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Though the Russians held a significant numerical advantage over the defenders, as well as the strategic value of an unexpectedly early offensive, they were beset by a number of disadvantages: many of the troops were poorly armed and equipped, owing to the incomplete mobilization; their artillery component was notably weak compared to the Germans'; though both Rennenkampf and Samsonov were capable officers, the latter was relatively new to his command, having previously served in the Far East and in Turkestan; and the Russians' supply lines would be inadequate once they advanced into Germany (Russia's use of a different rail gauge meant its cars could not run on German tracks). Another drawback that would prove significant was that the Russian army had neither a proper coding system in use, nor sufficient telephone or telegraph cable to run secure communication lines from front-line units to headquarters. As a result, once on German soil many military communications would be sent as "clear" (that is, uncoded) wireless messages, which the Germans frequently intercepted.
Though the Russians held a significant numerical advantage over the defenders, as well as the strategic value of an unexpectedly early offensive, they were beset by a number of disadvantages: many of the troops were poorly armed and equipped, owing to the incomplete mobilization; their artillery component was notably weak compared to the Germans'; though both Rennenkampf and Samsonov were capable officers, the latter was relatively new to his command, having previously served in the Far East and in Turkestan; and the Russians' supply lines would be inadequate once they advanced into Germany (Russia's use of a different rail gauge meant its cars could not run on German tracks). Another drawback that would prove significant was that the Russian army had neither a proper coding system in use, nor sufficient telephone or telegraph cable to run secure communication lines from front-line units to headquarters. As a result, once on German soil many military communications would be sent as "clear" (that is, uncoded) wireless messages, which the Germans frequently intercepted.
==Prelude==
Though Russian units had made forays across the frontier as early as August 12, the main offensive opened on the 17th, when Rennenkampf's First Army crossed the border in force, headed for the Insterburg Gap; Samsonov's Second Army invaded from the south two days later. On the first day of his advance, Rennenkampf met resistance at the town of Stallupönen from a portion of the German I Corps under Lieutenant General Hermann von François, which drove the Russian 27th Division back in a chaotic retreat and took some 3,000 prisoners. This attack had been unauthorized by Prittwitz, who ordered François to fall back toward the Eighth Army's main line on the Angerapp River that night; the promising results of Stallupönen, though, and the sluggish pace of the Russian advance, convinced the general to launch a more general counterattack, in hopes of defeating Rennenkampf before Samsonov brought his forces to bear.
Prittwitz attacked near the town of Gumbinnen on the morning of August 20, with generally negative results. The I Corps under François enjoyed some success, assaulting the right flank of the Russian XX Corps and driving it from the field after its artillery ammunition ran out. However, the other units--the XVII Corps under Lieutenant General August von Mackensen and the I Reserve Corps under General Otto von Below--had had to hastily advance from the Angerapp and thus were not in a position to do more than launch frontal attacks, which the Russians easily repulsed. Under heavy bombardment, Mackensen's and Below's troops broke and fled the field, and by nightfall Prittwitz had ordered the whole army to pull back. Though Rennenkampf declined to pursue the retreating troops, due to concern about the state of his supply lines, reports had by now arrived of Samsonov's offensive from the south; in response, Prittwitz gave orders for Eighth Army to retreat all the way to the Vistula, which would mean abandoning most of East Prussia. That same night, he telephoned Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, overall commander of the German armies, to explain his intentions.
[[Category:World War I]]
[[Category:World War I]]