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→Relations with the United States
===Relations with China===
===Relations with China===
Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] made it quite clear that the core of the Russia-China relationship revolves around establishing an economic and financial axis to counterpunch the [[Bretton Woods Conference|Bretton Woods arrangement]]. That implies doing everything to protect Moscow and [[Beijing]] from “threats of sanctions by other states”; progressive de-dollarization; and advances in [[cryptocurrency]].<ref>https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-usnato-versus-russia-china-hybrid-war-finish</ref>
Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] made it quite clear that the core of the Russia-China relationship revolves around establishing an economic and financial axis to counterpunch the [[Bretton Woods Conference|Bretton Woods arrangement]]. That implies doing everything to protect Moscow and [[Beijing]] from “threats of sanctions by other states”; progressive de-dollarization; and advances in [[cryptocurrency]].<ref>https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/escobar-usnato-versus-russia-china-hybrid-war-finish</ref>
===Relations with NATO===
===Post-Cold War===
To assent to the reunification of Germany, Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker (DOS)]] that a reunited Germany would be part of NATO but the military alliance would not move “one inch” to the east, that is, absorb any of the former [[Warsaw Pact]] nations into NATO.
On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”<ref>https://consortiumnews.com/2022/01/28/the-tangled-tale-of-nato-expansion-at-the-heart-of-ukraine-crisis/</ref> Gorbachev’s mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.<ref>For years it was believed there was no written record of the Baker-Gorbachev exchange at all, until the National Security Archive at George Washington University in December 2017 published a series of memos and cables about these assurances against NATO expansion eastward.</ref>
{{quotebox-float|“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by [[Western]] leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents …
The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of [[East German]] territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels. … The documents reinforce former CIA Director [[Robert Gates]]’s criticism of ‘pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.’ …
President [[George H.W. Bush]] had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (‘I have not jumped up and down on the [[Berlin Wall]]”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests.’”<ref>https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early</ref>}}
In May 1995 President [[Bill Clinton]] was invited to [[Moscow]] for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the victory over [[Hitler]]. In Moscow, Russian President [[Boris Yeltsin]] berated Clinton about NATO expansion, seeing “nothing but humiliation” for Russia: “For me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding towards those of Russia – that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.”<ref>https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2021-11-24/nato-expansion-budapest-blow-1994</ref>
Vladimir Putin assumed office as the president of Russia on the last day of 1999. In an interview with David Frost broadcast on the [[BBC]] on March 13, 2000, Putin expressed his desire to see Russia join NATO:<ref>https://www.gazeta.ru/2001/02/28/putin_i_bbc.shtml</ref>
{{quotebox-float|'''Frost: Tell me about your views on NATO, if you would. Do you see NATO as a potential partner, or rival, or an enemy?'''
Putin: Russia is a part of European culture. I simply cannot see my country isolated from Europe, from what we often describe as the civilized world. That is why it is hard for me to regard NATO as an enemy. I think that such a perception has nothing good in store for Russia and the rest of the world. ...
We strive for equal cooperation, partnership, we believe that it is possible to speak even about higher levels of integration with NATO. But only, I repeat, if Russia is an equal partner. As you know, we constantly express our negative attitude to NATO's expansion to the East. ...
'''Frost: Is it possible that Russia will ever join NATO?'''
Putin: Why not? I do not rule out such a possibility. I repeat, on condition that Russia's interests are going to be taken into account, if Russia becomes a full-fledged partner. I want to specially emphasize this. ...
When we say that we object to NATO's expansion to the East, we are not expressing any special ambitions of our own, ambitions in respect of some regions of the world. ... By the way, we have never declared any part of the world a zone of our national interests. Personally, I prefer to speak about strategic partnership. The zone of strategic interests of any particular region means first of all the interests of the people who live in that region. ...}}
===Relations with the United States===
===Relations with the United States===