Changes

When the French Revolution led to war in 1793 between Britain (America's leading trading partner), and France (the old ally, with a treaty still in effect), Washington and his cabinet decided on a policy of neutrality.  Washington supported the [[Jay's Treaty]], designed by Hamilton to avoid war with Britain and encourage commerce.  The Jeffersonians vehemently opposed the treaty, but Washington's support proved decisive, and the U.S. and Britain were on friendly terms for a decade.

When the French Revolution led to war in 1793 between Britain (America's leading trading partner), and France (the old ally, with a treaty still in effect), Washington and his cabinet decided on a policy of neutrality.  Washington supported the [[Jay's Treaty]], designed by Hamilton to avoid war with Britain and encourage commerce.  The Jeffersonians vehemently opposed the treaty, but Washington's support proved decisive, and the U.S. and Britain were on friendly terms for a decade.

The French were openly seizing American ships, leading to an undeclared war known as the [[Quasi-War]] of 1798-99.  President [[John Adams]] tried diplomacy; it failed. In 1798, the French demanded American diplomats pay huge bribes in order to see the French Foreign Minister [[Talleyrand]], which the Americans rejected. The Jeffersonian Republicans, suspicious of Adams, demanded the documentation, which Adams released using X, Y and Z as codes for the names of the French diplomats. A wave of nationalist sentiment overwhelmed the U.S. Congress approved Adams' plan to organize the navy. Adams reluctantly signed the Alien and Sedition Act as a wartime measure.  Adams broke with the Hamiltonian wing of his [[Federalist Party]] and made peace with France in 1800.

The French were openly seizing American ships, leading to an undeclared war known as the [[Quasi-War]] of 1798–99.  President [[John Adams]] tried diplomacy; it failed. In 1798, the French demanded American diplomats pay huge bribes in order to see the French Foreign Minister [[Talleyrand]], which the Americans rejected. The Jeffersonian Republicans, suspicious of Adams, demanded the documentation, which Adams released using X, Y and Z as codes for the names of the French diplomats. A wave of nationalist sentiment overwhelmed the U.S. Congress approved Adams' plan to organize the navy. Adams reluctantly signed the Alien and Sedition Act as a wartime measure.  Adams broke with the Hamiltonian wing of his [[Federalist Party]] and made peace with France in 1800.

==Late 19th Century==

==Late 19th Century==

In 1889 GOP President [[Benjamin Harrison]] appointed party leader [[James G. Blaine]] as Secretary of State. During three years of service in this office, helped open the nation's engagement with the outside world.<ref>A. T. Volwiler, "Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889-1893," ''Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,'' Vol. 79, No. 4 (Nov. 15, 1938), pp. 637-648 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/984943 in JSTOR];  Robert L. Beisner, ''From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865—1900.'' (2d ed., 1986); Edward P. Crapol, ''James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire.''  (2000); David Healy, ''James G. Blaine and Latin America'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=109808323 online edition]

In 1889 GOP President [[Benjamin Harrison]] appointed party leader [[James G. Blaine]] as Secretary of State. During three years of service in this office, helped open the nation's engagement with the outside world.<ref>A. T. Volwiler, "Harrison, Blaine, and American Foreign Policy, 1889-1893," ''Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,'' Vol. 79, No. 4 (Nov. 15, 1938), pp. 637-648 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/984943 in JSTOR];  Robert L. Beisner, ''From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865—1900.'' (2d ed., 1986); Edward P. Crapol, ''James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire.''  (2000); David Healy, ''James G. Blaine and Latin America'' (2001) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=109808323 online edition]

</ref> Blaine focused on relations with Latin-American and Britain. He pushed for an canal across Panama, built, operated, and controlled by the United States; he secured Congressional legislation resulting in the Pan-American Conference which met in Washington in October, 1889. Blaine's set up the Bureau of American Republics in Washington.<ref>Healy (2001)</ref> As an early environmentalist he used diplomacy to protect the seal herds in the Pribilof Islands of Alaska.<ref>Charles S. Campbell, Jr., "The Anglo-American Crisis in the Bering Sea, 1890-1891." ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'' 1961 48(3): 393-414. Issn: 0161-391x Fulltext: in Jstor</ref> He tried to annex Hawaii (which almost succeeded in early 1893, but was postponed to 1898). Indeed, the permanent influence of Blaine on American life was through his foreign policy. Although Blaine concluded tariff reciprocity agreements with eight Latin American nations, reciprocity negotiations with Canada stalled in 1891-92. Harrison and Blaine feared a political backlash from American farmers and lumbermen if concessions were made to Canada. Blaine's Anglophobia also influenced the outcome of the negotiations, and Canada's negotiators to the end resisted the inclusion of reciprocity on manufactured articles in any treaty.<ref>Allan B. Spetter, "Harrison and Blaine: No Reciprocity for Canada." ''Canadian Review of American Studies'' 1981 12(2): 143-156. Issn: 0007-7720</ref> The two most important reciprocity agreements were signed with Brazil and with Spain for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

</ref> Blaine focused on relations with Latin-American and Britain. He pushed for an canal across Panama, built, operated, and controlled by the United States; he secured Congressional legislation resulting in the Pan-American Conference which met in Washington in October, 1889. Blaine's set up the Bureau of American Republics in Washington.<ref>Healy (2001)</ref> As an early environmentalist he used diplomacy to protect the seal herds in the Pribilof Islands of Alaska.<ref>Charles S. Campbell, Jr., "The Anglo-American Crisis in the Bering Sea, 1890-1891." ''Mississippi Valley Historical Review'' 1961 48(3): 393-414. Issn: 0161-391x Fulltext: in Jstor</ref> He tried to annex Hawaii (which almost succeeded in early 1893, but was postponed to 1898). Indeed, the permanent influence of Blaine on American life was through his foreign policy. Although Blaine concluded tariff reciprocity agreements with eight Latin American nations, reciprocity negotiations with Canada stalled in 1891–92. Harrison and Blaine feared a political backlash from American farmers and lumbermen if concessions were made to Canada. Blaine's Anglophobia also influenced the outcome of the negotiations, and Canada's negotiators to the end resisted the inclusion of reciprocity on manufactured articles in any treaty.<ref>Allan B. Spetter, "Harrison and Blaine: No Reciprocity for Canada." ''Canadian Review of American Studies'' 1981 12(2): 143-156. Issn: 0007-7720</ref> The two most important reciprocity agreements were signed with Brazil and with Spain for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

In foreign policy Blaine was a transitional figure, marking the end of one era in foreign policy and foreshadowing the next. Blaine brought energy, imagination and verve to the office in sharp contrast with his somnolent rivals, inspiring his activist twentieth-century successors. He was a pioneer in arbitration treaties, tariff reciprocity, and American administration of Latin American customs houses. to avert civil wars over the revenue stream.  Blaine wanted the U.S. to be the protector and leader of the Western Hemisphere, even if the Latin America countries disagreed. He insisted on keeping the Americas away from European control while favoring peaceful arbitration and negotiations rather than war. Blaine forcefully argued for the national interests of his country. He kept the big picture firmly in mind, seeking long-term programs and not simply short-term fixes for the matter at hand.

In foreign policy Blaine was a transitional figure, marking the end of one era in foreign policy and foreshadowing the next. Blaine brought energy, imagination and verve to the office in sharp contrast with his somnolent rivals, inspiring his activist twentieth-century successors. He was a pioneer in arbitration treaties, tariff reciprocity, and American administration of Latin American customs houses. to avert civil wars over the revenue stream.  Blaine wanted the U.S. to be the protector and leader of the Western Hemisphere, even if the Latin America countries disagreed. He insisted on keeping the Americas away from European control while favoring peaceful arbitration and negotiations rather than war. Blaine forcefully argued for the national interests of his country. He kept the big picture firmly in mind, seeking long-term programs and not simply short-term fixes for the matter at hand.

====Roosevelt Corollary and Panama Canal====

====Roosevelt Corollary and Panama Canal====

The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers.  The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay.  The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902-03.  The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants.  The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online</ref>

The '''Roosevelt Corollary''' to the [[Monroe Doctrine]] was a substantial expansion in 1904. Roosevelt asserted the right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the economic affairs of small nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts and were at risk of intervention by European powers.  The new policy primarily prevented intervention by Britain and Germany, which loaned money to the countries that did not repay.  The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela affair of 1902–03.  The intervention took the form of takeover of the customs collection, and disbursement of the funds to the debtors and claimants.  The policy was unpopular abroad.<ref>Serge Ricard, "The Roosevelt Corollary." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 17-26. Issn: 0360-4918, online</ref>

[[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal&mdash;and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]]

[[Image:Panam2.JPG|thumb|350px|Roosevelt builds the canal&mdash;and shovels dirt on Bogota, the capital of Colombia]]

Tensions with Mexico, then in the throes of a violent civil war, escalated almost to the point of warfare. The U.S. sent military forces to chase Pancho Villa and to control the port of Vera Cruz. In 1917 both parties pulled back, and by 1920 the civil war was over.  

Tensions with Mexico, then in the throes of a violent civil war, escalated almost to the point of warfare. The U.S. sent military forces to chase Pancho Villa and to control the port of Vera Cruz. In 1917 both parties pulled back, and by 1920 the civil war was over.  

More serious was the worldwide Great War (now called [[World War I]]) that began in 1914 and was killing millions of soldiers to no apparent end. Proclaiming neutrality, President [[Woodrow Wilson]] tried repeatedly to broker peace in 1915-1916, but the adversaries in Europe were both planning to win and did not want a negotiated settlement. After Germany started sinking American merchant ships in 1917, and tried to entice Mexico into going to war with the U.S. Wilson in April 1917 asked and received a declaration of war from Congress. Wilson argued persuasively that it was now necessary to fight against militarism and for democracy in the world. He set up a draft and trained millions of soldiers, sending the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] to the [[Western Front]] in France under the command of General [[John J. Pershing]]. The Americans and the Allies defeated the Germans in late 1918—the so-called "armistice" was in effect a German surrender.

More serious was the worldwide Great War (now called [[World War I]]) that began in 1914 and was killing millions of soldiers to no apparent end. Proclaiming neutrality, President [[Woodrow Wilson]] tried repeatedly to broker peace in 1915–1916, but the adversaries in Europe were both planning to win and did not want a negotiated settlement. After Germany started sinking American merchant ships in 1917, and tried to entice Mexico into going to war with the U.S. Wilson in April 1917 asked and received a declaration of war from Congress. Wilson argued persuasively that it was now necessary to fight against militarism and for democracy in the world. He set up a draft and trained millions of soldiers, sending the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] to the [[Western Front]] in France under the command of General [[John J. Pershing]]. The Americans and the Allies defeated the Germans in late 1918—the so-called "armistice" was in effect a German surrender.

Wilson, aided by his top advisor [[Colonel House]], played a dominant role in ending the war with his [[Fourteen Points]] and played the central role at the 1919 [[Paris Peace Conference]] that set the peace terms. Wilson failed to obtain Senate approval for the [[Treaty of Versailles]] because it required American entry into the [[League of Nations]], and Republicans led by Senator [[Henry Cabot Lodge]] demanded amendments (called "reservations") to protect American sovereignty, which Wilson rejected. The League went into operation but was ineffective; the U.S. never joined it.  

Wilson, aided by his top advisor [[Colonel House]], played a dominant role in ending the war with his [[Fourteen Points]] and played the central role at the 1919 [[Paris Peace Conference]] that set the peace terms. Wilson failed to obtain Senate approval for the [[Treaty of Versailles]] because it required American entry into the [[League of Nations]], and Republicans led by Senator [[Henry Cabot Lodge]] demanded amendments (called "reservations") to protect American sovereignty, which Wilson rejected. The League went into operation but was ineffective; the U.S. never joined it.  

===1933-39: Isolation===

===1933-39: Isolation===

The rejection of the [[League of Nations]] treaty in 1919 marked the dominance of [[isolationism]] from world organizations in American foreign policy. Despite Roosevelt's Wilsonian background, he and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Cordell Hull]] acted with great care not to provoke isolationist sentiment. Roosevelt's "bombshell" message to the world monetary conference in 1933 effectively ended any major efforts by the world powers to collaborate on ending the worldwide depression, and allowed Roosevelt a free hand in economic policy. The main foreign policy initiative of Roosevelt's first term was the [[Good Neighbor Policy]], which was a re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards [[Latin America]]. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. American forces were withdrawn from [[Haiti]], and new treaties with [[Cuba, history|Cuba]] and [[Panama]] ended their status as protectorates. In December 1933, Roosevelt signed the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, renouncing the right to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of Latin American countries. The rise to power of [[Adolf Hitler]] in Germany in 1933 aroused fears of a new world war. In 1935, at the time of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, Congress passed the Neutrality Act, applying a mandatory ban on the shipment of arms from the U.S. to any combatant nation. Roosevelt opposed the act on the grounds that it penalized the victims of aggression such as Ethiopia, and that it restricted his right as President to assist friendly countries, but public support was overwhelming so he signed it. In 1937, Congress passed an even more stringent act, but when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, public opinion favored China, and Roosevelt found various ways to assist that nation.

The rejection of the [[League of Nations]] treaty in 1919 marked the dominance of [[isolationism]] from world organizations in American foreign policy. Despite Roosevelt's Wilsonian background, he and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Cordell Hull]] acted with great care not to provoke isolationist sentiment. Roosevelt's "bombshell" message to the world monetary conference in 1933 effectively ended any major efforts by the world powers to collaborate on ending the worldwide depression, and allowed Roosevelt a free hand in economic policy. The main foreign policy initiative of Roosevelt's first term was the [[Good Neighbor Policy]], which was a re-evaluation of U.S. policy towards [[Latin America]]. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. American forces were withdrawn from [[Haiti]], and new treaties with [[Cuba, history|Cuba]] and [[Panama]] ended their status as protectorates. In December 1933, Roosevelt signed the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, renouncing the right to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of Latin American countries. The rise to power of [[Adolf Hitler]] in Germany in 1933 aroused fears of a new world war. In 1935, at the time of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, Congress passed the Neutrality Act, applying a mandatory ban on the shipment of arms from the U.S. to any combatant nation. Roosevelt opposed the act on the grounds that it penalized the victims of aggression such as Ethiopia, and that it restricted his right as president to assist friendly countries, but public support was overwhelming so he signed it. In 1937, Congress passed an even more stringent act, but when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, public opinion favored China, and Roosevelt found various ways to assist that nation.

==Coming of World War II==

==Coming of World War II==

* [[Harry Hopkins]], FDR's negotiator with Britain and the Soviet Union

* [[Harry Hopkins]], FDR's negotiator with Britain and the Soviet Union

While there were miscalculations as to where Japan woulds strike, Roosevelt did not provoke the attack on Pearl Harbor as a means of getting into war with Germany. Roosevelt's third term was dominated by World War II, in Europe and in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Roosevelt slowly began re-armament in 1938 since he was facing strong isolationist sentiment from leaders like Senators [[William Borah]] and [[Robert Taft]] who supported re-armament. By 1940, it was in high gear, with bipartisan support, partly to expand and re-equip the Army and Navy and partly to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" supporting Britain, France, China and (after June 1941), the Soviet Union. As Roosevelt took a firmer stance against the [[Axis Powers]], American isolationists—including [[Charles Lindbergh]] and [[America First]]—attacked the President as an irresponsible warmonger. Unfazed by these criticisms and confident in the wisdom of his foreign policy initiatives, FDR continued his twin policies of preparedness and aid to the Allied coalition. On December 29, 1940, he delivered his Arsenal of Democracy fireside chat, in which he made the case for involvement directly to the American people, and a week later he delivered his famous [[Four Freedoms]] speech in January 1941, further laying out the case for an American defense of basic rights throughout the world. Germany and the Soviet Union had been allied in 1939-41, so American Communists demanded neutrality and no aid to Britain; they opposed FDR's reelection in 1940. Increasingly the conservative Republican business and professional community in the Northeast rallied behind Britain, and supported Roosevelt's efforts to aid the British war effort. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Roosevelt extended Lend-Lease to the Soviets.  

While there were miscalculations as to where Japan woulds strike, Roosevelt did not provoke the attack on Pearl Harbor as a means of getting into war with Germany. Roosevelt's third term was dominated by World War II, in Europe and in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Roosevelt slowly began re-armament in 1938 since he was facing strong isolationist sentiment from leaders like Senators [[William Borah]] and [[Robert Taft]] who supported re-armament. By 1940, it was in high gear, with bipartisan support, partly to expand and re-equip the Army and Navy and partly to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" supporting Britain, France, China and (after June 1941), the Soviet Union. As Roosevelt took a firmer stance against the [[Axis Powers]], American isolationists—including [[Charles Lindbergh]] and [[America First]]—attacked the President as an irresponsible warmonger. Unfazed by these criticisms and confident in the wisdom of his foreign policy initiatives, FDR continued his twin policies of preparedness and aid to the Allied coalition. On December 29, 1940, he delivered his Arsenal of Democracy fireside chat, in which he made the case for involvement directly to the American people, and a week later he delivered his famous [[Four Freedoms]] speech in January 1941, further laying out the case for an American defense of basic rights throughout the world. Germany and the Soviet Union had been allied in 1939–41, so American Communists demanded neutrality and no aid to Britain; they opposed FDR's reelection in 1940. Increasingly the conservative Republican business and professional community in the Northeast rallied behind Britain, and supported Roosevelt's efforts to aid the British war effort. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Roosevelt extended Lend-Lease to the Soviets.  

During 1941, Roosevelt agreed that the U.S. Navy would escort British convoys as far east as Britain and would fire upon German ships or submarines if they attacked Allied shipping within the U.S. Navy zone. Moreover, by 1941, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers were secretly ferrying British fighter planes between Britain and the Mediterranean war zones, and the British Royal Navy was receiving supply and repair assistance at American naval bases. Thus, by mid-1941, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to the Allied side with a policy of "all aid short of war." Roosevelt met with Churchill in August 1941, to write the [[Atlantic Charter]] in what was to be the first of several wartime conferences. The War Department's "Victory Program," provided the President with the estimates necessary for the total mobilization of manpower, industry, and logistics to defeat Germany and Japan.<ref>Mark Skinner Watson, ''Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations,'' (1950), 331-366 at [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/csppp/ch11.htm online]</ref> The program also planned to dramatically increase aid to the Allied nations and to have ten million men in arms, half of whom would be ready for deployment abroad in 1943. Roosevelt was firmly committed to the Allied cause.

During 1941, Roosevelt agreed that the U.S. Navy would escort British convoys as far east as Britain and would fire upon German ships or submarines if they attacked Allied shipping within the U.S. Navy zone. Moreover, by 1941, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers were secretly ferrying British fighter planes between Britain and the Mediterranean war zones, and the British Royal Navy was receiving supply and repair assistance at American naval bases. Thus, by mid-1941, Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to the Allied side with a policy of "all aid short of war." Roosevelt met with Churchill in August 1941, to write the [[Atlantic Charter]] in what was to be the first of several wartime conferences. The War Department's "Victory Program," provided the President with the estimates necessary for the total mobilization of manpower, industry, and logistics to defeat Germany and Japan.<ref>Mark Skinner Watson, ''Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations,'' (1950), 331-366 at [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/csppp/ch11.htm online]</ref> The program also planned to dramatically increase aid to the Allied nations and to have ten million men in arms, half of whom would be ready for deployment abroad in 1943. Roosevelt was firmly committed to the Allied cause.

* [[Harry Truman]], President 1945-53

* [[Harry Truman]], President 1945-53

===Isolationism===

===Isolationism===

The Republican party had an isolationist wing led by Senator [[Robert A. Taft]]. During World War II, the internationalist wing of the GOP gained strength, as former isolationist Arthur Vandenberg switched sides. The leaders of the anti-isolationist or "internationalist" wing were [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] (president 1952-60), and [[Richard Nixon]] (president 1968-74).  Conservative leader [[Barry Goldwater]] in 1964 rejected isolationism and called for an aggressive [[Rollback]] strategy to defeat Communism, a policy followed by [[Ronald Reagan]] (president 1980-88).   

The Republican party had an isolationist wing led by Senator [[Robert A. Taft]]. During World War II, the internationalist wing of the GOP gained strength, as former isolationist Arthur Vandenberg switched sides. The leaders of the anti-isolationist or "internationalist" wing were [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] (president 1952–60), and [[Richard Nixon]] (president 1968–74).  Conservative leader [[Barry Goldwater]] in 1964 rejected isolationism and called for an aggressive [[Rollback]] strategy to defeat Communism, a policy followed by [[Ronald Reagan]] (president 1980–88).   

Meanwhile, isolationist sentiment grew in the Democratic party, largely in reaction to the failure of the [[Vietnam War]]. the chief spokesman was Senator [[George McGovern]], whose 1972 presidential campaign had the isolationist slogan, "Come Home America".

Meanwhile, isolationist sentiment grew in the Democratic party, largely in reaction to the failure of the [[Vietnam War]]. the chief spokesman was Senator [[George McGovern]], whose 1972 presidential campaign had the isolationist slogan, "Come Home America".

====Containment====

====Containment====

In 1947 Truman, a Democrat, convinced the Republican-controlled Congress to support the [[Truman Doctrine]] by sending massive aid to the small country of Greece, threatened by a Communist takeover.  The rest of Europe was still in economic ruin, which Washington feared would help the spread of Communism, so the [[Marshall Plan]] was proposed to help restore the European economies.  When Stalin engineered a Communist takeover of democratic Czechoslovakia in early 1948, and forbade his satellites to accept Marshall plan moneys, Americans realized that Winston Churchill's warnings about an “iron curtain” had come true.  The strategy of isolationism had failed in 1941. The strategy of friendship (or détente) with Communism had failed in 1948.  Some argued for a strategy of direct confrontation or “Roll-Back”—but that was considered too dangerous, especially when the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon in 1950.  Washington decided on a strategy of containment, as embodied in the NATO military alliance set up in 1949.  The plan was to prevent further Communist expansion, hoping that the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system would soon lead to its collapse.  The problem with containment was that it meant fighting wars against Communist expansion, especially in Korea in 1950-53, and in Vietnam 1963-73.  Containment had the basic flaw that the enemy could choose the time and place of movement, while America and its allies had to defend everywhere at all times.  In 1949 [[Mao ZeDong]] and his Communists won the civil war in China showing the failure of containment in Asia.

In 1947 Truman, a Democrat, convinced the Republican-controlled Congress to support the [[Truman Doctrine]] by sending massive aid to the small country of Greece, threatened by a Communist takeover.  The rest of Europe was still in economic ruin, which Washington feared would help the spread of Communism, so the [[Marshall Plan]] was proposed to help restore the European economies.  When Stalin engineered a Communist takeover of democratic Czechoslovakia in early 1948, and forbade his satellites to accept Marshall plan moneys, Americans realized that Winston Churchill's warnings about an “iron curtain” had come true.  The strategy of isolationism had failed in 1941. The strategy of friendship (or détente) with Communism had failed in 1948.  Some argued for a strategy of direct confrontation or “Roll-Back”—but that was considered too dangerous, especially when the Soviets tested their first nuclear weapon in 1950.  Washington decided on a strategy of containment, as embodied in the NATO military alliance set up in 1949.  The plan was to prevent further Communist expansion, hoping that the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system would soon lead to its collapse.  The problem with containment was that it meant fighting wars against Communist expansion, especially in Korea in 1950–53, and in Vietnam 1963–73.  Containment had the basic flaw that the enemy could choose the time and place of movement, while America and its allies had to defend everywhere at all times.  In 1949 [[Mao ZeDong]] and his Communists won the civil war in China showing the failure of containment in Asia.

===Korean War: 1950-1953===

===Korean War: 1950-1953===

===Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson: 1953-1968===

===Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson: 1953-1968===

President [[John F. Kennedy]] called for youth, dynamism, vigor and an intellectual approach to aggressive new policies in foreign affairs.  The downside was his inexperience in foreign affairs, standing in stark contrast to the vast experience of the president he replaced, Republican [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]. Kennedy's rashness and inexperience caused a national humiliation in 1961 as he sent CIA-trained Cuban exiles into an ill-prepared attack on Castro's Cuba. At the [[Bay of Pigs]], all Kennedy's invaders were killed or captured, and he was forced to ransom them for cash.  Kennedy's supporters blamed the fiasco on Eisenhower.  Russian boss [[Nikita Khrushchev]], seeing for himself Kennedy's inexperience at a summit conference, threw up the [[Berlin Wall]] as the Soviets escalated the [[Cold War]] regarding the status of Berlin, predicting correctly that Kennedy's response would be weak.  Khrushchev went too far in 1962 when he sent nuclear missiles into Cuba aimed at the U.S.  For the first time since Washington and New Orleans were attacked in 1914-1815, the U.S. was vulnerable to a major attack by an enemy power. Kennedy and Khrushchev reached a compromise whereby the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba publicly (giving Kennedy a public relations triumph), while Kennedy secretly removed American missiles from Turkey aimed at the Soviets, and also promised that America would never invade Cuba—a promise still in effect in 2009.  Vietnam proved a trap for Kennedy as he sent in 16,000 military advisors to prop up an ineffective regime in South Vietnam. Historians are uncertain whether or how Kennedy would have avoided the failures of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, for Kennedy himself had no definite plans of what to do.

President [[John F. Kennedy]] called for youth, dynamism, vigor and an intellectual approach to aggressive new policies in foreign affairs.  The downside was his inexperience in foreign affairs, standing in stark contrast to the vast experience of the president he replaced, Republican [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]. Kennedy's rashness and inexperience caused a national humiliation in 1961 as he sent CIA-trained Cuban exiles into an ill-prepared attack on Castro's Cuba. At the [[Bay of Pigs]], all Kennedy's invaders were killed or captured, and he was forced to ransom them for cash.  Kennedy's supporters blamed the fiasco on Eisenhower.  Russian boss [[Nikita Khrushchev]], seeing for himself Kennedy's inexperience at a summit conference, threw up the [[Berlin Wall]] as the Soviets escalated the [[Cold War]] regarding the status of Berlin, predicting correctly that Kennedy's response would be weak.  Khrushchev went too far in 1962 when he sent nuclear missiles into Cuba aimed at the U.S.  For the first time since Washington and New Orleans were attacked in 1914–1815, the U.S. was vulnerable to a major attack by an enemy power. Kennedy and Khrushchev reached a compromise whereby the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba publicly (giving Kennedy a public relations triumph), while Kennedy secretly removed American missiles from Turkey aimed at the Soviets, and also promised that America would never invade Cuba—a promise still in effect in 2009.  Vietnam proved a trap for Kennedy as he sent in 16,000 military advisors to prop up an ineffective regime in South Vietnam. Historians are uncertain whether or how Kennedy would have avoided the failures of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, for Kennedy himself had no definite plans of what to do.

==1969 to 1989==

==1969 to 1989==

One challenge to détente came with the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Faced with a threat of Soviet intervention, Nixon put U.S. military forces be placed on worldwide alert. He then employed shuttle diplomacy to secure cease-fires between Israel and the Arab states and to restore U.S. Egyptian diplomatic ties, broken since 1967.  

One challenge to détente came with the outbreak of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Faced with a threat of Soviet intervention, Nixon put U.S. military forces be placed on worldwide alert. He then employed shuttle diplomacy to secure cease-fires between Israel and the Arab states and to restore U.S. Egyptian diplomatic ties, broken since 1967.  

==== Latin America====

==== Latin America====

The Nixon administration sought to protect the economic and commercial interests of the United States during a period of heightened Latin American nationalism and expropriations, 1969-74. Though the administration initially adopted a flexible policy toward Latin American governments that nationalized American corporations' assets, the influence of Nixon's economic ideology, domestic political pressures, and the advice of his close adviser, Secretary of the Treasury [[John Connally]], led to a more confrontational stance toward Latin American countries. As the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and Henry Kissinger had warned, however, Latin American countries took an even more anti-US stance and expropriated even more assets. Nixon's "get tough" stance, therefore, had a negative effect on US credibility and influence in the hemisphere.<ref>Hal Brands, "Richard Nixon and Economic Nationalism in Latin America: the Problem of Expropriations, 1969-1974." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2007 18(1): 215-235. Issn: 0959-2296 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> Kissinger and Nixon permitted covert [[CIA]] operations designed to destabilize the anti-American Allende regime in [[Chile]]  

The Nixon administration sought to protect the economic and commercial interests of the United States during a period of heightened Latin American nationalism and expropriations, 1969–74. Though the administration initially adopted a flexible policy toward Latin American governments that nationalized American corporations' assets, the influence of Nixon's economic ideology, domestic political pressures, and the advice of his close adviser, Secretary of the Treasury [[John Connally]], led to a more confrontational stance toward Latin American countries. As the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and Henry Kissinger had warned, however, Latin American countries took an even more anti-US stance and expropriated even more assets. Nixon's "get tough" stance, therefore, had a negative effect on US credibility and influence in the hemisphere.<ref>Hal Brands, "Richard Nixon and Economic Nationalism in Latin America: the Problem of Expropriations, 1969-1974." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 2007 18(1): 215-235. Issn: 0959-2296 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> Kissinger and Nixon permitted covert [[CIA]] operations designed to destabilize the anti-American Allende regime in [[Chile]]  

====South Asia====

====South Asia====

During the South Asian crisis in 1971, the White House, stood firmly behind Pakistani president Yahya Khan and demonstrated a disdain for India and particularly its leader, [[Indira Gandhi]] because of India's tilt toward the Soviet Union. Many analysts believed that Pakistan's role as a conduit of rapprochement with China and Kissinger's focus on geopolitical concerns greatly influenced the American policy decision in 1971. These claims have now been confirmed by recently declassified documents. The US undertook at least three initiatives to dissipate the Bangladesh movement but which backfired and contributed to the bloodshed instead of bringing it to an end. Nixon and Kissinger were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide, because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities. Instead of a Cold War they wanted peace, trade and cultural exchanges. They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive; neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.  

During the South Asian crisis in 1971, the White House, stood firmly behind Pakistani president Yahya Khan and demonstrated a disdain for India and particularly its leader, [[Indira Gandhi]] because of India's tilt toward the Soviet Union. Many analysts believed that Pakistan's role as a conduit of rapprochement with China and Kissinger's focus on geopolitical concerns greatly influenced the American policy decision in 1971. These claims have now been confirmed by recently declassified documents. The US undertook at least three initiatives to dissipate the Bangladesh movement but which backfired and contributed to the bloodshed instead of bringing it to an end. Nixon and Kissinger were "realists" who deemphasized idealistic goals like anti-communism or promotion of democracy worldwide, because those goals were too expensive in terms of America's economic capabilities. Instead of a Cold War they wanted peace, trade and cultural exchanges. They realized that Americans were no longer willing to tax themselves for idealistic foreign policy goals, especially for containment policies that never seemed to produce positive results. Instead Nixon and Kissinger sought to downsize America's global commitments in proportion to its reduced economic, moral and political power. They rejected "idealism" as impractical and too expensive; neither man showed much sensitivity to the plight of people living under Communism. Kissinger's realism fell out of fashion as idealism returned to American foreign policy with Carter's moralism emphasizing human rights, and Reagan's rollback strategy aimed at destroying Communism.  

Relations with Britain had been strained since the Suez crisis of 1956. Now both countries were led by like-minded leaders who collaborated closely, Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] and Reagan. Their collaboration was based on a striking convergence of ideologically driven conservatives who shared similar domestic agendas and a common foreign policy. Both led domestic political revolutions—supply-side economics, increased defense spending, privatization, deregulation, and an overall conservative agenda. Reagan was the "Great Communicator", Thatcher the "Iron Lady". The two became personal friends. Reagan and Thatcher's mutual trust strengthened Reagan's hand against the Soviet Union.  

Relations with Britain had been strained since the Suez crisis of 1956. Now both countries were led by like-minded leaders who collaborated closely, Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] and Reagan. Their collaboration was based on a striking convergence of ideologically driven conservatives who shared similar domestic agendas and a common foreign policy. Both led domestic political revolutions—supply-side economics, increased defense spending, privatization, deregulation, and an overall conservative agenda. Reagan was the "Great Communicator", Thatcher the "Iron Lady". The two became personal friends. Reagan and Thatcher's mutual trust strengthened Reagan's hand against the Soviet Union.  

Thatcher wanted to cooperate with Gorbachev and convinced Reagan that it was possible. That assessment shifted Western political rhetoric from East-West confrontation to conciliation and support for internal democratic reform in the Soviet Union. Reagan adopted Thatcher's view, and when Gorbachev started to dismantle the Soviet Empire Reagan largely abandoning his own harsh depiction of the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil in the modern world." The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, lessened U.S. military need for a trusty friend in Europe. Thus, American relations with Britain turned more to trade and economic issues.

Thatcher wanted to cooperate with Gorbachev and convinced Reagan that it was possible. That assessment shifted Western political rhetoric from east–west confrontation to conciliation and support for internal democratic reform in the Soviet Union. Reagan adopted Thatcher's view, and when Gorbachev started to dismantle the Soviet Empire Reagan largely abandoning his own harsh depiction of the Soviet Union as the "focus of evil in the modern world." The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, lessened U.S. military need for a trusty friend in Europe. Thus, American relations with Britain turned more to trade and economic issues.

==1989 to present==

==1989 to present==