Changes

Jump to navigation Jump to search
1,397 bytes added ,  04:38, August 1, 2020
Added to page
Line 21: Line 21:  
Although the Schlieffen Plan had accepted the likelihood of a brief occupation of Germany's eastern fringe, until all of its military power could be thrown against the Russian foe, the actual prospect of abandoning East Prussia was not acceptable to the political and military leadership, and pressure was rapidly building for a complete change in policy, and if necessary, commanders. Moltke had for some time wanted to replace Prittwitz, whom he considered too old and temperamentally unfit for his job, and the general's vacillating conduct on August 20-21 was not received well at OHL. The conversation of the 21st, in which Prittwitz expressed his decision to give up most of East Prussia and even implied he would retreat from the Vistula without reinforcements, probably sealed his fate. That evening, Moltke decided to relieve both Prittwitz and his chief of staff, Major General Alfred von Waldersee, of their commands.
 
Although the Schlieffen Plan had accepted the likelihood of a brief occupation of Germany's eastern fringe, until all of its military power could be thrown against the Russian foe, the actual prospect of abandoning East Prussia was not acceptable to the political and military leadership, and pressure was rapidly building for a complete change in policy, and if necessary, commanders. Moltke had for some time wanted to replace Prittwitz, whom he considered too old and temperamentally unfit for his job, and the general's vacillating conduct on August 20-21 was not received well at OHL. The conversation of the 21st, in which Prittwitz expressed his decision to give up most of East Prussia and even implied he would retreat from the Vistula without reinforcements, probably sealed his fate. That evening, Moltke decided to relieve both Prittwitz and his chief of staff, Major General Alfred von Waldersee, of their commands.
   −
To lead the Eighth Army, Moltke and OHL selected a retired Prussian general, Paul von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg, who had served on the Army General Staff and later been a corps commander; though 67 years old and not especially brilliant or vigorous, he was regarded as solid and dependable, which was what the Eastern Front needed at the moment. Hindenburg received the request to take command at his home in Hanover the following afternoon and agreed at once. At the same time, the OHL sought a new chief of staff (an especially important position in the German army, to the extent that such a person was often effectively a co-commander). It chose Major General Erich Ludendorff, who had distinguished himself earlier that month in the siege of [[Liège]] on the Western Front as a man with a penchant for quick and decisive action. The hope was that he would thus be an ideal complement to Hindenburg. Ludendorff was summoned from his position on the 22nd and dispatched east by train that same evening, joining Hindenburg (the two had never previously met) in Hanover the following morning and continuing on to Eighth Army headquarters in Marienburg, arriving on the afternoon of the 23rd and formally taking over from Prittwitz and Waldersee.<ref>Tuchman, p. 334-38.</ref>   
+
To lead the Eighth Army, Moltke and OHL selected a retired Prussian general, Paul von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg, who had served on the Army General Staff and later been a corps commander; though 67 years old and not especially brilliant or vigorous, he was regarded as solid and dependable, which was what the Eastern Front needed at the moment. Hindenburg received the request to take command at his home in Hanover the following afternoon and agreed at once. At the same time, the OHL sought a new chief of staff (an especially important position in the German army, to the extent that such a person was often effectively a co-commander). It chose Major General Erich Ludendorff, who had distinguished himself earlier that month in the siege of [[Liège]] on the Western Front as a man with a penchant for quick and decisive action. The hope was that he would thus be an ideal complement to Hindenburg. Ludendorff was summoned from his position on the 22nd and dispatched east by train that same evening, joining Hindenburg (the two had never previously met) in Hanover the following morning and continuing on to Eighth Army headquarters in Marienburg, arriving on the afternoon of the 23rd and formally taking over from Prittwitz and Waldersee.<ref>Tuchman, p. 334-38.</ref>  
 +
 
 +
==Opening Phase: August 23-26== 
 +
 
 +
Despite the Russians' early success, the crippling problems of communication and supply continued to worry their high command. In particular, communications between Samsonov and General Yakov Zhilinskiy, who had overall responsibility for the front, were patchy and delayed, and out of concern this would cause Samsonov to hesitate, Zhilinskiy repeatedly sent messages (intercepted by German radio) urging haste on the part of Second Army. Samsonov was in fact marching north into East Prussia with all possible speed, having crossed the border on the 19th and pushing back the heavily outnumbered XX Corps over the next few days. However, his troops had by now outrun their supply lines and were growing exhausted in the summer heat, and there was a gap of over sixty miles between them and Rennenkampf's First Army.
 +
 
 +
Already on August 21, the Eighth Army deputy chief of operations, Colonel Max Hoffmann, had issued orders for most of the other units to shift southward and support XX Corps, gambling that Rennenkampf would remain inactive. Upon receiving his new assignment, Ludendorff, with Hindenburg's approval, confirmed these orders, reasoning that with Samsonov still advancing, and the two armies geographically separated, the only real option was to mass all possible force against them one at a time, with the prospect of defeating them in detail.  
    
==References==
 
==References==
SkipCaptcha, Automoderated users, edit
1,631

edits

Navigation menu