list” of unresolved [[Department of State]] security cases compiled by the investigators for the House Appropriates Committee in 1947.  Robert E. Lee was the committee's lead investigator and supervised preparation of the list.  The Tydings subcommittee also obtained this list.  The Lee list, using numbers rather than names, was published in the proceeding of the subcommittee.<ref>U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1950).</ref>  

   

   

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.<ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.

Senator McCarthy furnished the [[Tydings Committee]] the real names attached to his numbered cases, and the Tydings Committee received the real names attached to the Lee list as well.<ref>McCarthy to Tydings, 18 March 1950 with attached list.</ref>  Over the years that followed all of the names became public one way or another. Additionally, in a series of speeches McCarthy named others as secret Communists, spies, security risks, or participants in the Communist conspiracy.

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]], as well as  [[Harry Dexter White]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*3 August [[Whittaker Chambers]] names the first General Secretary of the [[United Nations]] Charter meeting and confident of [[President Roosevelt]] at the [[Yalta Conference]], [[Alger Hiss]], as well as  [[Harry Dexter White]] as Communists in testimony before the HUAC.

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC and claims he’s a loyal New Deal [[Democrat]].

*13 August Harry Dexter White, the first head of the [[International Monetary Fund]], a keystone post war institution, denies charges he is a Soviet agent before HUAC and claims he's a loyal New Deal [[Democrat]].

*Three days later on 16 August Harry Dexter White died of a heart attack. His complicity in espionage  was later conclusively determined by the FBI through evidence gathered by the Venona project as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist".<ref>[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist FBI Memo Ladd to the Director, October 16, 1950], Identifying Harry Dexter White as agent Jurist.</ref>

*Three days later on 16 August Harry Dexter White died of a heart attack. His complicity in espionage  was later conclusively determined by the FBI through evidence gathered by the Venona project as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist".<ref>[http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist FBI Memo Ladd to the Director, October 16, 1950], Identifying Harry Dexter White as agent Jurist.</ref>