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| | He was nicknamed '''The Little Corporal''' due to his small height of 5ft 6" (167cm) | | He was nicknamed '''The Little Corporal''' due to his small height of 5ft 6" (167cm) |
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| − | ==Early History== | + | ==Early history== |
| | He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa. He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes, proud members of the lower aristocracy, were destitute. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French—he always had a thick Corsican accent—Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest, newest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France. | | He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa. He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes, proud members of the lower aristocracy, were destitute. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French—he always had a thick Corsican accent—Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest, newest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France. |
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| | ==Rise to Power== | | ==Rise to Power== |
| − | [[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]] | + | [[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|300px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]] |
| | Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref>Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref> | | Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref>Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref> |
| | ===Italy=== | | ===Italy=== |
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| | ===Coup d'état of the 18th Brumaire=== | | ===Coup d'état of the 18th Brumaire=== |
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| | Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred, he forced the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch. Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: there was no longer an elected representative government.<ref>Furet (1996) p 212</ref> | | Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred, he forced the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch. Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: there was no longer an elected representative government.<ref>Furet (1996) p 212</ref> |
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| | ===Slavery=== | | ===Slavery=== |
| | Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean—sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever. Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic.<ref>Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse</ref> Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref>Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref> | | Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean—sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever. Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic.<ref>Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse</ref> Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref>Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref> |
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| | ==Military action to 1812== | | ==Military action to 1812== |
| − | [[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]] | + | [[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|230px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]] |
| | Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref>Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref> | | Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref>Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref> |
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| | ===Austerlitz, 1805=== | | ===Austerlitz, 1805=== |
| − | The [[Battle of Austerlitz]] on 2 December 1805 is celebrated as Napoleon's greatest victory. The collapse of the Peace of Amiens led Britain to assemble the "Third Coalition" in April 1805, including Austria, Russia, and Sweden. After threatening to invade Britain, Napoleon sent 200,000 soldiers marching east. He used six army corps, each a self-contained, all-arms combat force. The [[corps]] was a Napoleonic invention, and each was strong enough to operate independently, allowing the army to advance along a broad front, which facilitated [[logistics]] (each army seized supplies in its region), and increased the speed of the advance. Napoleon commanded in person in Germany; relying on the support of most of the south German states, he advanced to meet the Austrians who had invaded [[Bavaria]]. On the upper Danube he concentrated his 200,000 men, reinforced by Bernadotte, and by allied from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau. After the Austrians had been defeated in several engagements, their main army was surrounded at Ulm and surrendered 30,000 men on October 17, 1805 without a fight. | + | The [[Battle of Austerlitz]] on December 2, 1805 is celebrated as Napoleon's greatest victory. The collapse of the Peace of Amiens led Britain to assemble the "Third Coalition" in April 1805, including Austria, Russia, and Sweden. After threatening to invade Britain, Napoleon sent 200,000 soldiers marching east. He used six army corps, each a self-contained, all-arms combat force. The [[corps]] was a Napoleonic invention, and each was strong enough to operate independently, allowing the army to advance along a broad front, which facilitated [[logistics]] (each army seized supplies in its region), and increased the speed of the advance. Napoleon commanded in person in Germany; relying on the support of most of the south German states, he advanced to meet the Austrians who had invaded [[Bavaria]]. On the upper Danube he concentrated his 200,000 men, reinforced by Bernadotte, and by allied from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau. After the Austrians had been defeated in several engagements, their main army was surrounded at Ulm and surrendered 30,000 men on October 17, 1805 without a fight. |
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| | At the same time, "the French had captured most of Europe and intended to seize England, the final piece of the puzzle." [http://modelshipmaster.com/products/tall_ships/hms_Surprise.htm] (For a dramatic treatment of a great English-French naval encounter, see "[[Master and Commander]]".) | | At the same time, "the French had captured most of Europe and intended to seize England, the final piece of the puzzle." [http://modelshipmaster.com/products/tall_ships/hms_Surprise.htm] (For a dramatic treatment of a great English-French naval encounter, see "[[Master and Commander]]".) |
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| | ===Russia to 1812=== | | ===Russia to 1812=== |
| | ===The Polish issue=== | | ===The Polish issue=== |
| − | [[File:Alejandro Walewski.jpg|thumb|left|His son Alexander Walewski.]] | + | [[File:Alejandro Walewski.jpg|thumb|His son Alexander Walewski.]] |
| | In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812.<ref>Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies. | | In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812.<ref>Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies. |
| | | | |
| | == Moscow == | | == Moscow == |
| − |
| |
| | ===Collapse, 1813-1814=== | | ===Collapse, 1813-1814=== |
| | The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20-year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref>Thompson ch 13-14</ref> | | The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20-year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref>Thompson ch 13-14</ref> |
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| | ==Impact on Europe== | | ==Impact on Europe== |
| − | [[File:Napoleon, statue invalides.jpg|thumb|left|Statue of Napoleon at l'Hotel des Invalides' Honor Courtyard, Paris.]] | + | [[File:Napoleon, statue invalides.jpg|thumb|left|230px|Statue of Napoleon at l'Hotel des Invalides' Honor Courtyard, Paris.]] |
| | Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property. | | Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property. |
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| | ==Personality== | | ==Personality== |
| − | [[File:Delaroche Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes 1848 WC PD.jpg|thumb|Paul Delaroche, Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes.]] | + | [[File:Delaroche Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes 1848 WC PD.jpg|thumb|230px|Paul Delaroche, Bonaparte franchissant les Alpes.]] |
| | All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence. Although not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation. After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general.<ref>See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975).</ref> | | All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence. Although not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation. After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general.<ref>See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975).</ref> |
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| | [[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by [[Jacques-Louis David|J. L. David]]]] | | [[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by [[Jacques-Louis David|J. L. David]]]] |
| | Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004)</ref> | | Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004)</ref> |
| − | [[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]] | + | [[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|230px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]] |
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| | The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref>Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref> | | The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref>Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref> |
| − | [[File:Statue de Napoleon I, place Vendome a Paris, par Auguste Dumont,.jpg|thumb|Statue of Napoleon I, at Place Vendome, Paris, by Auguste Dumont.]]
| + | |
| | Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004)</ref> | | Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004)</ref> |
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| | </blockquote> | | </blockquote> |
| | | | |
| − | <center> | + | ==Gallery== |
| − | | + | <gallery widths=180> |
| − | [[File:Steuben Mort de Napoleon.jpg|thumb|420px|center|Death of Napoleon I at Santa Elena, May 5, 1821 by Charles de Steuben]]
| + | Steuben Mort de Napoleon.jpg|Death of Napoleon I at Santa Elena, May 5, 1821 by Charles de Steuben |
| − | | + | Gros Napoleon at Arcola.jpg|[[Antoine Jean Gros]], Napoleon at Arcola (detail). |
| − | </center> | + | Gros Eylau.jpg|Napoleon on the Battlefield of Eylau (detail), 1808. |
| | + | Statue de Napoleon I, place Vendome a Paris, par Auguste Dumont,.jpg|Statue of Napoleon I, at Place Vendome, Paris, by Auguste Dumont. |
| | + | </gallery> |
| | | | |
| | ==See also== | | ==See also== |
| − | [[File:Gros Napoleon at Arcola.jpg|thumb|[[Antoine Jean Gros]], Napoleon at Arcola (detail).]]
| |
| − |
| |
| | * [[List of military strategies and concepts]] | | * [[List of military strategies and concepts]] |
| − |
| |
| − | [[File:Gros Eylau.jpg|thumb|left|Napoleon on the Battlefield of Eylau (detail), 1808.]]
| |
| − | {{Clear}}
| |
| | | | |
| | ==Basic further reading== | | ==Basic further reading== |
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| | * ''Cambridge Modern History'' (1907) vol 9: Napoleon [https://books.google.com/books?id=gMgFAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=Cambridge+Modern+History+napoleon+waterloo online edition], older articles by scholars, 900pp | | * ''Cambridge Modern History'' (1907) vol 9: Napoleon [https://books.google.com/books?id=gMgFAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=Cambridge+Modern+History+napoleon+waterloo online edition], older articles by scholars, 900pp |
| | | | |
| − | ==Historiography and Memory== | + | ==Historiography and memory== |
| | * Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." ''European History Quarterly'' 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals | | * Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." ''European History Quarterly'' 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals |
| | * Datta, Venita. "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 | | * Datta, Venita. "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 |
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| | * Wilson-Smith, Timothy. ''Napoleon and His Artists'' (1996) | | * Wilson-Smith, Timothy. ''Napoleon and His Artists'' (1996) |
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| − | ===Primary Sources=== | + | ===Primary sources=== |
| | * Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. ''The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook.'' (2002) 213pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108790059 online edition] | | * Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. ''The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook.'' (2002) 213pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108790059 online edition] |
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