Changes

==Background==

==Background==

Following the [[First Battle of the Marne]] in early September 1914, in which the Franco-British armies checked the German advance toward [[Paris]], neither side held a clear strategic advantage: the Germans' attempt to quickly win the war in the west with a knockout blow against [[France]] had failed and they were now on the defensive, but the Allies had suffered heavy casualties in the battle and were able to advance only slowly. The German armies retreated a short distance to the Aisne River in northeastern France, where they entrenched and repulsed Allied attacks in the First Battle of the Aisne (September 13-28).

Following the [[First Battle of the Marne]] in early September 1914, in which the Franco-British armies checked the German advance toward [[Paris]], neither side held a clear strategic advantage: the Germans' attempt to quickly win the war in the west with a knockout blow against [[France]] had failed and they were now on the defensive, but the Allies had suffered heavy casualties in the battle and were able to advance only slowly. The German armies retreated a short distance to the Aisne River in northeastern France, where they entrenched and repulsed Allied attacks in the First Battle of the Aisne (September 13–28).

By this point, it was clear to both sides that a frontal assault against fixed enemy positions could only succeed at great cost to themselves; therefore, they began attempting to turn each other's northern flank, in the open country of northern France and western Belgium between the Aisne and the [[North Sea]]. The [[Race to the Sea]], as this period of maneuvering was called (inaccurately: the goal was not to reach the sea before the enemy, but to take advantage of the undefended terrain in between), unfolded between late September and late October in a series of pitched battles, as the armies extended their lines farther and farther northward to protect their own flank and search for a weakness in that of the enemy. These efforts ultimately proved fruitless, however; by mid-October, the front lines extended almost all the way to the sea. The last stretch of open country was plugged by the Belgian army around October 17-19 as it retreated from [[Antwerp]], marking the effective end of the "race."<ref>John Keegan, ''The First World War'' (1998), p. 123-29.</ref>

By this point, it was clear to both sides that a frontal assault against fixed enemy positions could only succeed at great cost to themselves; therefore, they began attempting to turn each other's northern flank, in the open country of northern France and western Belgium between the Aisne and the [[North Sea]]. The [[Race to the Sea]], as this period of maneuvering was called (inaccurately: the goal was not to reach the sea before the enemy, but to take advantage of the undefended terrain in between), unfolded between late September and late October in a series of pitched battles, as the armies extended their lines farther and farther northward to protect their own flank and search for a weakness in that of the enemy. These efforts ultimately proved fruitless, however; by mid-October, the front lines extended almost all the way to the sea. The last stretch of open country was plugged by the Belgian army around October 17–19 as it retreated from [[Antwerp]], marking the effective end of the "race."<ref>John Keegan, ''The First World War'' (1998), p. 123-29.</ref>

==Prelude==

==Prelude==

Most of the fighting in Flanders by the Germans up to this point had been conducted by the Sixth Army, under Crown Prince Rupprecht of [[Bavaria]] (nearly all of its troops being Bavarian as well), along with significant [[cavalry]] formations. In mid-October, however, Falkenhayn reinforced it with the Fourth Army under Duke Albert of Württemberg, itself backed by several reserve corps arriving from Germany and from Antwerp. Its task (with the Sixth Army providing support farther south) was to cross the Yser River in extreme western Belgium, advance across the French border, and cut the Allies off from the ports of [[Dunkirk]] and [[Calais]].

Most of the fighting in Flanders by the Germans up to this point had been conducted by the Sixth Army, under Crown Prince Rupprecht of [[Bavaria]] (nearly all of its troops being Bavarian as well), along with significant [[cavalry]] formations. In mid-October, however, Falkenhayn reinforced it with the Fourth Army under Duke Albert of Württemberg, itself backed by several reserve corps arriving from Germany and from Antwerp. Its task (with the Sixth Army providing support farther south) was to cross the Yser River in extreme western Belgium, advance across the French border, and cut the Allies off from the ports of [[Dunkirk]] and [[Calais]].

The Allied armies had less unity of command, being divided between British, French, and Belgian units. At the beginning of October, Marshal Joseph Joffre, the French overall commander, and Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the BEF, had agreed that the BEF would be sent north into Flanders, to shore up the Allied flank there and to provide the British forces with more direct communication to the Channel ports and [[Great Britain]]. Its component units (the I, II, III, IV, and Indian Corps, plus cavalry and air-reconnaissance units) arrived between October 8 and 19, concentrating along a line that stretched from the town of Langemarck, south along some low ridges a few miles east of the city of Ypres, and on to the La Bassée canal. The BEF was joined by units of the French 8th Army under General Victor d'Urbal and, to the north, some 60-80,000 survivors of the Belgian Army under King Albert I. BEF commander French and General Ferdinand Foch, who had overall charge of French units in Flanders, agreed that the primary objective was to repulse any German attack in the vicinity of Ypres, but both hoped to follow this up with a counteroffensive that would liberate Lille and perhaps all of western Belgium.<ref>J. Edmonds, ''Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914'', Vol. II (London: 1928), p. 268.</ref>

The Allied armies had less unity of command, being divided between British, French, and Belgian units. At the beginning of October, Marshal Joseph Joffre, the French overall commander, and Field Marshal Sir John French, commander of the BEF, had agreed that the BEF would be sent north into Flanders, to shore up the Allied flank there and to provide the British forces with more direct communication to the Channel ports and [[Great Britain]]. Its component units (the I, II, III, IV, and Indian Corps, plus cavalry and air-reconnaissance units) arrived between October 8 and 19, concentrating along a line that stretched from the town of Langemarck, south along some low ridges a few miles east of the city of Ypres, and on to the La Bassée canal. The BEF was joined by units of the French 8th Army under General Victor d'Urbal and, to the north, some 60–80,000 survivors of the Belgian Army under King Albert I. BEF commander French and General Ferdinand Foch, who had overall charge of French units in Flanders, agreed that the primary objective was to repulse any German attack in the vicinity of Ypres, but both hoped to follow this up with a counteroffensive that would liberate Lille and perhaps all of western Belgium.<ref>J. Edmonds, ''Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914'', Vol. II (London: 1928), p. 268.</ref>

==Battle==

==Battle==

By October 19, troops from the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps of the German Fourth Army were advancing towards Ypres, pushing the British IV Corps back from its initial positions along the low ridges east of the city back towards Ypres itself. The BEF's ability to hold the city at all was seriously threatened until the 20th with the arrival of the I Corps under Lieutenant-General Douglas Haig. That same day, the Fourth and Sixth Armies began an offensive all along the Ypres front, which reached its climax between October 21 and 24, with the heaviest blows coming against the IV Corps at Langemarck.  

By October 19, troops from the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps of the German Fourth Army were advancing towards Ypres, pushing the British IV Corps back from its initial positions along the low ridges east of the city back towards Ypres itself. The BEF's ability to hold the city at all was seriously threatened until the 20th with the arrival of the I Corps under Lieutenant-General Douglas Haig. That same day, the Fourth and Sixth Armies began an offensive all along the Ypres front, which reached its climax between October 21 and 24, with the heaviest blows coming against the IV Corps at Langemarck.  

The BEF was heavily outnumbered, having on hand only seven divisions (three of them cavalry fighting dismounted) against fourteen German infantry divisions, and lacked sufficient artillery; however, the British were far better at delivering fast and accurately-aimed rifle fire, while the German attacks were poorly coordinated and delivered in large part by newly-trained troops advancing over open terrain in large, dense masses. Spearheaded by the 7th Division, the British defenders at Langemarck were able to repulse attack after attack, inflicting very heavy casualties in the process--the advancing waves of German infantry suffered casualty rates of upward of 70 percent. The greatest danger to the Allied line came on the northern flank, where French cavalry were pushed back to the Yser River by the XXIII Reserve Corps, which thus threatened to envelop the BEF's left; however, the line held until it was reinforced by the French IX Corps on the 23rd. The following day, these fresh troops, joined by the British 2nd Division, launched a counterattack from the Yser that relieved some of the pressure on Langemarck and Ypres, and this brought the most intense phase of the battle to an end, though active combat continued another two days.

The BEF was heavily outnumbered, having on hand only seven divisions (three of them cavalry fighting dismounted) against fourteen German infantry divisions, and lacked sufficient artillery; however, the British were far better at delivering fast and accurately-aimed rifle fire, while the German attacks were poorly coordinated and delivered in large part by newly trained troops advancing over open terrain in large, dense masses. Spearheaded by the 7th Division, the British defenders at Langemarck were able to repulse attack after attack, inflicting very heavy casualties in the process—the advancing waves of German infantry suffered casualty rates of upward of 70 percent. The greatest danger to the Allied line came on the northern flank, where French cavalry were pushed back to the Yser River by the XXIII Reserve Corps, which thus threatened to envelop the BEF's left; however, the line held until it was reinforced by the French IX Corps on the 23rd. The following day, these fresh troops, joined by the British 2nd Division, launched a counterattack from the Yser that relieved some of the pressure on Langemarck and Ypres, and this brought the most intense phase of the battle to an end, though active combat continued another two days.

===Battle of Gheluvelt===

===Battle of Gheluvelt===

==Aftermath==

==Aftermath==

By mid-November, attempts by either the Allies or the Germans to score a major breakthrough at Ypres had failed, and the various high commands had recognized that an open flank on the Western Front no longer existed. This had been emphatically demonstrated not only by the situation map in Flanders, and the increasingly elaborate fortifications thrown up on each side, but by the appalling casualties that resulted from attacking those fortifications. British losses from mid-October to late November have been reckoned at 55-60,000 men, French losses at 50-85,000, Belgian losses at 20,000+, and German losses at 135,000. These numbers come from the entire Western Front, but it is certain that the majority were incurred at or near Ypres. In the most severe fighting at Langemarck in October, individual units of the German reserve corps attacking the BEF defensive positions suffered casualty rates of up to 70 percent. Many of these reservists were student volunteers ages 18-20, and the large number of deaths among them led Germans to dub Ypres a ''Kindermord''--"Massacre of the Children" or "Massacre of the Innocents."<ref>Edmonds, ''Military Operations'', p. 466-68.</ref>

By mid-November, attempts by either the Allies or the Germans to score a major breakthrough at Ypres had failed, and the various high commands had recognized that an open flank on the Western Front no longer existed. This had been emphatically demonstrated not only by the situation map in Flanders, and the increasingly elaborate fortifications thrown up on each side, but by the appalling casualties that resulted from attacking those fortifications. British losses from mid-October to late November have been reckoned at 55–60,000 men, French losses at 50–85,000, Belgian losses at 20,000+, and German losses at 135,000. These numbers come from the entire Western Front, but it is certain that the majority were incurred at or near Ypres. In the most severe fighting at Langemarck in October, individual units of the German reserve corps attacking the BEF defensive positions suffered casualty rates of up to 70 percent. Many of these reservists were student volunteers ages 18–20, and the large number of deaths among them led Germans to dub Ypres a ''Kindermord''--"Massacre of the Children" or "Massacre of the Innocents."<ref>Edmonds, ''Military Operations'', p. 466-68.</ref>

The high number of German casualties, and the failure to break through the Allied defensive line, has been widely credited as a testament to the courage and tenacity of the British soldier. Although often outnumbered two to one, and suffering very heavy losses themselves, the BEF units nonetheless successfully held out. This has been attributed to their ability to improvise functioning battle groups from decimated formations, the cohesion and strong historical identity of the British Army units, the quiet determination and devotion to duty of the individual soldier, and especially to their superior marksmanship in infantry rifle fire. So notorious did the BEF become for its rapid and well-aimed fire that a later legend grew that the Germans had mistaken the sounds of its rifles for machine guns.

The high number of German casualties, and the failure to break through the Allied defensive line, has been widely credited as a testament to the courage and tenacity of the British soldier. Although often outnumbered two to one, and suffering very heavy losses themselves, the BEF units nonetheless successfully held out. This has been attributed to their ability to improvise functioning battle groups from decimated formations, the cohesion and strong historical identity of the British Army units, the quiet determination and devotion to duty of the individual soldier, and especially to their superior marksmanship in infantry rifle fire. So notorious did the BEF become for its rapid and well-aimed fire that a later legend grew that the Germans had mistaken the sounds of its rifles for machine guns.