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During that same day, German headquarters was in a state of nervous tension, owing to François' failure to advance, and also to mistaken reports from aerial reconnaissance that Rennenkampf's First Army might be moving in their direction. Ludendorff experienced a brief panic, and seems to have considered breaking off the battle; however, during a private conversation with Hindenburg, the latter apparently stiffened his resolve, as orders were shortly sent to continue the attack.<ref>Paul von Hindenburg, ''Out of My Life'' (1921), p. 117.</ref>

During that same day, German headquarters was in a state of nervous tension, owing to François' failure to advance, and also to mistaken reports from aerial reconnaissance that Rennenkampf's First Army might be moving in their direction. Ludendorff experienced a brief panic, and seems to have considered breaking off the battle; however, during a private conversation with Hindenburg, the latter apparently stiffened his resolve, as orders were shortly sent to continue the attack.<ref>Paul von Hindenburg, ''Out of My Life'' (1921), p. 117.</ref>

By nightfall, François' ammunition had finally arrived, and he was ready to begin his attack. In the early morning hours of the 27th, he launched a massive artillery bombardment that broke the Russian I Corps, holding the far left of Samsonov's line at Usdau; by midday, it had abandoned its positions, and François was able to take the field without any serious action by his infantry. Though Samsonov's left later rallied, it was clear his army was now in serious danger of a double envelopment. By day's end, even Zhilinskiy had recognized this fact, and sent Rennenkampf new orders to move to Second Army's support; given the great distance between them, though, it was impossible for him to render Samsonov any immediate help.

By nightfall, François' ammunition had finally arrived, and he was ready to begin his attack. In the early morning hours of the 27th, he launched a massive artillery bombardment that broke the Russian I Corps, holding the far left of Samsonov's line at Usdau; by midday, it had abandoned its positions, and François was able to take the field without any serious action by his infantry. Though Samsonov's left later rallied, it was clear his army was now in serious danger of a double envelopment. By day's end, even Zhilinskiy had recognized this fact, and sent Rennenkampf new orders to move to Second Army's support; given the great distance between them, though, it was impossible for him to render Samsonov any immediate help.<ref>https://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm</ref>

The following day, the 28th, saw intense and often confused fighting all along the line. François continued to press around the Russian left in hopes of gaining Samsonov's rear and cutting off his retreat; while Scholtz's XX Corps was, in the opinion of Ludendorff, almost "exhausted" by the past several days of continuous battle, Mackensen, after a slow start, again engaged with the isolated VI Corps and drove it back further, while Below reached Allenstein and threatened to separate the Russian center and right entirely. Samsonov himself, demoralized by the collapse of I Corps on his left, which he had counted on to stabilize the rest of his army, traveled to the front and attempted to personally direct the fighting in Martos' sector; by nightfall, though, he had concluded the situation was irretrievable, and issued orders for a general retreat.

The following day, the 28th, saw intense and often confused fighting all along the line. François continued to press around the Russian left in hopes of gaining Samsonov's rear and cutting off his retreat; while Scholtz's XX Corps was, in the opinion of Ludendorff, almost "exhausted" by the past several days of continuous battle, Mackensen, after a slow start, again engaged with the isolated VI Corps and drove it back further, while Below reached Allenstein and threatened to separate the Russian center and right entirely. Samsonov himself, demoralized by the collapse of I Corps on his left, which he had counted on to stabilize the rest of his army, traveled to the front and attempted to personally direct the fighting in Martos' sector; by nightfall, though, he had concluded the situation was irretrievable, and issued orders for a general retreat.

Of the many factors that contributed to the German success, the most important are regarded as the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff; the Russians' many supply problems brought on by their rushed mobilization, as compared to the Germans' ability to quickly move troops from one point to another via a superior rail system; and not least the Russian reliance on uncoded wireless communications that the Germans could intercept, thus discovering their intended movements. Colonel Hoffmann of the Eighth Army staff later said of the campaign, "We had an ally--the enemy. We knew all the enemy's plans."<ref>Max Hoffmann, ''War Diaries and Other Papers'' (1929), Vol. I, p. 41. Other spectators at Eighth Army headquarters during this time noted that Ludendorff came to expect nightly copies of intercepted Russian messages and would check with his radio operators if they were delayed.</ref>

Of the many factors that contributed to the German success, the most important are regarded as the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff; the Russians' many supply problems brought on by their rushed mobilization, as compared to the Germans' ability to quickly move troops from one point to another via a superior rail system; and not least the Russian reliance on uncoded wireless communications that the Germans could intercept, thus discovering their intended movements. Colonel Hoffmann of the Eighth Army staff later said of the campaign, "We had an ally--the enemy. We knew all the enemy's plans."<ref>Max Hoffmann, ''War Diaries and Other Papers'' (1929), Vol. I, p. 41. Other spectators at Eighth Army headquarters during this time noted that Ludendorff came to expect nightly copies of intercepted Russian messages and would check with his radio operators if they were delayed.</ref>

After the battle, either Ludendorff or Hoffmann decided to name it "Tannenberg." Though the village itself had served as Scholtz's headquarters for part of the action, the battle had unfolded along a front of more than 50 miles, and some of its most critical phases had occurred around other, larger towns, such as Allenstein and Neidenburg. However, the name Tannenberg carried with it great historical weight, having been the site of a battle in 1410 in which the German [[Teutonic Knights]] had been defeated by Poland-Lithuania. Thus, it was received by the Germans as not only a victory in the current conflict, but the avenging of that earlier event. (Hindenburg personally, claiming descent from the Teutonic Knights, strongly supported the proposed name.)

After the battle, either Ludendorff or Hoffmann decided to name it "Tannenberg." Though the village itself had served as Scholtz's headquarters for part of the action, the battle had unfolded along a front of more than 50 miles, and some of its most critical phases had occurred around other, larger towns, such as Allenstein and Neidenburg. However, the name Tannenberg carried with it great historical weight, having been the site of a battle in 1410 in which the German [[Teutonic Knights]] had been defeated by Poland-Lithuania. Thus, it was received by the Germans as not only a victory in the current conflict, but the avenging of that earlier event. (Hindenburg personally, claiming descent from the Teutonic Knights, strongly supported the proposed name.)<ref>https://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_hindenburg.htm</ref>

The results of Tannenberg were neither as drastic nor as immediate as sometimes claimed. It did not end the Russian presence on German soil, as Rennenkampf's First Army still occupied part of East Prussia; that would continue until German victory at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes the following month. Though Russian morale was shaken by the defeat, this was tempered somewhat by their own crushing triumph over the armies of [[Austria-Hungary]] in Galicia during the same period. Moreover, though Tannenberg had ended the prospect of a more thorough invasion of eastern Germany, the Russians had achieved their greater strategic purpose: by rapidly mobilizing and provoking fear among the German political and military leadership, they had led Moltke and the OHL to detach two corps from the critical Western Front to support the Eighth Army, weakening the armies sweeping through [[Belgium]] and into France when overwhelming strength was a necessity. After the narrow Franco-British victory at the [[First Battle of the Marne]] in September, a French officer stated, "Let us render to our Allies {i.e. Russia} the homage that is their due, for one of the elements of our victory was their debacle."<ref>Charles Dupont, ''Le Haut Commandement allemand en 1914: du point de vue allemand'' (1922), 2.</ref>

The results of Tannenberg were neither as drastic nor as immediate as sometimes claimed. It did not end the Russian presence on German soil, as Rennenkampf's First Army still occupied part of East Prussia; that would continue until German victory at the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes the following month. Though Russian morale was shaken by the defeat, this was tempered somewhat by their own crushing triumph over the armies of [[Austria-Hungary]] in Galicia during the same period. Moreover, though Tannenberg had ended the prospect of a more thorough invasion of eastern Germany, the Russians had achieved their greater strategic purpose: by rapidly mobilizing and provoking fear among the German political and military leadership, they had led Moltke and the OHL to detach two corps from the critical Western Front to support the Eighth Army, weakening the armies sweeping through [[Belgium]] and into France when overwhelming strength was a necessity. After the narrow Franco-British victory at the [[First Battle of the Marne]] in September, a French officer stated, "Let us render to our Allies {i.e. Russia} the homage that is their due, for one of the elements of our victory was their debacle."<ref>Charles Dupont, ''Le Haut Commandement allemand en 1914: du point de vue allemand'' (1922), 2.</ref>