Changes

This represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/jssr_15101.pdf ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043''], ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'', vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,</ref>]]

This represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/jssr_15101.pdf ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043''], ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'', vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,</ref>]]

In their 2010 journal article entitled, ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043'' published in the ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'', Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon wrote:

In their 2010 journal article entitled, ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043'' published in the ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'', Eric Kaufmann, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon wrote:

{{cquote|We find considerable stability of religious groups over time, but there are some important shifts. Hispanic Catholics experience the strongest growth rates to 2043. Immigration, high fertility, and a young age structure will enable this group to expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043, despite a net loss of communicants to secularism and Protestantism. This will power the growth of Catholics as a whole, who will surpass Protestants by mid century within the nation’s youngest age groups. This represents a historic moment for a country settled by anti-Catholic Puritans, whose Revolution was motivated in part by a desire to spread dissenting Protestantism and whose populationon the eve of revolution was 98 percent Protestant (Huntington 2004; Kaufmann 2004). Another important development concerns the growth of the Muslim population and decline of the Jews. High Muslim fertility and a young Muslim age structure contrasts with low Jewish childbearing levels and a mature Jewish age structure. Barring an unforeseen shift in the religious composition and size of the immigrant flow, Muslims will surpass Jews in the population by 2023 and in the electorate by 2028. This could have profound effects on the course of American foreign policy. Within the non-Hispanic white population, we expect to see continued Liberal Protestant decline due to low fertility and a net loss in exchanges with other groups. White Catholics will also lose due to a net outflow of converts. Fundamentalist and Moderate Protestant denominations will hold their own within the white population, but will decline overall as the white share of the population falls.

{{cquote|We find considerable stability of religious groups over time, but there are some important shifts. Hispanic Catholics experience the strongest growth rates to 2043. Immigration, high fertility, and a young age structure will enable this group to expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043, despite a net loss of communicants to secularism and Protestantism. This will power the growth of Catholics as a whole, who will surpass Protestants by mid century within the nation’s youngest age groups. This represents a historic moment for a country settled by anti-Catholic Puritans, whose Revolution was motivated in part by a desire to spread dissenting Protestantism and whose populationon the eve of revolution was 98 percent Protestant (Huntington 2004; Kaufmann 2004). Another important development concerns the growth of the Muslim population and decline of the Jews. High Muslim fertility and a young Muslim age structure contrasts with low Jewish childbearing levels and a mature Jewish age structure. Barring an unforeseen shift in the religious composition and size of the immigrant flow, Muslims will surpass Jews in the population by 2023 and in the electorate by 2028. This could have profound effects on the course of American foreign policy. Within the non-Hispanic white population, we expect to see continued Liberal Protestant decline due to low fertility and a net loss in exchanges with other groups. White Catholics will also lose due to a net outflow of converts. Fundamentalist and Moderate Protestant denominations will hold their own within the white population, but will decline overall as the white share of the population falls.