Changes

The Iraqi Survey Group in interrogations of Ba'athist officials from the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, undertook interviews of Ba'athists in custody.  Some detainees’ statements were made to minimize their culpability leading to potential prosecution. Detainees were very concerned about their fate and were not willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the tendency to place blame or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fled the country, or providing debriefers with previously known information. Some former high ranking officials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination.

The Iraqi Survey Group in interrogations of Ba'athist officials from the leadership of the intelligence and security services, and Qusay’s inner circle, undertook interviews of Ba'athists in custody.  Some detainees’ statements were made to minimize their culpability leading to potential prosecution. Detainees were very concerned about their fate and were not willing to implicate themselves in sensitive matters of interest such as WMD, in light of looming prosecutions. Debriefers noted the tendency to place blame or knowledge with individuals who were not in a position to contradict the detainee’s statements, such as deceased individuals or individuals who were not in custody or who had fled the country, or providing debriefers with previously known information. Some former high ranking officials, such as ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid Al Tikriti (Chemical ‘Ali), never gave substantial information, despite speaking colorfully and at length. Some obstructed all attempts to elicit information on WMD and illicit activities of the former Regime. Others, however, were keen to help clarify every issue, sometimes to the point of self-incrimination.

<b>The ISG's key findings stated that Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a Chemiclal Weapons effort when sanctions were lifted</b>. Saddam and many Iraqis regarded Chemical Weapons  as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the [[Iran-Iraq war]]— and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.  After 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital, or the know-how that was developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.  Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program workers with know-how, Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base. <b>The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or Iraq</b>. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

<b>The ISG's key findings stated that Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a Chemical Weapons effort when sanctions were lifted</b>. Saddam and many Iraqis regarded Chemical Weapons  as a proven weapon against an enemy’s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already—during the [[Iran-Iraq war]]— and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.  After 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital, or the know-how that was developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary to counter any Iranian threat.  Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual core of the former weapons program workers with know-how, Baghdad transferred many nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these scientists at the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base. <b>The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program from leaving either their jobs or Iraq</b>. Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals. The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program. Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure.   

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals. The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers, production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program. Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure.