Changes

'''''Rust v. Sullivan''''' has been cited by more than 3000 court decisions.  Future Chief Justice [[John Roberts]] successfully argued against the [[abortion]] side in this case, defeating [[liberal]] Professor [[Laurence Tribe]] who argued for the [[abortion]] side.

'''''Rust v. Sullivan''''' has been cited by more than 3000 court decisions.  Future Chief Justice [[John Roberts]] successfully argued against the [[abortion]] side in this case, defeating [[liberal]] Professor [[Laurence Tribe]] who argued for the [[abortion]] side.

In '''''Rust v. Sullivan''''', the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] held that, within "broad[] limits," when "the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program," it is "entitled to define the limits of that program" and to prohibit certain speech "to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed." ''Id.'' at 193-194.

In '''''Rust v. Sullivan''''', the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] held that, within "broad limits," when "the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program," it is "entitled to define the limits of that program" and to prohibit certain speech "to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed." ''Id.'' at 193-194.

Distinguishing between the government's sovereign and non-sovereign functions, the Court explained that the case involved, not "a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech," but rather a "refus[al] to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded." ''Id.'' at 194-195. The Court noted that a recipient of funds "is in no way compelled to operate a Title X project" and may "avoid the force of the regulations ... simply [by] declin[ing] the subsidy." ''Id.'' at 199 n.5. The Court also indicated that the result would have been different if the program had involved property "traditionally open to the public for expressive activity" or "expressly dedicated to speech activity," id. at 200 (quoting ''Kokinda'', 497 U.S. at 726), thereby suggesting that the program at issue could be viewed as a nonpublic forum.

Distinguishing between the government's sovereign and non-sovereign functions, the Court explained that the case involved, not "a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech," but rather a "refus[al] to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded." ''Id.'' at 194-195. The Court noted that a recipient of funds "is in no way compelled to operate a Title X project" and may "avoid the force of the regulations ... simply [by] declin[ing] the subsidy." ''Id.'' at 199 n.5. The Court also indicated that the result would have been different if the program had involved property "traditionally open to the public for expressive activity" or "expressly dedicated to speech activity," id. at 200 (quoting ''Kokinda'', 497 U.S. at 726), thereby suggesting that the program at issue could be viewed as a nonpublic forum.