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Line 28: − − ==Kra Canal== − China has been looking to construct a 120 kilometer mega canal cutting through the Isthmus of Kra, the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula in [[Thailand]]. This will open the [[South China Sea]] to the [[Indian Ocean]], bypassing the Strait of Malacca. What China is eyeing is a canal project in Thailand called the Kra Canal and the Thai leadership seems to be on board. Through this canal China is trying to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Currently 80 percent of China's oil imports passed through the South China Sea. − − The Strait of Malacca is a key reason why China has not been able to grow too powerful. Democratic and powers such as India, Australia, and − other Southeast Asian nations are well-positioned to cut off Chinese supply lines in the event of a major military confrontation by creating a − blockade around the Strait of Malacca. China wants to ensure that its commercial and naval vessels find an alternate route that altogether avoids the Malacca choke point while travelling between the Indian and [[Pacific Ocean]]s. This is an overhang of the maritime portion of Xi Jinping's Belt and Road initiative that seeks to connect Southeast Asia with the [[Middle East]] and [[Europe]].
→Kra Canal
These developments, significantly, are in sync with [[China]]'s much pronounced Maritime Silk Route strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a proposed sea network of ports, coastal infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in the Fujian province and culminating in the northern [[Mediterranean Sea]]. By virtue of this fresh strategy, [[Beijing]] seeks to gain greater access to the strategic pathways of the [[Indian Ocean]], alleviated access to [[Persian Gulf]] oil — which consequently shall reduce its dependence on the passage through the [[Straits of Malacca]] — a key potential vulnerability for China in the event of a future conflict.<ref>http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases</ref>
These developments, significantly, are in sync with [[China]]'s much pronounced Maritime Silk Route strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a proposed sea network of ports, coastal infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in the Fujian province and culminating in the northern [[Mediterranean Sea]]. By virtue of this fresh strategy, [[Beijing]] seeks to gain greater access to the strategic pathways of the [[Indian Ocean]], alleviated access to [[Persian Gulf]] oil — which consequently shall reduce its dependence on the passage through the [[Straits of Malacca]] — a key potential vulnerability for China in the event of a future conflict.<ref>http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases</ref>
==Republic of Maldives==
==Republic of Maldives==