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| | Following the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs. | | Following the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs. |
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| − | The Chinese military is in the process of transforming itself from a land-based power, centered on a vast ground force, to a mobile, high-tech military capable of mounting operations beyond its coastal borders.
| + | In just one generation, China has transformed itself from a largely agrarian country into a manufacturing and trading powerhouse — with a matching boom in military and technology power. In 2010 the budget of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was roughly $35 billion. By 2020 it was around $250 billion. China’s military boasts capable long-range ballistic missiles, 5th-generation fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, and the largest surface combatants in the world. Its forces are increasingly active in not just the [[Pacific]] but also carrying out operations far beyond. Its arms and equipment are the products of China’s defense industry. Once reliant on imports for high-end capabilities, China is now in the top tier of research, design, and production in fields that range from established areas like rocketry, shipbuilding, and aviation, to some of the most cutting-edge areas like robotics, AI, quantum, and hypersonic flight. This shift has also upended the global arms trade. China’s arms trade shows now preview not just what will equip the PLA next, but what will also show up next in the battlefields of the developing world.<ref>https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/introducing-china-intelligence/174256/</ref> |
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| − | China's power-projection capability is limited but has grown. China has acquired some advanced weapons systems from abroad, including Sovremmeny destroyers, SU-27 and SU-30 aircraft, and Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, and continued to develop domestic production capabilities, such as ship-building and the domestically-developed J-10 fighter aircraft. | |
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| | It should be remembered that the Military is still under the Party's control. It is not to be equated with the European and American Armed forces. | | It should be remembered that the Military is still under the Party's control. It is not to be equated with the European and American Armed forces. |
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| | ====Unrestricted warfare doctrine==== | | ====Unrestricted warfare doctrine==== |
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| − | Since the publication in 1999 of ''Unrestricted Warfare: Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization'', by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, it has been understood that hard-line elements within the Chinese National Security community have been envisioning and positioning themselves for war with the USA. As the title suggests, this book subverts the strategic thinking and rules of "old-style warfare”, proposes “new types of warfare” and explores military tactics, strategy and organization in the age of globalization. The “unrestricted” part of “unrestricted warfare” avoids direct military confrontation and seeks instead to conquer through non-kinetic means. | + | Since the publication in 1999 of ''Unrestricted Warfare: Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization'', by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangs |
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| | + | ui, it has been understood that hard-line elements within the Chinese National Security community have been envisioning and positioning themselves for war with the USA. As the title suggests, this book subverts the strategic thinking and rules of "old-style warfare”, proposes “new types of warfare” and explores military tactics, strategy and organization in the age of globalization. The “unrestricted” part of “unrestricted warfare” avoids direct military confrontation and seeks instead to conquer through non-kinetic means. |
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| | The authors argued that the notion that “national defense being the country’s main security goal is somewhat outdated, at least rather inadequate." Under such circumstances, a country, especially a weak one, must go beyond the limits of "traditional war" in order to win when it is faced with an opponent stronger than itself. | | The authors argued that the notion that “national defense being the country’s main security goal is somewhat outdated, at least rather inadequate." Under such circumstances, a country, especially a weak one, must go beyond the limits of "traditional war" in order to win when it is faced with an opponent stronger than itself. |