Changes

[[Operation Enduring Freedom]] easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly.  But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring [[Pakistan]] in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by [[opium]] production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamid Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and [[Islam]]ic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on civilians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces.  [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists—the only [[Arab]]s in Afghanistan—had been welcomed by the Taliban in 1999 and built their bases there. They have been largely destroyed or fled to Pakistan, according to the U.S. Army, having fewer than 100 people left in Afghanistan.

[[Operation Enduring Freedom]] easily defeated the Taliban in late 2001 and it seemed the war was over quickly.  But the Taliban regrouped, especially in the southern provinces, with sanctuaries inside neighboring [[Pakistan]] in remote areas where the government of Pakistan had little authority. By 2003 the insurgency in the south was in operation, funded by [[opium]] production. Important factors for the return of insurgency include the initial mistakes made in 2001; radical Islamic support from Pakistan; weaknesses of the [[Hamid Karzai]] government, especially its feeble and corrupt national army and police; the question of legitimacy and offenses to traditional tribal and [[Islam]]ic values and beliefs; and, finally, the extent to which NATO forces became part of the problem by angering the tribes. The insurgency controlled numerous areas and engaged in terror attacks on civilians and guerrilla warfare against American and NATO forces.  [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists—the only [[Arab]]s in Afghanistan—had been welcomed by the Taliban in 1999 and built their bases there. They have been largely destroyed or fled to Pakistan, according to the U.S. Army, having fewer than 100 people left in Afghanistan.

In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. He said official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the '''International Security Assistance Force''', or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal reported.  

 

In Aug. 2009, General [[Stanley A. McChrystal]], the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan said the Afghan government was riddled with corruption and NATO was being undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He called the Taliban insurgency "a muscular and sophisticated enemy" that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. He said official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the '''International Security Assistance Force''', or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal reported.  

McChrystal told Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."  By November no decision had been made on the urgent request.<ref>Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html ''Washington Post,'' Sept 21, 2009]</ref>  

McChrystal told Washington that he urgently needs more forces within the next year; without them, he warned, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure."  By November no decision had been made on the urgent request.<ref>Bob Woodward, "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'' [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html ''Washington Post,'' Sept 21, 2009]</ref>