Changes

Justice Scalia wrote the oft-cited Court opinion in ''[[R.A.V. v. St. Paul]]'', 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which enjoyed 5-4 support though the verdict was unanimous. Justice Scalia also wrote the 7-2 Court opinion in ''[[Crawford v. Washington]]'', 541 U.S. 36 (2004), in which he applied the [[Confrontation Clause]] to exclude an out-of-court statement by a witness who did not testify in court (because of the spousal privilege) against her defendant husband.

Justice Scalia wrote the oft-cited Court opinion in ''[[R.A.V. v. St. Paul]]'', 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which enjoyed 5-4 support though the verdict was unanimous. Justice Scalia also wrote the 7-2 Court opinion in ''[[Crawford v. Washington]]'', 541 U.S. 36 (2004), in which he applied the [[Confrontation Clause]] to exclude an out-of-court statement by a witness who did not testify in court (because of the spousal privilege) against her defendant husband.

Justice Scalia has been a consistent supporter of [[federalism]], and in ''[[Printz v. United States]]'' (1997) he wrote the 5-4 opinion that invalidated certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536, commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks.

Justice Scalia has been a consistent supporter of [[federalism]], and in ''[[Printz v. United States]]'' (1997) he wrote the 5-4 opinion that invalidated certain interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103–159, 107 Stat. 1536, commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks.

In the dissent for [[Obergefell v. Hodges]], Scalia wrote:

In the dissent for [[Obergefell v. Hodges]], Scalia wrote:

::I cannot avoid observing, however, two stark discrepancies between today's due process reasoning and the due process reasoning the Court applies to its identification of new so-called fundamental rights, such as the right to structure family living arrangements, see ''Moore v. East Cleveland'', 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) (plurality opinion), and the right to an abortion, see ''Roe v. Wade'', 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). First and most obviously, where respondent's claimed right to hold onto his property is at issue, the Court upholds the tax amendment because it rationally furthers a legitimate interest; whereas when other claimed rights that the Court deems fundamental are at issue, the Court strikes down laws that concededly promote legitimate interests, id., at 150, 162. Secondly, when it is pointed out that the Court's retroactive-tax ruling today is inconsistent with earlier decisions, ''see, e.g.'', ''Nichols v. Coolidge'', 274 U.S. 531, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927); ''Blodgett v. Holden'', 275 U.S. 142, 72 L. Ed. 206, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1927); ''Untermyer v. Anderson'', 276 U.S. 440, 72 L. Ed. 645, 48 S. Ct. 353 (1928), the Court dismisses those cases as having been "decided during an era characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an approach that 'has long since been discarded.'" ''Ante'', at 34, quoting ''Ferguson v. Skrupa'', 372 U.S. 726, 730, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93, 83 S. Ct. 1028 (1963). But economic legislation was not the only legislation subjected to "exacting review" in those bad old days, and one wonders what principled reason justifies "discarding" that bad old approach only as to that category. For the Court continues to rely upon "exacting review" cases of the Nichols-Blodgett-Untermyer vintage for its due process "fundamental rights" jurisprudence. ''See, e.g.'', ''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 152-153, 159 (citing ''Meyer v. Nebraska'', 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), and ''Pierce v. Society of Sisters'', 268 U.S. 510, 535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925)); see also ''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479, 483, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) ("We reaffirm the principle of the ''Pierce'' and the ''Meyer'' cases").

::I cannot avoid observing, however, two stark discrepancies between today's due process reasoning and the due process reasoning the Court applies to its identification of new so-called fundamental rights, such as the right to structure family living arrangements, see ''Moore v. East Cleveland'', 431 U.S. 494, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) (plurality opinion), and the right to an abortion, see ''Roe v. Wade'', 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). First and most obviously, where respondent's claimed right to hold onto his property is at issue, the Court upholds the tax amendment because it rationally furthers a legitimate interest; whereas when other claimed rights that the Court deems fundamental are at issue, the Court strikes down laws that concededly promote legitimate interests, id., at 150, 162. Secondly, when it is pointed out that the Court's retroactive-tax ruling today is inconsistent with earlier decisions, ''see, e.g.'', ''Nichols v. Coolidge'', 274 U.S. 531, 71 L. Ed. 1184, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927); ''Blodgett v. Holden'', 275 U.S. 142, 72 L. Ed. 206, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1927); ''Untermyer v. Anderson'', 276 U.S. 440, 72 L. Ed. 645, 48 S. Ct. 353 (1928), the Court dismisses those cases as having been "decided during an era characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an approach that 'has long since been discarded.'" ''Ante'', at 34, quoting ''Ferguson v. Skrupa'', 372 U.S. 726, 730, 10 L. Ed. 2d 93, 83 S. Ct. 1028 (1963). But economic legislation was not the only legislation subjected to "exacting review" in those bad old days, and one wonders what principled reason justifies "discarding" that bad old approach only as to that category. For the Court continues to rely upon "exacting review" cases of the Nichols-Blodgett-Untermyer vintage for its due process "fundamental rights" jurisprudence. ''See, e.g.'', ''Roe'', 410 U.S. at 152-153, 159 (citing ''Meyer v. Nebraska'', 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923), and ''Pierce v. Society of Sisters'', 268 U.S. 510, 535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925)); see also ''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479, 483, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) ("We reaffirm the principle of the ''Pierce'' and the ''Meyer'' cases").

Justice Scalia wrote a strident dissent in ''[[Sell v. United States]]'' (2003), in which he supported allowing the government to forcibly medicate a never-convicted defendant with mind-altering drugs, and without a right of direct appeal of such decision. [[Conservative]] groups in the case opposed such far-reaching with Justice Scalia by a 6-3 vote and blocked the forced medication in that case.

Justice Scalia wrote a strident dissent in ''[[Sell v. United States]]'' (2003), in which he supported allowing the government to forcibly medicate a never-convicted defendant with mind-altering drugs, and without a right of direct appeal of such decision. [[Conservative]] groups in the case opposed such far-reaching with Justice Scalia by a 6–3 vote and blocked the forced medication in that case.

Justice Scalia surprisingly joined a more [[liberal]] group in striking down state restrictions on the direct shipment of wine by out-of-state wineries. In ''Granholm v. Heald'' (2005), Justice Scalia rejected numerous [[conservative]] amicus briefs and declined to join the opinion of Justice Thomas, and instead provided the pivotal 5th vote to interpreting the [[Commerce Clause]] as prohibiting state limitations on interstate wine shipments, despite the [[Twenty-First Amendment]] and a federal statute granting authority to states over alcohol.

Justice Scalia surprisingly joined a more [[liberal]] group in striking down state restrictions on the direct shipment of wine by out-of-state wineries. In ''Granholm v. Heald'' (2005), Justice Scalia rejected numerous [[conservative]] amicus briefs and declined to join the opinion of Justice Thomas, and instead provided the pivotal 5th vote to interpreting the [[Commerce Clause]] as prohibiting state limitations on interstate wine shipments, despite the [[Twenty-First Amendment]] and a federal statute granting authority to states over alcohol.