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→Muslim role
====Muslim role====
====Muslim role====
Sri Lankan Muslim ethnic identity has emerged from the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils. The highly urbanized Muslims of the southwest are engaged in trade and commerce, whereas Muslims in the northeast are more rural and involved in agricultural production. The southwest Muslim middle class strengthened its religious identity when the government sought resources from Middle Eastern countries to deal with the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. At the same time the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) was formed in the northeast to cope with the security and self-defense needs there. The southwest Muslims' support of the SLMC disappeared when the SLMC supported revolution. Southwest Muslims shifted their support to Muslim moderates in the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, while others have rejoined the United National Party.<ref>Meghan O'Sullivan, "Conflict as a Catalyst: the Changing Politics of the Sri Lankan Muslims." ''South Asia'' 1997 20(special Issue): 281-308. Issn: 0085-6401</ref>
Sri Lankan Muslim ethnic identity has emerged from the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils. The highly urbanized Muslims of the southwest are engaged in trade and commerce, whereas Muslims in the northeast are more rural and involved in agricultural production. The southwest Muslim middle class strengthened its religious identity when the government sought resources from Middle Eastern countries to deal with the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. At the same time the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) was formed in the northeast to cope with the security and self-defense needs there. The southwest Muslims' support of the SLMC disappeared when the SLMC supported revolution. Southwest Muslims shifted their support to Muslim moderates in the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, while others have rejoined the United National Party.<ref>Meghan O'Sullivan, "Conflict as a Catalyst: the Changing Politics of the Sri Lankan Muslims." ''South Asia'' 1997 20(special Issue): 281-308. Issn: 0085-6401</ref>
==Belt and Road Initiative==
:{{See also|Belt and Road Initiative}}
Sri Lanka is fast becoming the pivot of rising Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region, in that, China also has a substantial controlling stake in the Hambantota port, with Colombo agreeing to grant Chinese state-owned companies operating rights to as many as four berths in exchange for an easing of loan conditions. Besides, there are unconfirmed reports of construction of a Chinese-run aircraft maintenance facility near Hambantota in order to service the [[Peoples Liberation Army]] [[Air Force]] (PLAAF) assets based in Sri Lanka. In neighboring Pakistan, the docking of a Chinese submarine in [[Karachi]], following the handing over of the port's operational control to China Overseas Port Holdings is another step towards consolidating Chinese permanent naval presence in South Asia.
These developments, significantly, are in sync with [[China]]'s much pronounced Maritime Silk Route strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a proposed sea network of ports, coastal infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in the Fujian province and culminating in the northern [[Mediterranean Sea]]. By virtue of this fresh strategy, [[Beijing]] seeks to gain greater access to the strategic pathways of the [[Indian Ocean]], alleviated access to [[Persian Gulf]] oil — which consequently shall reduce its dependence on the passage through the [[Straits of Malacca]] — a key potential vulnerability for China in the event of a future conflict.<ref>http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases</ref>
The Strait of Malacca is a key reason why China has not been able to grow too powerful. Democratic and powers such as India, [[Australia]], and
other Southeast Asian nations are well-positioned to cut off Chinese supply lines in the event of a major military confrontation by creating a
blockade around the Strait of Malacca. China wants to ensure that its commercial and naval vessels find an alternate route that altogether avoids the Malacca choke point while traveling between the Indian and [[Pacific Ocean]]s. This is an overhang of the maritime portion of [[Xi Jinping]]'s Belt and Road initiative that seeks to connect Southeast Asia with the [[Middle East]] and [[Europe]].
==Bibliography==
==Bibliography==