Changes

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] woke Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar so they could have tea together in the wee hours of October 3. Zhou was Mao's closest associate. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

In a much discussed episode, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] woke Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar so they could have tea together in the wee hours of October 3. Zhou was Mao's closest associate. Zhou told Panikkar that China would intervene if American forces crossed 38th parallel. The South Korean forces that had already crossed were acceptable to China, he added.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting led to the misunderstanding that Chinese intervention was triggered by U.S. forces crossing the 38th parallel. Yet it was Stalin's request of October 1 that allowed Mao to unveil his plans to the Politburo the following day. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. That is to say, Zhou knew that military intervention was a done deal before he met Panikkar. Stalin followed up with a bullying telegram on October 5 demand the China act as soon as possible. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>

The Zhou-Panikkar meeting led to the misunderstanding that Chinese intervention was triggered by U.S. forces crossing the 38th parallel. It was Stalin's request of October 1 that allowed Mao to unveil his plans to the Politburo the following day. His was the only vote that mattered in Beijing. That is to say, Zhou knew that military intervention was a done deal before he met Panikkar. Stalin sent a bullying telegram on October 5 to demand that China act as soon as possible. The UN General Assembly voted on October 7 and American forces crossed the parallel later that day.<ref name="Chang"/>

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers were careful not to violate that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. Yet the legal partition line was drawn in an arbitrary way.

Learning all the wrong lessons from Korea, Vietnam-era policymakers were careful not to violate that country's partition line. Thus Vietnam's communists had less motivation to seek a ceasefire than did those in Korea. In both countries, a defensible a northern border was required to allow a viable non-communist state to develop in the South. Yet the legal partition line was drawn in an arbitrary way.