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Though ordered to begin the attack, François delayed advancing his troops for some time until their ammunition could arrive, despite angry demands by Ludendorff. When the battle ultimately began on the 26th, it was sparked instead by Mackensen, whose XVII Corps moved forward against the Russian VI Corps around Bischofsburg, near the Masurian Lakes. It struck an isolated divison, which lost 5,000 men and sixteen guns before day's end; a second division arrived to reinforce them, but by then Below's corps had also arrived, and through the rest of the day and into the night the VI Corps was steadily pushed back. Further west, where Scholtz was attacking the Russian center, the contest was initially more even. Over the past two days, Samsonov had received enough information to convince him most of Eighth Army was facing him and about to go over to the offensive, and had attempted to reinforce Martos with the XIII Corps of General Nikolai Klyuev and part of the XXIII Corps of General Kyprian Kandratovich. Thus strengthened, Martos' line did not break, but both his left flank (near Osterode) and his right flank (near Allenstein), in the latter case due to Mackensen and Below's defeat of VI Corps, were in danger of being turned. Though aware of the danger, Samsonov decided not to retreat but to hold his position the next day, in the belief that Rennenkampf must by now be threatening the German rear--in reality, Rennenkampf was slowly moving northwest towards Königsberg, and posed no immediate threat to Eighth Army.
 
Though ordered to begin the attack, François delayed advancing his troops for some time until their ammunition could arrive, despite angry demands by Ludendorff. When the battle ultimately began on the 26th, it was sparked instead by Mackensen, whose XVII Corps moved forward against the Russian VI Corps around Bischofsburg, near the Masurian Lakes. It struck an isolated divison, which lost 5,000 men and sixteen guns before day's end; a second division arrived to reinforce them, but by then Below's corps had also arrived, and through the rest of the day and into the night the VI Corps was steadily pushed back. Further west, where Scholtz was attacking the Russian center, the contest was initially more even. Over the past two days, Samsonov had received enough information to convince him most of Eighth Army was facing him and about to go over to the offensive, and had attempted to reinforce Martos with the XIII Corps of General Nikolai Klyuev and part of the XXIII Corps of General Kyprian Kandratovich. Thus strengthened, Martos' line did not break, but both his left flank (near Osterode) and his right flank (near Allenstein), in the latter case due to Mackensen and Below's defeat of VI Corps, were in danger of being turned. Though aware of the danger, Samsonov decided not to retreat but to hold his position the next day, in the belief that Rennenkampf must by now be threatening the German rear--in reality, Rennenkampf was slowly moving northwest towards Königsberg, and posed no immediate threat to Eighth Army.
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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R36715, Ostpreußen, deutsche Infanterie auf dem Marsch.jpg|thumb|220px|right|German soldiers at the Battle of Tannenberg]]
    
During that same day, German headquarters was in a state of nervous tension, owing to François' failure to advance, and also to mistaken reports from aerial reconnaissance that Rennenkampf's First Army might be moving in their direction. Ludendorff experienced a brief panic, and seems to have considered breaking off the battle; however, during a private conversation with Hindenburg, the latter apparently stiffened his resolve, as orders were shortly sent to continue the attack.<ref>Paul von Hindenburg, ''Out of My Life'' (1921), p. 117.</ref>
 
During that same day, German headquarters was in a state of nervous tension, owing to François' failure to advance, and also to mistaken reports from aerial reconnaissance that Rennenkampf's First Army might be moving in their direction. Ludendorff experienced a brief panic, and seems to have considered breaking off the battle; however, during a private conversation with Hindenburg, the latter apparently stiffened his resolve, as orders were shortly sent to continue the attack.<ref>Paul von Hindenburg, ''Out of My Life'' (1921), p. 117.</ref>
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