Changes

*a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;

*a ban on construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers;

*a ban on heavy mobile [[ICBM launcher]]s, and on launchers of heavy submarine-launched [[ballistic missile]]s (SLBMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

*a ban on heavy mobile [[ICBM]] launchers, and on launchers of heavy submarine-launched [[ballistic missile]]s (SLBMs) and air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

*a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side;

*a ban on flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one new type of light ICBM for each side;

*a ban on increasing the numbers of [[warhead]]s on existing types of ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range [[cruise missiles]] per [[heavy bomber]] would have been limited to an average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been limited to 20;

*a ban on increasing the numbers of warheads on existing types of ICBMs, and a limit of 10 warheads on the one new type of ICBM permitted to each Party, a limit of 14 warheads on SLBMs, and 10 warheads on ASBMs. The number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber would have been limited to an average of 28; and the number of long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber of existing types would have been limited to 20;

*ceilings on the [[launch-weight]] and [[throw-weight]] of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs;

*ceilings on the launch-weight and throw-weight of strategic ballistic missiles and a ban on the conversion of light ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs;

*a ban on the Soviet [[SS-16]] ICBM;

*a ban on the Soviet SS-16 ICBM;

*a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems;

*a ban on rapid reload ICBM systems;

*a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the [[seabed]]s;

*a ban on certain new types of strategic offensive systems which were technologically feasible, but which had not yet been deployed. Such systems included long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships, and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabeds;

*advance notification of certain ICBM [[test launch]]es; and

*advance notification of certain ICBM test launches; and

*an agreed [[data base]] for systems included in various SALT-limited categories.

*an agreed [[database]] for systems included in various SALT-limited categories.

The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance [[verification]], a ban on circumvention of the provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the [[SCC]] in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty was to have been through 1985.

The Treaty also included detailed definitions of limited systems, provisions to enhance [[verification]], a ban on circumvention of the provisions of the agreement, and a provision outlining the duties of the SCC in connection with the SALT II Treaty. The duration of the Treaty was to have been through 1985.

Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical means (NTM) of verification, including [[photo-reconnaissance]] satellites. The sides had agreed not to interfere with each other's [[national technical means of verification]], and not to use deliberate concealment measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of electronic signals known as [[telemetry]] which are used during tests to transmit information about systems while they are being tested. Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry [[encryption]] whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Verification of the SALT II Treaty would have been by national technical means (NTM) of verification, including photo-reconnaissance satellites. The sides had agreed not to interfere with each other's national technical means of verification, and not to use deliberate concealment measures which would have impeded verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Because specific characteristics of some SALT-limited systems become apparent during the testing phase, monitoring of testing programs was an important aspect of SALT verification. Such monitoring might have involved collection of electronic signals known as [[telemetry]] which are used during tests to transmit information about systems while they are being tested. Therefore, the sides had agreed not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information such as through the use of telemetry [[encryption]] whenever such denial would have impeded verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the agreement specifically for verification purposes.

In addition to these provisions of the Treaty which directly addressed the question of verification, counting and distinguishability rules, as well as some constraints on specific systems, were incorporated into the agreement specifically for verification purposes.