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By August 23, the XX Corps had formed a defensive line between the villages of Orlau and Frankenau, which was assaulted the following morning by Samsonov's XV Corps under General Nikolai Martos. After heavy losses on both sides, the German commander, Lieutenant General Friedrich von Scholtz, pulled back another ten miles, forming a new line based around the village of Tannenberg. Owing to the poor communications, Samsonov believed that Rennenkampf was still keeping the bulk of the Eighth Army occupied further northeast, and therefore ordered a continued advance by all four of his corps the following day--this message too was intercepted and reported to the German commanders. In fact, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who had come to Tannenberg that same day to confer with Scholtz, regarded it as a confirmation of their initial decision and summoned Mackensen's and Below's corps to march south at once to reinforce the XX Corps. Simultaneously, François' I Corps, which had been moving from Gumbinnen to the Tannenberg sector via train the past several days, was ordered to attack the Russian left flank at Usdau the next morning, the 25th; though François protested--in vain--that as his ammunition had not yet arrived, his troops would have to rely on the bayonet. Mackensen, supported by Below, would meanwhile assail the Russian right, while Scholtz engaged their center.
By August 23, the XX Corps had formed a defensive line between the villages of Orlau and Frankenau, which was assaulted the following morning by Samsonov's XV Corps under General Nikolai Martos. After heavy losses on both sides, the German commander, Lieutenant General Friedrich von Scholtz, pulled back another ten miles, forming a new line based around the village of Tannenberg. Owing to the poor communications, Samsonov believed that Rennenkampf was still keeping the bulk of the Eighth Army occupied further northeast, and therefore ordered a continued advance by all four of his corps the following day--this message too was intercepted and reported to the German commanders. In fact, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who had come to Tannenberg that same day to confer with Scholtz, regarded it as a confirmation of their initial decision and summoned Mackensen's and Below's corps to march south at once to reinforce the XX Corps. Simultaneously, François' I Corps, which had been moving from Gumbinnen to the Tannenberg sector via train the past several days, was ordered to attack the Russian left flank at Usdau the next morning, the 25th; though François protested--in vain--that as his ammunition had not yet arrived, his troops would have to rely on the bayonet. Mackensen, supported by Below, would meanwhile assail the Russian right, while Scholtz engaged their center.
As the battle was being planned, OHL telephoned Eighth Army headquarters to inform them it was sending three corps and a cavalry division from the Western Front. Ludendorff, who from his time on the General Staff knew the heavy emphasis the Schlieffen Plan placed on an overwhelming flanking assault against the French, protested that the troops were not "positively" needed and could not arrive in time to make a difference; but OHL, under stiff political pressure to spare East Prussia from Russian occupation, insisted (though only two corps were actually sent).
==Main Battle: August 26-30==
Though ordered to begin the attack, François delayed advancing his troops for some time until their ammunition could arrive, despite angry demands by Ludendorff. When the battle ultimately began on the 26th, it was sparked instead by Mackensen, whose XVII Corps moved forward against the Russian VI Corps around Bischofsburg, near the Masurian Lakes. It struck an isolated divison, which lost 5,000 men and sixteen guns before day's end; a second division arrived to reinforce them, but by then Below's corps had also arrived, and through the rest of the day and into the night the VI Corps was steadily pushed back. Further west, where Scholtz was attacking the Russian center, the contest was initially more even. Over the past two days, Samsonov had received enough information to convince him most of Eighth Army was facing him and about to go over to the offensive, and had attempted to reinforce Martos with the XIII Corps of General Nikolai Klyuev and part of the XXIII Corps of General Kyprian Kandratovich. Thus strengthened, Martos' line did not break, but both his left flank (near Osterode) and his right flank (near Allenstein), in the latter case due to Mackensen and Below's defeat of VI Corps, were in danger of being turned. Though aware of the danger, Samsonov decided not to retreat but to hold his position the next day, in the belief that Rennenkampf must by now be threatening the German rear--in reality, Rennenkampf was slowly moving northwest towards Königsberg, and posed no immediate threat to Eighth Army.
During that same day, German headquarters was in a state of nervous tension, owing to François' failure to advance, and also to mistaken reports from aerial reconnaissance that Rennenkampf's First Army might be moving in their direction. Ludendorff experienced a brief panic, and seems to have considered breaking off the battle; however, during a private conversation with Hindenburg, the latter apparently stiffened his resolve, as orders were shortly sent to continue the attack.<ref>Paul von Hindenburg, ''Out of My Life'' (1921), p. 117.</ref>
By nightfall, François' ammunition had finally arrived, and he was ready to begin his attack. In the early morning hours of the 27th, he launched a massive artillery bombardment that broke the Russian I Corps, holding the far left of Samsonov's line at Usdau; by midday, it had abandoned its positions, and François was able to take the field without any serious action by his infantry. Though Samsonov's left later rallied, it was clear his army was now in serious danger of a double envelopment. By day's end, even Zhilinskiy had recognized this fact, and sent Rennenkampf new orders to move to Second Army's support; given the great distance between them, though, it was impossible for him to render Samsonov any immediate help.
The following day, the 28th, saw intense and often confused fighting all along the line. François continued to press around the Russian left in hopes of gaining Samsonov's rear and cutting off his retreat; while Scholtz's XX Corps was, in the opinion of Ludendorff, almost "exhausted" by the past several days of continuous battle, Mackensen, after a slow start, again engaged with the isolated VI Corps and drove it back further, while Below reached Allenstein and threatened to separate the Russian center and right entirely. Samsonov himself, demoralized by the collapse of I Corps on his left, which he had counted on to stabilize the rest of his army, traveled to the front and attempted to personally direct the fighting in Martos' sector; by nightfall, though, he had concluded the situation was irretrievable, and issued orders for a general retreat.
==References==
==References==