| Line 184: |
Line 184: |
| | Russia's efforts to transform its Soviet-legacy military into a smaller, lighter and more mobile force continue to be hampered by an ossified military leadership, discipline problems and human rights violations, limited funding and demographics. Recent steps by the Government of Russia suggest a desire to reform. There has been an increased emphasis on practical training, and the government is introducing bills to improve the organization of the military. | | Russia's efforts to transform its Soviet-legacy military into a smaller, lighter and more mobile force continue to be hampered by an ossified military leadership, discipline problems and human rights violations, limited funding and demographics. Recent steps by the Government of Russia suggest a desire to reform. There has been an increased emphasis on practical training, and the government is introducing bills to improve the organization of the military. |
| | [[Image:Cannon Russia.jpg|left|300px]] | | [[Image:Cannon Russia.jpg|left|300px]] |
| − | Despite large increases in the budget, defense spending is still unable to sustain Russia's large military. Current troop strength, estimated at 1.1 million, is large in comparison to Russia's GDP and military budget, which continues to make the process of transformation to a professional army difficult. This is both the result of the Soviet legacy and military thinking, and Russian geography, which demands a sizable force simply to patrol and maintain normal defensive readiness across Russia's huge, remote and sparsely populated territory. Furthermore, unrest in Russia's souther regions demands a substantial military force at a high level of readiness. | + | Despite large increases in the budget, defense spending is still unable to sustain Russia's large military. Current troop strength, estimated at 1.1 million, is large in comparison to Russia's GDP and military budget, which continues to make the process of transformation to a professional army difficult. This is both the result of the Soviet legacy and military thinking, and Russian geography, which demands a sizable force simply to patrol and maintain normal defensive readiness across Russia's huge, remote and sparsely populated territory. Furthermore, unrest in Russia's southern regions demands a substantial military force at a high level of readiness. |
| | + | |
| | + | In the 21st century, Russia has modernized its strategic doctrine with the addition of special operations forces with amphibious landing capabilities. |
| | | | |
| | Russian military salaries are low. Though, the army provides all necessities, the quality of accommodation is low, though the situation has improved considerably since the Yeltsin era when the military establishment almost totally collapsed, and some soldiers actually starved when provisions to remote bases went undelivered for months on end. Problems with both discipline and brutal hazing remain common, however. HIV infection rates in the Russian army are estimated to be between two and five times higher than in the general population, and tuberculosis is a persistent problem both in and outside the military, affecting the fitness of recruits. | | Russian military salaries are low. Though, the army provides all necessities, the quality of accommodation is low, though the situation has improved considerably since the Yeltsin era when the military establishment almost totally collapsed, and some soldiers actually starved when provisions to remote bases went undelivered for months on end. Problems with both discipline and brutal hazing remain common, however. HIV infection rates in the Russian army are estimated to be between two and five times higher than in the general population, and tuberculosis is a persistent problem both in and outside the military, affecting the fitness of recruits. |