| | According to President [[Jimmy Carter]]'s [[National Security Advisor]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], the United States began aiding the mujahidin with weapons on July 3, 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768089</ref> | | According to President [[Jimmy Carter]]'s [[National Security Advisor]] [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], the United States began aiding the mujahidin with weapons on July 3, 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768089</ref> |
| − | By October 1979, relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilize and consolidate his government. Faced with a deteriorating security situation, on December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces, joining thousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul under the pretext of a field exercise. On December 26, these invasion forces killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction, bringing him back from Czechoslovakia and making him Prime Minister. Massive Soviet ground forces invaded from the north on December 27. The Soviet Union cited U.S. interference as the reason for intervention.<ref>[https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115531 ALEXANDER LYAKHOVSKIY'S ACCOUNT OF THE DECISION OF THE CC CPSU DECISION TO SEND TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN], DECEMBER, 1979. Wilson Center Digital Archives. </ref> | + | By October 1979, relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilize and consolidate his government. Faced with a deteriorating security situation, on December 24, 1979, large numbers of Soviet airborne forces, joining thousands of Soviet troops already on the ground, began to land in Kabul under the pretext of a field exercise. On December 26, these invasion forces killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction, bringing him back from Czechoslovakia and making him Prime Minister. Massive Soviet ground forces invaded from the north on December 27. The Soviet Union cited U.S. interference as the reason for intervention.<ref>[https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115531 ALEXANDER LYAKHOVSKIY'S ACCOUNT OF THE DECISION OF THE CC CPSU DECISION TO SEND TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN], DECEMBER, 1979. Wilson Center Digital Archive. </ref> |
| | Following the invasion, the Karmal regime, although backed by an expeditionary force that grew as large as 120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establish authority outside Kabul. As much as 80% of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluded effective government control. An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan mujahidin (''mu-jihad-en,'' from the root ''jihad,'' one who struggles in the service of [[Allah]]) made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. The mujahidin began receiving more assistance in the form of weapons and training from the U.S. and other outside powers after Brzezinski's visit. | | Following the invasion, the Karmal regime, although backed by an expeditionary force that grew as large as 120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establish authority outside Kabul. As much as 80% of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluded effective government control. An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan mujahidin (''mu-jihad-en,'' from the root ''jihad,'' one who struggles in the service of [[Allah]]) made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. The mujahidin began receiving more assistance in the form of weapons and training from the U.S. and other outside powers after Brzezinski's visit. |