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| | ===The Great Retreat=== | | ===The Great Retreat=== |
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| − | On August 24, Joffre issued orders canceling the French offensives; instead, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies were to conduct a fighting retreat westward, while the 4th and 5th (soon joined by a new army, the 6th, formed out of detachments from other units) supported the BEF in blunting the German advance between Lille and Sedan. General Order No. 2, issued the following day, outlined plans for a defensive stance along the Somme river, between Paris and the existing front line. The military governor of Paris, General Joseph Gallieni, made plans for a close-up defense of the capital, though there were relatively few available troops to defend it with. However, the German armies were advancing too rapidly; by the 29th, after heavy losses suffered by the French 5th Army around St. Quentin and the retreat of the BEF from around Compiègne, Joffre was forced to abandon the idea of a stand on the Somme, and ordered a further withdrawal southward, towards the Marne, and entertained the possibility of retreating as far as the Seine river. By September 1, elements of the German First Army, under General Alexander von Kluck, were only thirty miles from Paris, and there was serious talk of evacuating the capital. | + | On August 24, Joffre issued orders canceling the French offensives; instead, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies were to conduct a fighting retreat westward, while the 4th and 5th (soon joined by a new army, the 6th, formed out of detachments from other units) supported the BEF in blunting the German advance between Lille and Sedan. General Order No. 2, issued the following day, outlined plans for a defensive stance along the Somme river, between Paris and the existing front line. The military governor of Paris, General Joseph Gallieni, made plans for a close-up defense of the capital, though there were relatively few available troops to defend it with. However, the German armies were advancing too rapidly; by the 29th, after heavy losses suffered by the French 5th Army around St. Quentin and the retreat of the BEF from around Compiègne, Joffre was forced to abandon the idea of a stand on the Somme, and ordered a further withdrawal southward, towards the Marne, and entertained the possibility of retreating as far as the Seine river. By September 1, elements of the German First Army, under General Alexander von Kluck, were only thirty miles from Paris, and there was serious talk of evacuating the capital.<ref>Barbara W. Tuchman, ''The Guns of August'' (1962), p. 469.</ref> |
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| | ===Preparations=== | | ===Preparations=== |
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| | Learning of the changed tactical situation on September 3, Gallieni at once urged Joffre to permit an immediate flank attack upon the Germans, which Joffre personally favored but was unwilling to undertake without the active participation of the BEF. The British and French armies were separate commands, and Sir John French, the BEF's commander, was not only on poor terms with Joffre and his other counterparts, but had become increasingly pessimistic in the past weeks of fighting and seemed to prefer a retreat back to Britain altogether. After receiving what he understood as assurances from BEF headquarters that the British would join in a counterattack, though, Joffre on the evening of the 4th issued orders for an attack by his left wing on September 6. The French 5th and 6th Armies, together with the BEF, would attack Kluck's First Army, now astride the Marne river east of Château-Thierry, with the 3rd and 4th Armies engaging in a frontal attack against the German lines farther east. | | Learning of the changed tactical situation on September 3, Gallieni at once urged Joffre to permit an immediate flank attack upon the Germans, which Joffre personally favored but was unwilling to undertake without the active participation of the BEF. The British and French armies were separate commands, and Sir John French, the BEF's commander, was not only on poor terms with Joffre and his other counterparts, but had become increasingly pessimistic in the past weeks of fighting and seemed to prefer a retreat back to Britain altogether. After receiving what he understood as assurances from BEF headquarters that the British would join in a counterattack, though, Joffre on the evening of the 4th issued orders for an attack by his left wing on September 6. The French 5th and 6th Armies, together with the BEF, would attack Kluck's First Army, now astride the Marne river east of Château-Thierry, with the 3rd and 4th Armies engaging in a frontal attack against the German lines farther east. |
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| − | French had not, in fact, committed the BEF to Joffre's counterattack, and in fact that same evening indicated his plans to resume his retreat, back toward Fontainebleau. Joffre was forced to travel to French's headquarters at Melun on the 5th, and made a personal appeal to the British general, emphatically protesting, "''Monsieur le Maréchal'', the honor of England is at stake!" Moved by his words, French reversed himself and promised "we will do all we possibly can." By late afternoon, then, Joffre had achieved the necessary conditions for his planned offensive the following morning. | + | French had not, in fact, committed the BEF to Joffre's counterattack, and in fact that same evening indicated his plans to resume his retreat, back toward Fontainebleau. Joffre was forced to travel to French's headquarters at Melun on the 5th, and made a personal appeal to the British general, emphatically protesting, "''Monsieur le Maréchal'', the honor of England is at stake!" Moved by his words, French reversed himself and promised "we will do all we possibly can." By late afternoon, then, Joffre had achieved the necessary conditions for his planned offensive the following morning.<ref>Tuchman, p. 515-17.</ref> |
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| | By this time, Moltke had realized his initial plan had misfired and that the Allies were preparing a large-scale counterattack. Accordingly, he ordered his (westernmost) First and Second Armies to stand on the defensive, while the Third, Fourth, and Fifth stayed on the offensive further east around Verdun to open the way for envelopment of the French right. The same day these orders were issued (September 5th), though, General Hans von Gronau, commanding the IV Reserve Corps that covered Kluck's western flank, received intelligence of the French 6th Army's advance toward his front as part of Joffre's planned offensive, and responded with an immediate attack of his own along the Ourcq, a minor tributary of the Marne. Gronau's corps successfully held the 6th Army at bay until nightfall, after which it fell back; while Kluck, now alerted of the threat to his flank, began to reorient his army to face this new threat. | | By this time, Moltke had realized his initial plan had misfired and that the Allies were preparing a large-scale counterattack. Accordingly, he ordered his (westernmost) First and Second Armies to stand on the defensive, while the Third, Fourth, and Fifth stayed on the offensive further east around Verdun to open the way for envelopment of the French right. The same day these orders were issued (September 5th), though, General Hans von Gronau, commanding the IV Reserve Corps that covered Kluck's western flank, received intelligence of the French 6th Army's advance toward his front as part of Joffre's planned offensive, and responded with an immediate attack of his own along the Ourcq, a minor tributary of the Marne. Gronau's corps successfully held the 6th Army at bay until nightfall, after which it fell back; while Kluck, now alerted of the threat to his flank, began to reorient his army to face this new threat. |
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| | Over the course of September 8, Hentsch, moving from east to west, visited in turn the headquarters of the Fifth, Fourth, Third, and Second Armies. Though the first three were, he judged, in fair condition, Bülow told Hentsch that evening that the gap between his and Kluck's lines had made their position untenable and that they ought to withdraw north of the Marne to avoid being outflanked and overwhelmed. By the following morning, Hentsch had come to agree with Bülow and his staffers and, visiting Kluck later that day, advised him to disengage and withdraw north in order to close ranks with the rest of the German line. Though Kluck was initially opposed to this policy--his IX Corps had already begun to overlap the French northern flank and threatened to sweep into their rear--Bülow had already begun his retreat, and by mid-afternoon Kluck had instructed his corps commanders to follow suit. | | Over the course of September 8, Hentsch, moving from east to west, visited in turn the headquarters of the Fifth, Fourth, Third, and Second Armies. Though the first three were, he judged, in fair condition, Bülow told Hentsch that evening that the gap between his and Kluck's lines had made their position untenable and that they ought to withdraw north of the Marne to avoid being outflanked and overwhelmed. By the following morning, Hentsch had come to agree with Bülow and his staffers and, visiting Kluck later that day, advised him to disengage and withdraw north in order to close ranks with the rest of the German line. Though Kluck was initially opposed to this policy--his IX Corps had already begun to overlap the French northern flank and threatened to sweep into their rear--Bülow had already begun his retreat, and by mid-afternoon Kluck had instructed his corps commanders to follow suit. |
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| − | The withdrawal of the First and Second Armies forced Hausen's Third to follow suit, which spurred the other German formations to fall back as well. After Moltke himself visited the front line on September 11, he ordered all the armies to retreat as far as the Aisne river, some 40-50 miles behind the Marne, and to entrench along the high ground there. It was around this time that Moltke supposedly told Kaiser Wilhelm, who was at the Supreme Headquarters in Luxembourg, "Your Majesty, we have lost the war." Whether Moltke actually said this or not is uncertain; but he did seem to understand that German forces had suffered a defeat and would have to abandon the offensive. Already in poor health when the war started, he also suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown, and on September 14 was relieved of his command, replaced as Chief of the General Staff (the official title for the overall German military commander) by General Erich von Falkenhayn. | + | The withdrawal of the First and Second Armies forced Hausen's Third to follow suit, which spurred the other German formations to fall back as well. After Moltke himself visited the front line on September 11, he ordered all the armies to retreat as far as the Aisne river, some 40-50 miles behind the Marne, and to entrench along the high ground there. It was around this time that Moltke supposedly told Kaiser Wilhelm, who was at the Supreme Headquarters in Luxembourg, "Your Majesty, we have lost the war." Whether Moltke actually said this or not is uncertain; but he did seem to understand that German forces had suffered a defeat and would have to abandon the offensive. Already in poor health when the war started, he also suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown, and on September 14 was relieved of his command, replaced as Chief of the General Staff (the official title for the overall German military commander) by General Erich von Falkenhayn. |
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| | + | ==References== |
| | + | {{reflist}} |
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| | [[Category:World War I]] | | [[Category:World War I]] |