| | Shiite Iran (and its Hezbollah), and the Sunni ISIS, both believe that any moment now their "messiah", will appear. Iran and ISIS are both eager to hasten the coming of their Mahdi. | | Shiite Iran (and its Hezbollah), and the Sunni ISIS, both believe that any moment now their "messiah", will appear. Iran and ISIS are both eager to hasten the coming of their Mahdi. |
| | <ref>[https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/09/radical-islam-iran-isis-apocalytpic-messiah-mahdi/amp/ Radical Islam? Apocalyptic Islam Poses the Greater Threat], ''NRO'', Sep 11, 2015</ref> | | <ref>[https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/09/radical-islam-iran-isis-apocalytpic-messiah-mahdi/amp/ Radical Islam? Apocalyptic Islam Poses the Greater Threat], ''NRO'', Sep 11, 2015</ref> |
| | <ref>[https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/10/irans-proxies-are-more-powerful-than-ever.html Iran's Proxies Are More Powerful Than Ever], ''RAND'', Oct. 16, 2019.</ref><ref>[https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East], ''CSIS'' Briefs, March 11, 2019</ref><ref>[https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/amp/ Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran's most successful export], ''Brookings Institution,'' Jan 17, 2019</ref> such as: [[Hezbollah]], [[Houthis]], "Palestinian" [[Islamic Jihad]], it is strongly [[Hamas]] linked. Its bases of operations in [[South America]] works through Hezbollah network, via local Arab-Muslims in the community in: [[Venezuela]], [[Maicao]]/ [[Colombia]]n/Venzuelan border;<ref>[https://www.securefreesociety.org/designating-hezbollah-as-a-terrorist-group-is-a-legal-tool/ Designating Hezbollah As A Terrorist Group Is A Legal Tool], Joseph M. Humire. SFS, Jan 21, 2020</ref> Tri-Border area<ref>[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fighting-terror-the-tri-border-area Fighting Terror in the Tri-Border Area], ''Wilson Center,'' Dec 9, 2019</ref><ref>[https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-and-hezbollahs-presence-around-world Iran and Hezbollah's Presence Around the World], ''Lawfare'', Jan 8, 2020</ref> in [[Argentina]]/[[Brazil]]/[[Paraguay]]). In recent years it has even expanded its TV channel in Spanish. | | <ref>[https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/10/irans-proxies-are-more-powerful-than-ever.html Iran's Proxies Are More Powerful Than Ever], ''RAND'', Oct. 16, 2019.</ref><ref>[https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East], ''CSIS'' Briefs, March 11, 2019</ref><ref>[https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/amp/ Hezbollah: Revolutionary Iran's most successful export], ''Brookings Institution,'' Jan 17, 2019</ref> such as: [[Hezbollah]], [[Houthis]], "Palestinian" [[Islamic Jihad]], it is strongly [[Hamas]] linked. Its bases of operations in [[South America]] works through Hezbollah network, via local Arab-Muslims in the community in: [[Venezuela]], [[Maicao]]/ [[Colombia]]n/Venzuelan border;<ref>[https://www.securefreesociety.org/designating-hezbollah-as-a-terrorist-group-is-a-legal-tool/ Designating Hezbollah As A Terrorist Group Is A Legal Tool], Joseph M. Humire. SFS, Jan 21, 2020</ref> Tri-Border area<ref>[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fighting-terror-the-tri-border-area Fighting Terror in the Tri-Border Area], ''Wilson Center,'' Dec 9, 2019</ref><ref>[https://www.lawfareblog.com/iran-and-hezbollahs-presence-around-world Iran and Hezbollah's Presence Around the World], ''Lawfare'', Jan 8, 2020</ref> in [[Argentina]]/[[Brazil]]/[[Paraguay]]). In recent years it has even expanded its TV channel in Spanish. |
| | + | The Iranian government supports and funds [[Islamic terrorist]] organizations in various countries, doing so since the Islamic revolution in 1979.<ref>Nazarian, Adelle (October 13, 2017). [https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/10/13/brief-timeline-iran-sponsored-terrorism-since-1979/ A Brief Timeline of Iran-Sponsored Terrorism Since 1979]. ''Breitbart News''. Retrieved October 13, 2017.</ref> The U.S. Department of State labels Iran as a leading state sponsor of terror.<ref>Lee, Matthew (July 19, 2017). [https://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/iran-still-top-state-sponsor-terrorism-u-s-report-says/ Iran still top state sponsor of terrorism, U.S. report says]. ''PBS'' (from the ''Associated Press''). Retrieved October 13, 2017.</ref> |
| | + | According to a U.S. court record for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, [[Osama Bin Laden]] was living in Khartoum, Sudan when Sudanese religious scholar Ahmed Abdel Rahman Hamadabi brought Shekih Nomani an emissary of Iran to meet the [[Al-Qaeda]] leadership. Sheikh Nomani was described as having "had access to the highest echelons of power in Tehran.<ref>Rohan Gunaratna, "[https://books.google.com/books?id=WDkqQSWFvvIC&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q&f=false Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror]," (Columbia University Press, 2002), p.146</ref> This meeting resulted in an informal agreement between Iran and Al-Qaeda to cooperate, with Iran providing critical explosives, intelligence and security training to Bin Laden's organization.<ref name="washingtoninstitute.org">https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-iran-al-qaeda-conundrum</ref> Iran continued to provide support to Al-Qaeda even after they relocated to Afghanistan in 1996. Iranian officials helped Al-Qaeda members transit through Iran to Afghanistan. Iranian border guards were instructed not to stamp their passports, to prevent their home governments from suspecting that they had traveled to Afghanistan.<ref name="washingtoninstitute.org"/> A section of the 9/11 commission states that shortly after the meetings between Iran and Al-Qaeda in Sudan in 1991,"senior Al-Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Laden reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations."<ref>[https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf#page=257 The 9/11 Commission Report] Page 257 (PDF)</ref> |