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{{cquote|American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal.<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951">Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>}}

{{cquote|American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal.<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951">Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>}}

Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of baling wire.<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951"/>

Wedemeyer warned that the communist would invade the South as soon as:

{{cquote|they can be sure that the North Korean [[puppet government]] and its armed forces ... are strong enough ... to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said that before June 1950, when the attack occurred, no aid had been sent but a few hundred dollars worth of baling wire.<ref name="Foreign Relations 1951"/>}}

Conditions inviting the North Korean attack were created by the [[United Nations]] which issued a resolution for withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops. Troops began withdrawing September 15, 1948, leaving only about 7500 Americans lightly armed. This left in South Korea 16,000 Koreans and 7500 Americans, both groups lightly armed, against 150,000 fully armed North Korean Communists. General Roberts, head of the U. S. Military Mission said the South Koreans were not permitted to arm adequately.

The [[United Nations]] issued a resolution calling for withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops. Troops began withdrawing September 15, 1948. This left in South Korea 16,000 Koreans and 7500 Americans, both groups lightly armed, against 150,000 fully armed North Korean Communists. General Roberts, head of the U. S. Military Mission said the South Koreans were not permitted to arm adequately.

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] gave a speech to the National Press Club excluding South Korea from the defense perimeter.<ref>https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-3-13.pdf</ref> Omar Bradley blamed Truman and Acheson in his memoir ''A General's Life'', and historian Bill Shinn concurs.<ref>A General's Life by Omar N. Bradley, pg. 528</ref><ref>The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953: A War Correspondent's Notebook & Today's Danger in Korea by Bill Shinn, pg. 52</ref> During his address to the UN General Assembly, Truman said, “The men who laid down their lives for the United Nations in Korea will have a place in our memory, and in the memory of the world, forever. They died in order that the United Nations might live.” <ref>https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207324.htm</ref>

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] gave a speech to the National Press Club excluding South Korea from the defense perimeter.<ref>https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-3-13.pdf</ref> Omar Bradley blamed Truman and Acheson in his memoir ''A General's Life'', and historian Bill Shinn concurs.<ref>A General's Life by Omar N. Bradley, pg. 528</ref><ref>The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953: A War Correspondent's Notebook & Today's Danger in Korea by Bill Shinn, pg. 52</ref> During his address to the UN General Assembly, Truman said, “The men who laid down their lives for the United Nations in Korea will have a place in our memory, and in the memory of the world, forever. They died in order that the United Nations might live.” <ref>https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207324.htm</ref>