Changes

===Overseas diaspora and dissident groups===

===Overseas diaspora and dissident groups===

The UFWD teaching manual directs operatives to win overseas Chinese over to the CCP’s side by emphasizing “flesh and blood” ties to China with the goal of securing political, moral, and financial support for the CCP.  To achieve these ends, UFWD officials often meet with local chapters of “Hometown Associations” (groups that connect Chinese emigrants from the same locale), sometimes along with senior staff from Chinese consulates.  

The UFWD teaching manual directs operatives to win overseas Chinese over to the CCP’s side by emphasizing “flesh and blood” ties to China with the goal of securing political, moral, and financial support for the CCP.<ref>https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4</ref> To achieve these ends, UFWD officials often meet with local chapters of “Hometown Associations” (groups that connect Chinese emigrants from the same locale), sometimes along with senior staff from Chinese consulates. In March 2018, the UFWD absorbed a number of State Council offices, including its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, further consolidating its responsibility for activities that seek to sway the overseas Chinese communities.

In March 2018, the UFWD absorbed a number of State Council offices, including its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, further consolidating its responsibility for activities that seek to sway the overseas Chinese communities.

Chinese intelligence services have specifically targeted ethnic minorities such as [[Uyghur]]s living overseas, threatening to send their families still in [[Xinjiang]] to internment camps, or keep them there, if the former do not  agree to spy for China.  According to Uyghurs who have been threatened in this way, this coercion is intended “not only to gather details about Uyghurs’ activities abroad, but also to sow discord within exile communities in [[the West]] and intimidate people in hopes of preventing them from speaking out against the Chinese state.”

Chinese intelligence services have specifically targeted ethnic minorities such as [[Uyghur]]s living overseas, threatening to send their families still in [[Xinjiang]] to internment camps, or keep them there, if the former do not  agree to spy for China.  According to Uyghurs who have been threatened in this way, this coercion is intended “not only to gather details about Uyghurs’ activities abroad, but also to sow discord within exile communities in [[the West]] and intimidate people in hopes of preventing them from speaking out against the Chinese state.”