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→Free Will
== Free Will ==
== Free Will ==
The twentieth century saw the rise of a "reformed" philosophy of religion, spearheaded primarily by Alvin Plantinga, a prominent professor at Notre Dame. Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work <i>God and Other Minds</i>, a "defense" of theism against the argument from evil that hinges on free will. Rather than attempt to produce a theodicy that positively accounts for the existence of evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>, in a broadly logical sense. The question of evil then becomes a byproduct of free will existence, not a moral quandry.
The twentieth century saw the rise of a "reformed" philosophy of religion, spearheaded primarily by Alvin Plantinga, a prominent professor at Notre Dame. Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work <i>God and Other Minds</i>, a defense of theism against the argument from evil that hinges on free will. Rather than attempt to produce a theodicy that positively accounts for the existence of evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>, in a broadly logical sense. The question of evil then becomes a byproduct of free will existence, not a moral quandry.
Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. This view counters theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil - as a logical inconsistency equivalent to a statement like 'God can make a color that is bluer than blue.' Some conditions by their nature can not occur and putting God in front of it does not change that.
Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. This view counters theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil - as a logical inconsistency equivalent to a statement like 'God can make a color that is bluer than blue.' Some conditions by their nature can not occur and putting God in front of it does not change that.